


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Coopératives et autogestion
les effets économiques de la participation

**The Green Movement
in Eastern Europe**

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42nd year

This publication, produced by the UAI, appears six times a year.

The purpose of the studies, surveys and information included in this periodical concerning the international and transnational networks of nongovernmental organizations is to promote understanding of the associative phenomenon in a human society which continues to grow and evolve regardless of the consequences.

The programme of the review, in accordance with the principles of the UAI, is intended to clarify general awareness concerning the associative phenomenon within the framework of international relations and, in particular, to inform associations about aspects of the problems which they tend to share or which are of common interest to them.

The columns of this review are open to association officers, research workers and specialists of associative questions. The articles do not of course necessarily reflect the point of view of the publisher.

42^{ème} année

Cette publication, éditée par l'UAI, se présente à ses lecteurs sous la forme d'une revue de période bimestrielle.

Son objet associatif d'études, d'enquêtes, d'informations, au service des réseaux internationaux et transnationaux d'organisations non gouvernementales, s'attache aux idées et aux faits d'un phénomène de société humaine en expansion continue et en évolution hâtée.

Son programme, conforme aux principes et aux méthodes de l'UAI, vise, en général, à éclairer les connaissances du grand public sur la vie associative dans la perspective des relations internationales et, en particulier, à informer les associations des divers aspects de leurs problèmes propres et d'intérêt commun.

Les colonnes de la revue sont ouvertes à la fois aux responsables d'associations, chercheurs, spécialistes des matières associatives, dont les articles n'expriment pas nécessairement le point de vue de l'éditeur.

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Status and Relevance of Nongovernmental Organizations in View of Mounting International Interdependence

by Jürgen Höfner*

The classic thesis that the state represents its citizens as protagonist in international affairs is more and more eroding in view of mounting global interdependence. Because of mounting economic and political interdependence, classic areas of state activity in foreign policy are penetrated more and more by social, economic, technological and ecological forces. The result is an erosion of (exclusive) national sovereignty as prime factor of foreign-policy.

This development of emphasis shifting slowly but steadily from the state to non-governmental forces is inseparably tied to rising global interdependence. The billiards ball model is developing into a spider web model, so to speak.

- What are the reasons for this shift of emphasis?
 - Growing international interconnection through media and means of communication. A worldwide flow of information is facilitated more and more. There is a trend toward an *international information society*.
 - The realization that particularism cannot offer an adequate concept for solving global problems. Problems such as environmental pollution, famine, disarmament, international criminal activity and economic woes require a comprehensive concept of analysis and action. Particularism in foreign policy is more and more superseded by a concept of *international domestic policy*. A major aspect which is guiding activities is the realization that an armed conflict between the East and the West would most probably end in world destruction.
 - Frequently, states cannot satisfy the demands of their citizens, whose official representatives they are, after all. This is why non-governmental groups are formed at national level, which seek to achieve their objectives in transnational coalitions of interests. The traditional « state » is replaced by a non-governmental protagonist. The thesis can be established that the growing number and influence of NGOs and INGOs (international non-governmental organizations) can be interpreted as an indicator of the citizens' disaffection with state activity in domestic and foreign policies.

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These (incomplete) factors favor the growing number of non-governmental protagonists at international level. Their rising number also means an increase in their spheres of influence. In this inter-social process of interaction, relatively autonomous social protagonists communicate in various societies which are communicating with each other. These *trans-societal* relations imply a trend toward an erosion of (national) state sovereignty.

The structures of INGOs are normally made up of local groupings combined at national level. The national amalgamations are united at international level. This means that the vertical structure extends from miniscule national groupings to international amalgamations. This is a constellation ideal for enabling a swift top-down and bottom-up flow of information.

The NGOs and INGOs emerge from civil-law organizations at national level. On the international stage, NGOs, in terms of significance and influence, are by no means « private » organizations any longer, which exist and operate below the level of « big » politics.

Unlike the majority of international governmental organizations (IGO), INGOs do not have the status of a subject of international law. Irrespective of this absence of international-law recognition, the political relevance of NGOs and INGOs needs no further proof. Their commitment alone in formerly classic sectors, which today are most significant fields of action, such as disarmament, ecology, human rights, development aid, etc., demonstrates the relevance of international NGO work in solving global problems. Their constantly rising number (some 180 (by 1909), some 1000 (in 1954), some 3000 (in 1986) INGOs active throughout the political sector of some 20,000 INGOs worldwide) documents that NGOs are today not only an integral part of international politics, but moreover enjoy growing autonomy with respect to governmental decision-makers under the conditions of international interdependence. Among the reasons offered for this is the indispensable role of NGOs as expert groups, which grants them more and more political latitude.

The growing importance of international NGO work is increasingly changing the system of international politics.

Status and Relevance of Nongovernmental Organizations in View of Mounting International Interdependence.

- Organizational, conceptual and executive flexibility of NGO work, combined with more freedom from political « constraints », makes it easier for NGOs to recognize global changes and the relating problems and take appropriate Steps more quickly.
- The integrative impact of the objectives of NGO work is more strongly felt by their members than in the governments. Throughout their specific history, the direction of their goals has mostly been more consistent in itself. Hence, the stability of the objectives of their activities offers their members more « reliability » than governmental policies, which are subject to major fluctuations with the change of governments.
- Particularist and selective perceptions have been abandoned by NGOs in favor of global approaches earlier than by governments in foreign-policy activities. This is why NGOs have more experience in developing concepts and actions.
- As a result of their specific actions, NGOs have acquired, by continuous work, expert knowledge about certain problem areas. Bolstered by lengthy experience, this expertise can be superior to governmental competence.
- Because of mutual information connections (global communication networks), NGOs can use formal and informal information at horizontal and vertical level more flexibly and effectively than official diplomacy. Even if few government contacts exist between countries, national NGO groupings can communicate at transnational level. What functional changes will be produced by the rising significance of NGOs in the international political system ?
- Formation of a « counter élite » or « parallel élite » vis-à-vis the official diplomacy which, by means of its expertise, either competes with or supports the official diplomacy (« counterexpertocracy »).
- Establishment of a transnational social public and its integration into intergovernmental opinion-forming and decision-making processes. It will be more and more difficult to make decisions stick against the objection of a mobilized « world public opinion ». NGOs function as the main non-governmental sounding board of international conferences and international governmental organizations.
- Occupation and activation of subject areas which are not taken up and operationalized by intergovernmental politics or only hesitatingly and inadequately.
- Collective organizing and support of weak and small countries by articulation of their interests at an organizational level.
- Mediating and/or umpire function in intergovernmental conflicts of interests.
- « Lobbyism » with the function of a « pressure group ». NGOs act as catalysts of national-border-crossing group interests. They try to promote these interests by exerting official and unofficial influence on the protagonists of intergovernmental politics and international organizations (UN). In addition, the « pioneering role » of countries is exploited by NGOs for realizing their interests. This relationship is a major determinant of current international politics. Because governments as legitimate « external representatives » of their citizens represent these in international political affairs, the possible tensions between the state as the representative of its citizens and the claim of the NGOs to represent « public » opinion must be pointed out.
- The influence of the NGOs as socio-political opinion multipliers and accelerations is increasing also because they are more frequently taking up, combining and discussing « alternative » concepts with respect to conventional ideas, the former being articulated by the « New Social Movements » (citizens' initiatives, ecological, women's and peace movements). These minorities —from the point of view of government participation - represent ideas and sentiments shared by ever growing portions of the people not only in Western industrialized countries. The uneasiness which is articulated there and the mounting experience of citizens that traditional political activities by states have come up against the limits of their effectiveness and problem-solving capabilities give non-governmental and quasi transnationally « involved » protagonists major access to political participation and force the traditional political system to make the necessary adjustments and corrections.

Coopératives de production et entreprises autogérées

Une synthèse du débat sur les effets économiques, de la participation

par Jacques Defourny*

Le foisonnement d'initiatives néo-coopératives

Depuis le milieu des années 70, la plupart des pays d'Europe occidentale et d'Amérique du Nord connaissent un développement remarquable d'entreprises dont la propriété et la gestion sont, intégralement ou dans une large mesure, aux mains de leurs travailleurs. Le plus souvent, il s'agit de coopératives et si, dans certains pays, beaucoup de ces initiatives se coulent dans d'autres moules juridiques (1), elles n'en demeurent pas moins, en pratique, apparentées à la tradition de Rochdale.

Il est certain que les conditions économiques défavorables jouent un rôle déterminant dans le renouveau coopératif comme elles ont été prépondérantes dans les 100 premières années de la coopération, principalement marquées par le secteur de la distribution. Au XIX^{ème} siècle et au début du XX^{ème} siècle en effet, ce furent l'exploitation de la classe ouvrière et la faiblesse de son pouvoir d'achat qui engendrèrent, comme instruments de lutte et de subsistance, de multiples coopératives de consommateurs. Aujourd'hui, la crise agit aussi sur le pouvoir d'achat de la population, mais elle provoque surtout la disparition de millions d'emplois. Aussi est-il assez logique que la coopération soit revigorée dans une de ses branches longtemps considérée comme secondaire, la coopération de travail : en montant de toutes pièces ou en sauvant de la faillite des entreprises, ou encore en rachetant des sociétés patronales sans successeur, les travailleurs visent avant tout à créer ou à préserver leur emploi.

Bien qu'il soit difficile de cerner précisément le phénomène, notamment en raison des contextes juridiques variés, on peut s'en faire une idée, surtout dans les pays où des organisations rassemblent les coopératives de travailleurs. Tout en comportant des données très approximatives pour

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certaines pays, le tableau 1 en annexe montre qu'en 1985, les fédérations membres du Comité européen des coopératives ouvrières de production (CECOP) regroupaient environ 11.700 entreprises occupant elles-mêmes plus de 352.000 travailleurs. Si l'on ajoute les coopératives qui n'appartiennent à aucune organisation fédérale et celles affiliées à des organisations non membres du CECOP, on arrive probablement à plus de 32.000 entreprises et à un nombre d'emplois dépassant les 800.000 unités pour la Communauté européenne. Certes le poids de la seule Italie dans ces agrégats est considérable, mais les évolutions les plus surprenantes concernent d'autres pays : le Royaume-Uni par exemple ne possédait en 1976 que 80 entreprises liées à l'Industrial Common Ownership Movement tandis qu'en 1985, il se créait en moyenne une entreprise de ce type chaque jour. En Espagne et plus particulièrement dans la région catalane, le nombre des « coopératives de travail associé » est passé de 250 à plus de 2.000 depuis 1979, sans compter 300 « sociétés anonymes de travailleurs » nées en général de la reprise d'affaires défallantes. On pourrait encore citer bien d'autres expériences, y compris aux Etats-Unis et au Québec. Quant à notre pays, il a vu lui aussi émerger de multiples initiatives alors que les mouvements coopératifs beiges ne comptaient pratiquement aucune coopérative de travailleurs.

Si la problématique de l'emploi est présente dans la quasi totalité des « nouvelles coopératives », il importe, pour les comprendre, d'envisager plus largement le contexte social et culturel dans lequel elles prennent naissance. Le renouveau coopératif paraît en effet correspondre à l'esprit du temps, à des aspirations profondes dont on trouve la trace dans des courants d'idées qui traversent notre société comme des lames de fond (2). En ce sens, c'est bien une alliance originale entre l'économique et le social qui est en jeu.

Tout en reconnaissant cette originalité créatrice on peut se demander si les initiatives néo-coopératives pourront survivre dans un environnement capitaliste qui risque de les éliminer comme des corps étrangers. Des entreprises de

travailleurs sont-elles capables de mobiliser des ressources financières et d'investir au même rythme que leur concurrentes ? Les travailleurs ne devront-ils pas pour cela s'auto-exploiter et s'octroyer des salaires très inférieurs aux moyennes sectorielles ? Dans quelle mesure le risque des affaires peut-il être assumé par le facteur travail, c'est-à-dire par des personnes qui ne peuvent diversifier leurs emplois comme l'actionnaire le fait pour ses capitaux ?

Identifier ces défis, c'est de manière synthétique se demander quelle peut être la performance économique des coopératives de travailleurs, comparée à celle des entreprises capitalistes. L'objet principal de cet article est de donner un aperçu général des réponses apportées à cette question par la littérature économique de l'autogestion. Car la coopérative de travailleurs, on le verra dans la section 2, peut s'analyser fondamentalement comme une entreprise autogérée et toute une partie de la littérature économique s'intéresse à ce type d'entreprise. La section 3 montrera qu'on peut en fait distinguer deux grandes branches dans l'analyse économique de l'autogestion, même si échappent à cette classification certains auteurs qui, d'une manière ou d'une autre, ont aussi donné leur avis sur la participation des travailleurs à la gestion (notamment des auteurs aussi réputés que J.S. Mill et A. Marshall).

Quant au débat proprement dit sur les conséquences économiques de l'autogestion, il constituera notre quatrième et principale section. Il présentera en plusieurs catégories les différents arguments, formalisés ou non, qui sont disséminés dans la littérature et sur lesquels les économistes se fondent pour prédire à l'entreprise autogérée une performance économique inférieure ou supérieure à celle de sa jumelle capitaliste.

Souignons néanmoins que cette synthèse laissera de côté les résultats des travaux empiriques sur la question parce que ceux-ci sont encore à l'heure actuelle très embryonnaires (3).

La coopérative de travailleurs comme entreprise autogérée

En vertu de leurs principes fondamentaux, en particulier celui de gestion démocratique, les coopératives de travailleurs peuvent être considérées comme une forme, généralement imparfaite, d'entreprise autogérée.

En réalité, il n'existe pas de définition générale de l'autogestion et la diversité des conceptions de l'entreprise autogérée chez les scientifiques est à peine moins grande que dans l'opinion publique (4). Comme le notent J.P. Bonin et L. Putterman (1985, p. 3) dans leur remarquable synthèse de la littérature économique anglo-saxonne sur la coopération et l'autogestion, la définition qui pourrait être la plus largement acceptée se limite à mettre l'accent sur l'attribution des droits de gestion (ou de contrôle) de l'entreprise (5). En ce sens, une entreprise autogérée est une organisation productive sur laquelle le pouvoir de décision ultime appartient de façon exclusive à ses travailleurs et est réparti de façon égalitaire entre tous ceux-ci quels que soient leurs qualifications ou leurs apports en capital.

La plupart des économistes de l'autogestion et en tout cas ceux de la tradition néo-classique ajoutent un second élément au noyau central de la définition : le revenu net, après déduction des frais d'exploitation, de l'amortissement du capital et des impôts éventuels, est partagé entre les travailleurs selon certaines règles (6).

Reconnaissons d'emblée que la majorité des coopéra-

tives de travailleurs dans les pays occidentaux, ne remplissent pas parfaitement la première condition. En effet, le statut d'associé y est lié à la propriété d'une part au moins de capital (7) et certains travailleurs ne sont pas associés parce que non détenteurs de parts sociales (8). De plus, il se peut qu'un nombre limité d'associés ne soient pas travailleurs. Ces coopératives restent néanmoins de proches parentes de l'entreprise autogérée, et ce, par la combinaison de trois caractéristiques importantes :

- 1) le plus souvent, la majorité des travailleurs sont associés;
- 2) l'accès au sociétariat est proposé à tous les travailleurs, éventuellement au terme d'une période probatoire (principe coopératif de la porte ouverte) ;
- 3) le pouvoir de décision est réparti entre les associés de façon égalitaire (principe coopératif « un homme - une voix »).

C'est pourquoi les analyses théoriques de l'entreprise autogérée nous fourniront les principaux éléments susceptibles de nous aider à appréhender la performance économique des coopératives de travailleurs.

Les deux branches de l'analyse économique de l'autogestion

La littérature économique de l'autogestion dont nous pouvons rendre compte, c'est-à-dire celle de langues française et anglaise, peut probablement être divisée en deux grandes branches : celle de la socio-économie et celle de la théorie économique de type néo-classique (9).

Peu tentés par les modélisations de l'entreprise autogérée qui leur paraissent trop réductrices, les tenants de la socio-économie privilégient une approche assez empirique et souvent descriptive visant à restituer l'interaction entre les dimensions sociale et économique de l'autogestion. Dans le monde anglo-saxon, la revue « *Economic and Industrial Democracy* » et une institution comme la « *Cooperative Research Unit* » au Royaume-Uni incarnent assez bien de telles options (10). Les économistes francophones sont également nombreux dans cette branche et on peut les considérer comme les héritiers de l'économie politique de la coopération dont les grands noms furent Charles Gide (1922) et son « école de Nîmes », B. Lavergne (1949), G. Lasserre (1957) et P. Lambert (1964) (11) : tout en travaillant sur la coopération en général, ils en étudient le plus souvent la « pointe avancée », celle qui expérimente l'autogestion (12). Mais en publiant quasi exclusivement en français (13), ils travaillent de façon très autonome et développent peu de contacts avec les chercheurs anglo-saxons.

L'autre branche de l'analyse économique de l'autogestion est celle qui, depuis près de 20 ans, construit une théorie de l'entreprise et de l'économie autogérée sur base du paradigme néo-classique. Bâtie sur les contributions initiales de B. Ward (1958), E.D. Domar (1966) et J. Vanek (1970), elle recourt à une méthode essentiellement deductive et mathématique, est souvent normative et commence seulement depuis peu à tester empiriquement certains de ses résultats. Divers économistes francophones participent à ces développements théoriques mais, à l'inverse de ce qu'on constate pour la première branche, ils publient pratiquement toujours en anglais et s'intègrent ainsi à la littérature anglo-saxonne (14).

Pour le présent travail, nous retiendrons que la première branche a engendré quelques études empiriques comparant la performance d'entreprises autogérées à celle des firmes

capitalistes et surtout une vaste argumentation informelle. Quant à la seconde branche, une foule de modèles théoriques en sont issus cherchant en général à prédire le comportement de l'entreprise autogérée par rapport à celui de sa jumelle capitaliste.

Le débat sur les

conséquences économiques de l'autogestion

Pour introduire le débat, rapelons qu'en termes comparés, la plupart des auteurs analysent l'entreprise autogérée comme une organisation caractérisée par deux ou trois formes de participation des travailleurs : la participation à la gestion, aux bénéfices et éventuellement à la propriété. Ces trois modes de participation se retrouvent d'ailleurs dans presque toutes les coopératives de travailleurs. A son tour, la participation est vue comme générant un gain ou une perte d'efficacité productive et ce, par le biais d'une action sur au moins un des facteurs suivants : la capacité productive des travailleurs, l'intensité de l'effort au travail et l'efficacité organisationnelle. Les deux premiers types d'influence peuvent être considérés comme des effets incorporés (*embodied*) au facteur travail tandis que le dernier correspond plutôt à un effet non incorporé (*disembodied*) au facteurs de production (15).

Effets sur la capacité productive des travailleurs

Un premier effet positif de la participation à la gestion peut provenir de la résolution plus aisée des conflits grâce à une ambiance plus démocratique : un contexte moins conflictuel réduit la rotation de la main-d'œuvre et la stabilité accrue des travailleurs exerce un effet positif sur le « capital humain » (les compétences des travailleurs) parce que l'expérience professionnelle accumulée est mieux conservée dans l'entreprise. On trouve cette argumentation chez A.O. Hirschman (1970) et chez R.B. Freeman (1976, p. 365) dans les analyses qui ne traitent pas spécifiquement de l'entreprise autogérée mais plus généralement de la participation des travailleurs. De son côté H.M. Levin (1984, p. 26-27) pense que la participation des travailleurs au capital dans les coopératives de production réduit également la rotation du personnel en raison de la faible liquidité des parts coopératives qui peuvent seulement être vendues à des membres de l'entreprise et non dans le grand public.

Pour certains auteurs comme J. Vanek (1970, p. 260-263) et H. Levin (1982, p. 46-47), la participation à la gestion, à la propriété et aux bénéfices engendre aussi une plus grande accumulation de capital humain parce que les travailleurs y sont davantage encouragés. Cette incitation est à la fois morale et matérielle. Dans le premier cas, elle provient surtout d'une plus forte identification à l'entreprise et à sa prospérité. Dans le second, elle tient par exemple au désir d'obtenir un surplus de revenus aussi élevé que possible par la participation aux bénéfices (16). Ce peut être encore la perspective d'une plus grande stabilité d'emploi et de rémunérations gonflées par l'ancienneté. Quant à l'accroissement du capital humain, il peut lui aussi prendre plusieurs formes : formation des travailleurs pour des tâches variées afin d'éviter plus facilement des goulets d'étranglement dans la production (par exemple en cas d'absence de certains), ou encore meilleur apprentissage des jeunes travailleurs parce que leurs collègues ont intérêt à les encadrer le mieux possible et à leur transmettre leur savoir-faire.

En se plaçant à un niveau macro-économique, R.A.

Coopératives de production et entreprises autogérées
McCain (1973, p. 386) note quant à lui que le « collective entrepreneurship » est un puissant moyen de conserver l'input entrepreneurial, une ressource rare que les autres systèmes gaspillent.

A l'inverse cependant, on peut prétendre comme S. et B. Webb (1920, p. 166) que la participation des travailleurs à la gestion réduit la capacité productive de l'input managerial parce qu'elle hypothèque deux attributs essentiels des dirigeants, à savoir leur autorité et leur pouvoir discrétionnaire (17).

Effets sur l'effort des travailleurs

Il y a d'abord ici un argument qui vient assez facilement à l'esprit et qui était déjà énoncé au XIX^{ème} siècle par J.S. Mill (1909, p. 789) et par W.S. Jevons (1887, p. 145) (18). Dans une organisation participative les travailleurs fournissent un effort plus intense et soignent davantage la qualité de leur production parce qu'ils ont une perception plus positive de leur travail, un sens accru des responsabilités et le désir d'augmenter leurs revenus déterminés par la performance de l'entreprise. En raccourci, la sagesse populaire dira qu'on ne travaille jamais aussi bien que pour soi-même.

Les auteurs divergent cependant quant au ressort essentiel de la motivation des travailleurs. J. Vanek (1970 et 1975) pense que c'est la participation à la gestion qui est cruciale et considère les stimulants matériels comme secondaires. B. Horvat (1982) souligne aussi la participation à la gestion mais estime que la participation à la propriété, inacceptable pour Vanek, est sans doute également nécessaire. R. Oakeshott (1978) va plus loin et considère que l'élément essentiel est la détention par chaque travailleur d'une part substantielle de capital. Enfin J. Cåble et F. Fitzroy (1980a) mettent en évidence la participation aux bénéfices mais aussi les rôles complémentaires des stimulants financiers et non financiers.

Une seconde théorie développe les effets que produit une forte implication personnelle du travailleur non plus sur sa propre productivité mais sur celle de ses collègues. Bien que J.S. Mill (1879, p. 518-519) et A. Marshall (1964, p. 254-255) aient déjà clairement suggéré cet argument (19), c'est sans doute J. Cåble et F. Fitzroy (1987a, p. 102-103) qui en offrent la formation la plus élaborante : l'antagonisme traditionnel entre patrons et ouvriers, les pressions et les sanctions formelles à l'intérieur du groupe des travailleurs (« peer pressure ») jouent dans le sens d'une « collusion négative », par exemple contre les membres les plus zélés afin d'éviter une hausse des normes de productivité. Par contre, si cet antagonisme est remplacé par la coopération de tous les membres pour la réalisation d'objectifs communs, la dynamique sociale se transforme en « collusion positive » pour l'amélioration de la productivité et les pressions de groupe correspondent alors à un système de surveillance mutuelle (« horizontal monitoring ») qui réduit l'absentéisme et punit la paresse et le gaspillage. Ce raisonnement est également repris par K. Bradley et A. Gelb (1981, p. 222-225), R.A. McCain (1982, p. 38-39) et H.M. Levin (1982, p. 46). Ce dernier note en plus que l'incitation à la paresse est implicite dans le contrat de travail traditionnel qui définit un salaire horaire sans lien avec la performance de l'entreprise.

Dans un sens tout à fait opposé, plusieurs auteurs soulignent les limites du partage des bénéfices comme source de motivation pour les travailleurs. En particulier A.A. Alchian et H. Demsetz (1972, p. 780) remarquent que, dans le cadre d'un travail d'équipe, la mesure des productivités indivi-

duelles c'est-à-dire l'attribution de fractions du produit global à l'effort d'individus spécifiques est très difficile et coûteuse. Dès lors, chaque membre de l'équipe est incité à tirer au flanc puisqu'il peut réduire son effort sans diminution proportionnelle de sa rémunération (20). De la même façon, la participation aux bénéfices ne fournit à chaque travailleur qu'une petite partie du profit additionnel lié à l'accroissement de son effort et cette récompense largement partagée représente une incitation inadéquate. Sous des formes un peu différentes, J.E. Meade (1972, p. 403), R. Carson (1977, p. 584), développent le même thème. Quant à R.A. McCain (1982, p. 39), il reconnaît que le travailleur d'une entreprise participative n'est pas encouragé à produire spontanément l'effort optimal mais affirme qu'il y est tout de même poussé à cause de la surveillance exercée par ses collègues (21).

A.A. Alchain et H. Demsetz (1972, p. 780-786) estiment au contraire que le contrôle mutuel dans une équipe n'est guère praticable et concluent qu'un surveillant d'équipe ou contremaître (« monitor ») est indispensable. Mais le système de surveillance ne sera lui-même efficace que s'il existe un « central monitor » qui est en même temps le « residual claimant » c'est-à-dire peut s'approprier tout le revenu net de l'entreprise. C'est là une des nombreuses applications de l'idée centrale de « l'école des droits de propriété » : une entreprise ne peut être efficace que si son propriétaire jouit d'un droit de propriété complet sur le capital de celle-ci et d'un droit de créance total sur son revenu net, condition qui n'est satisfaite qu'avec un capitalisme sans la moindre entrave mais qui ne l'est dans aucun système participatif (22).

Enfin, certains comme A. Marshall (1919, p. 294) et A. Steinherr (1977, p. 547) pensent que les dirigeants d'une entreprise cogérée ou autogérée auront d'autant moins tendance à fournir un effort maximum qu'ils ressentiront un manque d'autorité et de pouvoir discrétionnaire.

Effets sur l'efficacité organisationnelle

Tout d'abord une ambiance participative facilite la communication et celle-ci, à son tour, est déterminante pour le repérage d'inefficacités organisationnelles que les travailleurs n'auraient pas nécessairement intérêt à dévoiler dans un cadre non coopératif où ils reçoivent un salaire fixe.

En plus de cette meilleure exploitation du know-how organisationnel des travailleurs, J. Vanek (1970, p. 23-24), J. Câble et F. Fitzroy (1980a, p. 166) et H.M. Levin (1982, p. 47) soulignent l'intérêt et la volonté des travailleurs d'appliquer efficacement les décisions des instances dirigeantes de l'entreprise, leur meilleur accueil des progrès technologiques et leur plus grand désir de faire eux-mêmes des propositions novatrices dans leurs sphères de compétence.

La motivation des travailleurs et leur participation à la gestion confèrent aussi aux entreprises autogérées une grande souplesse et leur donnent une marge de manœuvre appréciable. Ainsi, par exemple, les horaires et les conditions de travail peuvent être plus facilement adaptés en fonction des événements et des besoins (23).

J.S. Mill (1879, p. 518-519) et divers autres auteurs, notamment J. Câble et F. Fitzroy (1980a, p. 102) et même A.A. Alchain et H. Demsetz (1972, p. 786) notent encore qu'un esprit de coopération accroît l'efficacité productive de l'entreprise en réduisant les coûts de surveillance et de supervision. Pour K. Bradley et A. Gelb (1981, p. 225), un certain contrôle vertical est toujours nécessaire même dans une

entreprise autogérée mais ce contrôle s'avère plus efficace, parce que les travailleurs lui offrent une moindre résistance. A l'opposé de cette vue optimiste de l'autogestion, on trouve de nombreux auteurs pour mettre en évidence des facteurs qui, soit ralentissent la prise de décisions efficaces, soit mènent à des décisions inefficaces. C'est le cas de A. Marshall (1919, p. 294) qui souligne par exemple la nécessité de fournir une information considérable à un groupe important de travailleurs-décideurs peu expérimentés en gestion. M.C. Jensen et W.H. Meckling (1979, p. 488) eux, posent le problème de la formation des préférences collectives quand les préférences individuelles des travailleurs ne sont pas identiques. Sur ce point, J.-P. Bonin et L. Putterman (1985, p. 55) notent que si les décisions se prennent à la majorité des voix, elles sont sujettes à de sérieux problèmes de rationalité et de cohérence que la littérature du « public choice » a récemment développés. Quant à H.A. Simon (1971), il soutient que le processus de décision dans de grandes organisations (par exemple des coopératives d'une certaine taille) doit être hiérarchique parce qu'il permet de gérer à moindre coût une information complexe tout en étant confronté à une rationalité limitée. O. Williamson (1975) défend la même thèse mais parce que, selon lui, l'alternative à un système hiérarchique est un réseau de communication à canaux multiples qui finit par être surchargé et implique des « transaction costs » trop élevés quand le nombre d'agents devient important (24).

Autres effets de l'autogestion

ou de la propriété collective

Sans qu'on puisse les classer dans les catégories mentionnées ci-dessus, quelques autres thèmes sont également au centre de débats sur la performance économique de l'entreprise autogérée.

Le thème qui a sans doute fait couler le plus d'encre est celui de la « perverse supply response » démontrée initialement par B. Ward (1958) pour une entreprise qui maximise son revenu net par travailleur : dans le court terme, une telle firme « llyrienne » réagit à une augmentation du prix de vente de son output en réduisant sa production (25). Nous n'allons pas pour notre part nous attarder sur ce résultat dont l'évaluation empirique est très difficile et n'a même pas encore été ébauchée.

Une autre catégorie d'arguments en défaveur de l'entreprise autogérée concerne le niveau de risque accepté par les travailleurs. J.E. Meade (1972, p. 426) est sans doute le premier à avoir abordé cette question en faisant une remarque devenue classique : « *While property owners can spread their risks by putting small bits of their property into a large number of concerns, a worker cannot put small bits of his effort into a large number of different jobs. This presumably is a main reason why we find risk-bearing capital hiring labor rather than risk-bearing labor hiring capital* ». Le problème a ensuite été développé par de nombreux auteurs, notamment par J. Drèze (1976) dans le cadre d'un modèle d'équilibre général. La conclusion de celui-ci est que dans un contexte d'incertitude, il n'est pas aisé de trouver des formules institutionnelles qui concilient l'autogestion et l'efficacité au sens de Pareto. En effet, pour lui comme d'ailleurs pour R. Carson (1977, p. 584), M.C. Jensen et W.H. Meckling (1979, p. 486) et J.E. Meade (1982, chap. IX), la possession des actifs d'une entreprise par ses travailleurs de même que la non transférabilité de leurs créances sur le revenu net de celle-ci, signifient, pour des individus qui ont de l'aversion

pour le risque, une diversification inefficace de leur « portefeuille ». Aussi l'entreprise autogérée va-t-elle prendre un risque plus faible que la firme dont les actionnaires ont un portefeuille efficacement diversifié, et il en résultera pour elle une productivité en moyenne inférieure (26). La solution serait d'accepter des prises de participation extérieures mais, comme un pouvoir de contrôle devrait être associé à celles-ci, c'est le principe même d'autogestion qui disparaîtrait.

Le tendance de l'entreprise autogérée à sous-investir est également un sujet traité par de nombreux modèles (27). Selon E.G. Furuboth et S. Pejovich (1970), la cause de ce sous-investissement est le caractère non récupérable des fonds investis quand ils sont collectifs et la réticence des travailleurs à financer des projets dont une partie des bénéfices leur échappera parce qu'ils auront quitté l'entreprise. Aussi parle-t-on souvent à ce propos du problème de l'horizon temporel des travailleurs.

J. Vanek (1971) quant à lui dégage plusieurs effets pervers qui apparaissent lorsque l'entreprise autogérée finance ses investissements avec ses propres réserves collectives. L'idée essentielle de Vanek est qu'un capital productif détenu en commun par les travailleurs et non rémunéré

Notes

- (1) Dans certains pays comme l'Italie, la France et l'Espagne, la loi prévoit un statut particulier pour les coopératives de travailleurs. Dans d'autres pays par contre, comme en Allemagne, aux Pays-Bas ou en Belgique, il n'existe, pour tous les types de coopératives, qu'un statut générique surtout conçu pour les coopératives de consommateurs et peu adapté aux entreprises de travailleurs qui peuvent alors préférer d'autres formes juridiques. Enfin, il est possible que des sociétés capitalistes se transforment en entreprises de travailleurs sans changer de statut mais en utilisant certaines dispositions légales qui favorisent de telles mutations.
- (2) Nous avons développé ce thème ailleurs en évoquant notamment la vague autogestionnaire de mai 68, les mouvements communautaires centrés sur la « convivialité », l'attrait croissant de l'écologie, les « nouveaux entrepreneurs » et le néolibéralisme ainsi que le socialisme post-industriel que certains voudraient beaucoup plus décentralisé (Defourmy, 1982).
- (3) Les recherches empiriques sur la performance économique comparée des entreprises autogérées ne remplissent pratiquement jamais les conditions nécessaires pour dégager des résultats solides. Pour une synthèse de ces travaux et une tentative de dépasser ces limites dans le cadre d'une vaste étude comparée portant sur 500 coopératives de production en France, voir J. Defourmy (1987).
- (4) Evoquant les résultats d'un sondage réalisé en France à la fin des années septante, P. Peslieau et G. Quaden (1978) notent que la conception de l'autogestion dans l'opinion publique varie de la participation du personnel au choix des horaires et des cadences, à la participation aux véritables décisions de gestion. En revanche et comme on le verra plus loin, divers auteurs conçoivent l'autogestion bien au-delà du cadre de l'entreprise, comme un véritable système économique, voire un projet de société.
- (5) Les termes anglais « labor-management » et « worker-management » sont à cet égard plus explicites que le mot français qui n'évoque pas le facteur travail.
- (6) Il se peut très bien que les travailleurs reçoivent des avances, par exemple mensuelles, sur leur part du revenu net. L'important à noter ici est que le revenu du travail de chacun dépend du travail de tous et n'est pas fixé à l'avance. On peut aussi remarquer qu'une telle définition de l'entreprise autogérée ne spécifie aucun mode particulier de propriété.
- (7) A l'inverse de l'autogestion, la coopération de travail ne rompt donc pas le lien entre propriété du capital et contrôle de l'entreprise.
- (8) Parmi les principales exceptions, on relève les coopératives de Mondragon (en Espagne) et celles affiliées à l'Industriel Common Ownership Movement au Royaume Uni. Dans les premières, tous les travailleurs doivent faire un apport substantiel

génère une rente que ceux-ci ont intérêt à être aussi peu nombreux que possible pour recevoir chacun une part importante de la rente du capital.

Remarques finales

Pour conclure, signalons encore qu'à l'instar d'A. Marshall, de nombreux auteurs voient dans l'autogestion, et plus généralement dans la participation des travailleurs, à la fois des avantages et des inconvénients pour la performance économique de l'entreprise. En particulier R.R. Nelson (1981, p. 1039) note, en donnant un aperçu général des recherches sur la productivité : « *my reading of the results of fifty years of research is that few such stable relations (between variables under management control and the effectiveness of workers' performance) have yet been found ... In some experiments, greater worker participation in making decisions increases productivity, and in others it decreases productivity, and in others it doesn't matter* ». Une telle conclusion souligne la nécessité d'examiner au cas par cas les différentes formes de participation des travailleurs, en sachant en plus qu'un même régime participatif ne conduit sans doute pas toujours aux mêmes résultats.

de capital (voir par exemple M.-A. Saive, 1982) tandis qu'ils ne doivent souscrire qu'une part symbolique d'une livre sterling dans les secondes (voir par exemple J. Thornleyo, 1981).

- (9) Cette distinction est évidemment imparfaite mais les économistes qui appartiennent simultanément aux deux branches constituent une très petite minorité.
- (10) Parmi de très nombreux auteurs, on peut par exemple citer H. Thomas, W. Woodworth, J.G. Espinosa, H.M. Levin, etc...
- (11) On ne cite ici que quelques œuvres majeures.
- (12) Il s'agit surtout de chercheurs français et québécois (les coopératives de travailleurs sont plus nombreuses dans ces deux pays qu'en Belgique et en Suisse) : citons par exemple C. Vienney, D. Demoustier, J.C. Guérard, M.C. Malo, B. Tremblay, J.L. Martel, etc... Notons aussi que certains auteurs comme S. Koulytschisky, J. Gouverneur ou M. Konopnicki dans le tiers monde.
- (13) Les principaux journaux sont : la *Revue des études coopératives*, la *Revue de l'économie sociale*, *Autogestions*, *Coopératives et développement* et, dans une moindre mesure, les *Archives de sciences sociales de la coopération et du développement* ainsi que les *Annales de l'économie publique, sociale et coopérative*.
- (14) On peut approcher l'exhaustivité en citant J. Drèze, A. Steinherr, J.F. Thisse, P. Michel, P. Pestieau, A.-M. de Kerckhove, R. Guesnerie, J.-J. Laffont, G. Hawawini, H. Lepage, F. Milliquant, M. Moreaux, V. Perotin, D. Serra, M. Menconi, N. Daures et A. Dumas. A noter que ces quatre derniers auteurs (l'Ecole de Montpellier) ont tenté - mais sans être suivis - d'introduire la théorie néo-classique dans la littérature française de l'autogestion.
- (15) P.A. Samuelson (1977, p. 15) cité par Jones et Svejnar (1985, p. 461) affirme lui-même clairement que « *the economist's tool of a «production function» cannot be defined independently of workers' morale, attitudes, and wage rates* ». Voir aussi R.R. Nelson (1981, p. 1037-1040) qui passe en revue les principaux auteurs qui ont dépassé la vision néo-classique de la firme et ont appréhendé celle-ci comme une organisation ou comme un système social.
- (16) Samuelson (1977, p. 15) écrit aussi : « *Workers may produce more effectively and may promote the profitability of the firm if they have a sense of financial incentive and reward when the corporation flourishes* ».
- (17) Voir plusieurs citations des Webb dans D.C. Jones (1976).
- (18) Cités par D.C. Jones (1976, p. 66). Un texte de Mill sur ce sujet est également repris dans l'anthologie coopérative de H. Desroche et al. (1977, p. 66). Quelques lignes d'ailleurs célèbres suffisent pour montrer combien le fondateur de l'économie politique moderne croyait à la participation des travailleurs : « *The relation of masters and workpeople will be gradually*

superseded by partnership in one or two forms : in some cases, associations of the labourers with the capitalist, in others, and perhaps finally in all, associations of labourers among themselves.»

- (J.S. Mill, 1909, p. 764).
L. Walras (1865, p. 62-63) voyait lui aussi un grand avenir pour les associations ouvrières, mais son enthousiasme baissa **fortement** avec les déboires qu'il connut à la tête d'une caisse d'escompte destinée à favoriser leur développement. Voir à ce sujet W. Jaffé (1965, vol. 1).
- (19) Voir D.C. Jones (1976, p. 66-67). Les autres évocations de A. Marshall et J.S. Mill dans les pages qui suivent, se réfèrent aussi à cet article.
- (20) J. Stiglitz (1975, p. 572) prétend qu'un contrôle managérial hiérarchique faisant exécuter les décisions des propriétaires est même souhaité par les travailleurs eux-mêmes parce qu'il empêche chacun de tirer au flanc, engendre une production supérieure et assure ainsi à tous des salaires plus élevés. Ailleurs cependant (Stiglitz, 1974), il reconnaît que la participation lorsque la surveillance de chaque individu implique un coût prohibitif.
- (21) Le raisonnement de McCain est le suivant : un travailleur A ne recevrait sans doute qu'une faible part du profit résultant d'une hausse de la productivité d'un travailleur B, mais ce gain a des chances d'être supérieur au coût, pour le travailleur A, d'une dénonciation du travailleur B si celui-ci tire au flanc.

- (27) M.C. Jensen et W.H. Meckling (1979, p. 485), tout en reprenant cet argument, concèdent que la firme capitaliste moderne ne représente pas un cas parfait parce que le gestionnaire n'est généralement pas le seul propriétaire ni même le principal actionnaire.
- Dans la littérature économique française, ce sont sans doute H. Lepage (1978 et 1981) et H. Tezenas du Montcel (1981) qui ont le plus largement exploité la théorie des droits de propriété pour critiquer l'autogestion.
- (23) Voir par exemple le numéro de la revue *Autrement* (1981) intitulé *Dix heures par jour... avec passion*.
- (24) Voir L. Putterman (1984) pour une analyse critique très fouillée des argumentations respectives de O. Williamson (1975), A.A. Aghian et H. Demsetz (1972) et M.C. Jensen et W.H. Meckling (1979).
- (25) Voir J.P. Bonin et L. Putterman (1985, p. 9-22) pour une présentation synthétique du modèle de Ward et de tous les développements ultérieurs.
- (26) Drèze note cependant que, dans la réalité des économies occidentales, l'entreprise capitaliste n'arrive pas non plus à satisfaire toutes les conditions d'efficacité liées à un contexte d'incertitude.
- (27) M. Uvalic (1986) a récemment produit une synthèse critique de cette littérature.

ANNEXE
Les coopératives de travailleurs dans la CEE en 1985 (1)

	Totaux nationaux			Membres du CECOP	
	Coopératives	Travailleurs	Coopératives	Travailleurs	Fédérations (2)
Belgique	250	2.000	60	800	SAW
Danemark	1.100	48.000	300	1.500	SAPA
Espagne	8.800	243.000	320	9.200	FCTAC
		1.090	1.090	28.000	FVCTA
France	1.400	38.000	1.300	3.700	CGSCOP
Irlande	100	(500)	60	300	ICOS
Italie	19.000	(450.000)	2.800	137.000	Lega ANCPPL
		2.800		11.200	FEDERLAVORO
		1.000		-	AGCI
		460			FNCST
Pays-Bas	250	4.500	60	2000	ABC
Portugal	400	20.000	270	10.500	FINCOOP
		100		8.000	FECOOPSERV
Royaume-	1.000	7.000	1.000	5.500	ICOM
		80		600	SCDC
Total	32.500	813.000	11.700	352.400 (s)	ans AGCI et FNCST)

(1) Nous avons construit ce tableau avec l'aide de R. SCHLUTER et du CECOP. Tous les chiffres représentent des approximations parfois assez grossières, en particulier s'ils figurent entre parenthèses. Aucune estimation n'a pu être faite pour l'Allemagne et la Grèce.

(2) SAW : Solidarité des Alternatives Wallonnes

SAPA : Sammenslutningen af Produktionskollektiver og Arbejdsfaelleffkaber

FCTCA : Federacio de Coopératives de Treball Associat de Catalunya

FVCTA : Federacio Valenciana de Coopératives de Treball Associat

CGSCOP : Confédération générale des sociétés coopératives ouvrières de production

ICOS : Irish Cooperative Organisation Society Ltd

ANCPPL : Associazione Nazionale delle Cooperative di Produzione e Lavoro

FEDERLAVORO : Federazione Nazionale delle Cooperative di Produzione e Lavoro

AGCI : Associazione Générale Coopérative Italiana

FNCST : Federazione Nazionale delle Cooperative del Servizi e Trasporti

ABC : Associatie van Bedrijven op Cooperatieve Grondslag

FINCOOP : Federação Nacional das Cooperativas de Serviços

ICOM : Industrial Common Ownership Movement

SCDC : Scottish Cooperatives Development Committee.

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Cooperatives and Women Enterprise Development in India Note on a Women's Cooperative Bank

by Suren K. Saxena*

Introduction

In recent years, the Cooperative Movement in India has recorded considerable expansion. Introduced in the country by the Cooperative Credit societies Act of 1904 which allowed for the formation of cooperative credit societies on the Raiffeisen pattern for countering the problem of rural debt, the movement has now expanded into many fields of socio-economic endeavour. There are now in all approximately 315,000 cooperative societies with a total membership of 141 million. Nearly 2/3rds of these societies are in rural areas and their major thrust is towards supporting agricultural production through the supply of agricultural inputs. Short term rural financing was, and remains, the main activity of the village cooperative society. 62 % of the rural population is covered by the primary agricultural cooperative societies (PACS) ; short, medium and long-term credit supplied by cooperatives is of the order of Rs. 27,500 [1] million of which long-term lending was Rs. 5000 million ; Cooperatives distribute 4 million metric tons of fertilizers which constitutes about 45% of the total fertilizer sold; milk production through the activities of Operation Flood patterned on the world famous Anand Cooperative Dairy model has recorded remarkable rise. Sugar production through approximately 200 farmer-owned cooperative sugar processing units constitutes 60% of the country's total production. A number of committees have discussed repeatedly issues facing the movement, the principal ones being :the size and the ideal mix of PACS activities, movement's relations with the Government, Cooperative laws and their influence on the growth of the movement (under the Constitution, Cooperation is a State subject and each state has its own law), management, education needs of members and employees, policies, the role of secondary/apex organisations, member relations etc.

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Despite the impressive figures, the movement shows a number of weaknesses. It stands largely on the crutches of government support and leadership, overdues in credit societies are heavy, repayments are often fictitious, credit discipline is lax, management continues to be amateurish, the primary society is generally controlled by the more powerful sections in villages, the movement does not show innovative ness and the different parts of the movement are not interactive and mutually supporting.

Urban Cooperative Banks — The BN Coop Bank (2)

One sector which has done consistently well is that of Urban Cooperative Banking. These are credit institutions formed by the middle classes in urban areas, many of whom are professionals (lawyers, doctors, teachers). Initially, some were based on caste considerations ; others are formed around places on caste considerations ; others are formed around places of work. Most have now open membership. As of June 30 1977, there were in India 1162 urban cooperative banks [3]. Maharashtra, a State in the Western part of the country, has the largest number. Of a total of 1162, 29 are women's banks, that is, banks either exclusively or largely run by and for women. Of the 29, 20 according to the last information were showing a surplus.

Although accorded equality under the Constitution, women's position continues to be inferior in present Indian society. The Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, while addressing a SAAERC [4] Ministerial Meeting on *Women in Development*, said : « *Women are discriminated against at every stage* ». [5]. The Government of India's Report of the Committee on the Status of Women entitled *Towards Equality*, after undertaking a comprehensive analysis, made a number of far reaching recommendations (pp. 359 ff.) As well, two of the more recent official documents, the Sixth and Seventh Five Year Plans, have given attention to improving the position of women. Fields in which women have been largely handicapped are : education, health and nutrition and employment. Deeply ingrained conservative attitudes have rendered difficult the implementation of social reforms. The Sixth Five Plan says: « *The low status of women in large segments of Indian society cannot be raised without opening up*

opportunities of independent employment and income further » [6]. In the promotion of self-employment, lack of credit availability has been a major bottleneck.

It is against this background that the work of the BN Bank becomes a useful subject of study.

BN Bank is one of the bigger, although not the biggest and certainly not the oldest, of these banks. Its progress is shown in the following table between the years 1983-84 through 1985-86.

Amount in Indian Rs. (000's omitted)

Years	1 983-84	1984-85	1985-86
Particulars			
No. of share-holders	7452	8554	10684
Deposits (all kinds)	20734	37962	51982
() % rate of increase	(23.21)	(23.51)	(36.93)
Loans	22001	27595	38411
Sh capital	1787	2101	2827
Reserves	666	759	1232
Profits	128	230	401

One of the Bank's objectives is to support women to undertake activities in the fields of trade, commerce and others in order to infuse in them a spirit of self-reliance, enterprise and Cooperation. For this purpose, the Bank provides financial support.

The Reserve Bank, the country's Central Bank, generally maintains a sympathetic attitude towards starting Women's Banks in areas where none exist. However, the viability considerations as laid down in the *Report of the Committee on Urban Banking*, have to be observed. The BN Bank has six branches, all in and around Pune, and is planning to open more. It is run entirely by women ; 60 % of its customers are women. A Development office of the Bank is concerned with enlarging its work.

Early efforts and difficulties

The Bank owes its origin and current impulse to a band of devoted ladies. Stated by a Chartered accountant who along with his wife had earlier gained the experience of organizing a bank elsewhere in the State, BN Bank was established in 1974. A « socially oriented » bank, it seeks to provide for the financial needs of women. The Bank was predicated on the belief, verified by personal observations and conversations, that women had nowhere to place their savings ; they were often cheated by those in whom they placed their confidence. They had to obtain loans from *socars* (private moneylenders) who charged exorbitant rates of interest. The small band of workers approached women through a number of formal and informal groups e.g., Bhajan Mandais, Kirthan mandais [7] seeking support for the Bank. The questions asked by prospective customers were keen and pertinent ; what would happen to their money if the Bank went under ? Did the promoters have sufficient knowledge and experience of banking ? Would they, the customers or their relatives, be able to secure a regular job with the bank ? Word of mouth played a very important part in making the Bank known and in establishing confidence. Moneylenders' hold was tight and many women were indebted to them. The organizers realized that without enabling women to clear the past debts which they owed to the moneylenders, women could not be

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attracted to the fledgling Bank. Over 2000 such loans have been given to women to clear their past debts to private moneylenders. Organizers personally went with the borrowers to the moneylenders ans on repayment of loans, obtained written statements that the loans had been cleared. Problems of physical security were encountered, a factor which might have brought men into the work of the Sank. After a sum of RS. 500,000 had been collected, word got around and there was a positive reaction from the potential members. Pamphlets were distributed. Visits were made to women on salary days. Some women were not allowed to visit the Bank by their husbands. Some of those who came did not wish their savings to be revealed to their men folks. Their account books were retained in the Bank. All this preliminary work required two years of propaganda, area meetings, informal conversations during lunch hours when the purpose and objectives of the Bank were explained to women. Results in the field in mobilizing deposits were rewarded by employment offers in the Bank. The Government Employment Program was utilized under which new employees were hired at low cost to the Bank.

Activities

The BN Bank performs the normal functions of a Bank. Emphasis is on deposit mobilization and on loaning to needy women including those who wish to start small or medium enterprises. Apart from current and savings accounts, recurring and fixed deposits, it operates several schemes to encourage savings. For children there are special arrangements for savings (*Madhu Manjusha*), regular small savings are collected from families' door steps, savings are doubled after a certain period of regular savings for those who wish to save for their children's weddings or education (*Nivedita Nischini Yojana*) ; a scheme for those who want to save for their retirement (*Chiranjeeva Yojana*) is also in operation.

Loans are granted against different kinds or securities such as salary certificates, for non-earning women, on the strength of a salary certificate of any earning member in the family, gold and silver. Life Insurance Corporation policies, National Savings Certificates, fixed deposit receipts etc. Loans are given for business and small scale ventures (for some examples see the boxes) ; paying off loans obtained from moneylenders ; construction or repair of homes and advance payments for rental accommodation ; and special loans for the weaker or exploited sections of the society to help them recover their economic ground.

Organisation and management

The present membership of the Bank is over 12000 of which slightly less than 50 % are women ; there are individual and institutional members. The Board of Directors, elected for 5 years, consists of 15 of whom 11 are ladies and four are male. Two representatives of the employees are included in the Board and one is from the backward community as prescribed in the Cooperative Act. It reports to the Annual General Meeting. The 87 employees are almost all women and the bank is run largely for and by women.

Share, staff, loan and executive Committees have been set up. Consideration is now being given to establishing a cell which will concentrate on the promotion of women entrepreneurship. An applicant desirous of obtaining a loan has to complete a loan application form which, among other things,

Cooperatives and Women Enterprise Development In India requires information on : the amount of loan desired, reasons for the loan, occupation and address of employer, salary certificate duly signed by the proper authority, details of the business to be undertaken, shareholding in the bank etc. The Branch Manager's comments are invited ; the Head Office makes its recommendation and the resolution of the Loan Committee is, of course, taken into account. Three sureties are needed and other relevant documentation is called for. In case the applicant has no source of income, guarantee for repayment is given by a close member of the family agreeing to the recovery either from the guarantor's salary or immoveable property. Peer or group pressure is not used or regarded as a collateral, as is done, for instance, in the case of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh or in the Aga Khan Rural Support Program in Pakistan. Perhaps in an urban setting such as Pune, this is not feasible.

A random examination of the reasons [8] for which loans had been denied were : advanced age of the loanee which would have made the recovery uncertain ; previous loan was in arrears ; the amount of loan exceeded the limit set by the Bank; incomplete or inaccurate submission of papers; unsatisfactory nature of the security provided ; bona fides of the borrower for undertaking the business could not be ascertained.

Spice Grinding

Living in a colony where land has been allotted by the Government to « backward classes », Mrs SMS, 62, has undertaken, with BN Bank's help, a small economic venture. She grinds spices. After her husband's death, she was reduced to a state of penury; four of her five sons were then minors. There are now adults and they all live together in a joint family.

She came in contact with the Bank through another client, Mrs SBG, a municipal sweepress who learnt about the Bank through a leaflet she had picked up on the roadside during the course of her work. Mrs SMS borrowed Rs. 5000 from the BN Bank which she repays in monthly instalments of Rs. 175 plus an annual rate of 17 1/2 interest. She added her own Rs. 2000 from the sale of ornaments. The loan has been used for installing a simple machinery for grinding spices. An additional Rs. 6000 were invested from the son's income in the construction of a shed. The son is an auto-rickshaw driver who obtained the rickshaw, also, with the help of a BN Bank loan. Mrs SMS's income has gone up from Rs. 24000 to Rs. 6000 a year.

Known by the ambitious name of

BN Bank and Women's Enterprises

The Bank has given loans to women for a wide variety of tasks, viz., milk and confectionery shops, powdering spices, sewing machines and tailoring, making soft drinks, squashes and popsicles, buying embroidery machines, sale of *sans*, xeroxing facilities, cycle repairs, fabrication jobs, book binderies, making bricks and earthen wares, making idols, creche, hand cart pullers, fruit and vegetable stalls, TV and radio repairing shops, manufacturing fibre glass hoods and so on.

A small field investigation was conducted. Ten enterprises, all run by women, were visited and interviews conducted with the owners. Later, with the help of an experienced researcher, information on selected topics was collected. These were: the nature of the owner's family (nuclear or joint), motivation for starting the business, nature of relations with the BN Bank and the moneylender (ad hoc or continuing, financial and or advisory), ease of obtaining the loan from the Bank, suggestions for improving the Bank's role, income before and after the start of the enterprise and the difference it made in the standard of living, nature of work undertaken, employment generated by the enterprise, investment, problems faced, future plans, nature of discrimi-

P.D. Spice Grinding Factory, Mrs SMS powders spices ; the market is virtually insatiable. Neighbours bring their spices in whole to have them ground ; thus purity is assured in the case of a commodity beset by extensive adulteration. Most customers wait while the job is being done. Some ready stocks of pulverized spices are kept for over-the-counter sale. Mrs SMS's main motivation for starting the business was ; to alleviate poverty caused by the loss of

income on the husband's death. She worked for a while as a maidservant ; there are no non-family workers and all female members of the household work in the « factory ». She has some problems in enlarging her work as the Municipal Laws will not allow the extension of the shed. Her example has created no « ripple » effects ; in her own words, « *the people in the area are not enterprising.* » She regards the BN Bank as an institution which « *helps the cause of women* ».



Cane products

Mrs SBS, 45 is married to an ex-army *Jawan* (private). Basket weaving and making other cane and bamboo products (furniture, bamboo curtains etc) have been a family tradition. She was carrying on the business in a small way while her husband was in the Army. On his retirement in 1985, the family income was drastically reduced ; she decided to continue working in the field in which she had skills. A short distance away from her home was a branch of the BN Bank and she knew from her neighbours that that was a woman's bank and was staffed by women who were sympathetic to problems of needy women. She thus felt confident in approaching the

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Bank and secured a first loan of Rs. 5000 to expand her business. Obtaining the loan from the Bank was simple ; procedures were uncomplicated and officers were less than daunting. With her husband's assistance, she secured raw materials from Bangalore and Bombay. With the help of a second loan of Rs. 5000, a small roadside shop was started in early 1987. The first loan has been repaid ; instalments on the second have been overdue because of seasonal demand fluctuations ; money has been locked up in finished products.

Mrs SBS has five children ranging in age from 3 months to 10 years and dividing time between household tasks and business responsibilities is not easy. She can barely read and

write ; no outside labour is employed and production is kept at a level to meet the anticipated demand. This, however, is not easy because of market fluctuations. Production is carried out from home. However, she would like to construct a *pucca* shop which would require more money. The present premises are covered by a tin shed which, does not provide adequate protection against strong sun and the monsoon. Her monthly income has increased from Rs. 200 to Rs. 600. She now owns a TV and has gas for cooking purposes. Mrs SBS does not feel there is much scope for expansion. Her example has not inspired others to undertake business because, as she says, « *we have a family skill* ».

nation experienced (if any), the demonstration effect created by the enterprise, borrower's perception of the Cooperative nature of the BN Bank. Admittedly the inquiry was limited in scope and no suggestion is implied that the conclusion have wider applicability. Information about five projects is given in boxes « A » to « D ». On the basis of the discussions with the Bank authorities and visits to the ten enterprises, the following tentative observations may be offered :

- the major motivation for starting an enterprise was economic ; negatively, the difficulties in reconciling the normal working hours (10 A.M.- 6 P.M.) with family responsibilities, lack of outside employment opportunities, in one case transport difficulty and the stigma attached to outdoor work were also mentioned ;
 - all entrepreneurs lived in joint families and strong continuing support from other members (financial, moral) had played an important part in the start of the business ; several respondents suggested there was no social ostracism in Pune against women undertaking independent business ;
 - the contacts between the loanee and the Bank (except those are connected with the Bank as founders or shareholders) were of a one time nature ; here is no continuing relationship. Creation of a strong customer relations department in the Bank would help in a better mutual appreciation of the problems confronting the two parties ;
 - in all cases investigated, bar one, the loan had been repaid punctually ; where this was not done, the lapse was ascribed to demand seasonality ; one respondent spiritedly said : « I am no defaulter ». In all cases, the enterprise had raised the income and this had showed itself in the addition of durable assets to the home ;
 - although some additional employment had been generated, the demonstration effect, by and large, was small (the extent and reasons could not be investigated) ; in one case (see box D), training had been imparted to several girls who wanted to enter the profession ;
 - services provided by the Bank to entrepreneurs were limited.
- Although most mentioned that the Bank's advice had been helpful, the pro forma was defective in that it did not explicitly ask for information about the nature of such advice. Mostly advice had been given in an informal way and seemed to be limited to personal acquaintances of the leaders of the Bank. Although this has proved helpful, it cannot replace the more considered and technical advice (market analysis, feasibility studies) which would be required in the future. In view of the diversity of the various occupations followed by loanees, perhaps the maximum the Bank can expect to do is to put the budding entrepreneurs in contact with the various authorities (the Municipality, consulting agencies such as the Maharashtra Industrial Technical Consulting Service Bank and the Registrar of Cooperative Societies) ;
 - Two of the ten entrepreneurs visited had been indebted earlier to the moneylender. Through the Bank's loan, they were relieved of these debts. In the absence of a closer relationship between the BN Bank and the loanee, it is difficult to say if the state of indebtedness would not recur in times of economic adversity ;
 - Problems experienced by the entrepreneurs were mostly industry specific and did not stem from the loanee's relations with the Bank. All loanees found the Bank authorities sympathetic and the procedures uncomplicated. For expansion of their business, which many included in their future plans, the ladies would need larger sums and longer periods of repayment.
 - Personal contacts, informal contact points and the word of mouth have played an important role in the early establishment and expansion of the Bank and in creating confidence among the customers. At the macrolevel, the country's Central Bank has shown sympathy and understanding towards women's cooperative Banks.
 - Finally, the perception of the Bank by the loanees is one of an organisation which is sympathetic to the needs of women. There is very little understanding of what constitutes a « Cooperative » Bank nor were any of the projects visited were organized as a cooperative.

References

1. One Indian rupee equals approx 0.05 US cents.
2. Bhagini Nivedita Sahkari Bank, hereafter abbreviated as BN Bank.
3. Information supplied by the Reserve Bank of India.
4. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.
5. Govt. of India, New Delhi, 11.
6. Govt. of India, Sixth Five Year Plan, 1980-85, New Delhi, 423.
7. These are informal singing groups consisting mostly of women.
8. Dr B.S. Ubale helped me with the translation from Marathi into English.

Palana Ghar (Creche)

This much needed service is run by Mrs SVM who is 45 and belongs to a middle class family ; her husband runs a monthly magazine in the regional language. She has four sons two of whom are married and live away from home. The idea of starting a creche originated from (i) her love of children and (ii) the need to supplement the family income. Additional factors are : husband's encouragement and the independence inherent in self-employment. Moreover, she could not reconcile the 9-5 working hours with family responsibilities.

She obtained a loan of Rs. 5000 from the BN Bank in 1985; as an account holder, she was aware of the nature of the Bank's work. In addition, she invested Rs. 4500 of her husband's money ; by 1987, she had repaid Rs. 3000 of the loan. She feels that women have a better grasp of the family problems they face ; (however, she did not cite specific examples). The creche has resulted in adding Rs. 1500 to the family's gross monthly income of Rs. 4500. She has a certificate in mid-wifery which helps in her present work.

The creche consists of a longish room which merges into an outer



room. The equipment consists of 6 baby cots, 2 baby walkers, toys, a cage with birds and a small aquarium with coloured fish. Some additional employment has been created and the creche employs three maidservants who are untrained and do odd jobs. It takes in 42 children ; charges are Rs. 80 per month. Parents leave their children in the mornings and collect them on return from work. Parents also provide lunch and biscuits.

Schoolgoing children number 20 and are charged Rs. 95 per month. Future plans of expansion envisage accommodating more children but only after the Bank loan has been repaid. Mrs SVM would feel confident in approaching the Bank for an additional loan. She is not aware of the demonstration effect her venture has had on others. Her perception of the Bank is of «an organisation helping the needy women ».

Dining Hall and a Beauty Parlour

An interesting case is provided by * these two enterprises run, separately, by the mother and daughter-in-law out of their joint home. Mrs PM, a widow of 61 and a University Graduate, started a catering service in 1986. Her customers are a mixed group of students, trainees, workers etc. who come from the environs of Pune to pursue their occupations. After her husband's death, Mrs PM faced a bleak economic future and with advice from the Chairman of the BN Bank and technical advice from her son who has a diploma in catering, she obtained a cash credit limit

(continued on p. 17)

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of Rs. 20,000 from the Bank to start a canteen. Her two brothers, who live abroad, gave additional financial support. Mrs PM belongs to an urban family and is a shareholder in the Bank. She met with a sympathetic ear in the Bank ; loansanctioning procedures were simple. The loan was used mainly for the construction of the dining hall (a simple shed overhead) and with the rest of the funds, she equipped the establishment - commercial gas burners for cooking, utensils for serving food, furniture etc. Main reasons for starting the business were : the economic need, spare time and availability of technical know-how within the family. In addition, her age, unsuitability of office hours, transport difficulties and preference for self-employment were other factors which influenced her decision to start her business.

Within a year, the enterprise began to show results. Mrs PM's would be interested in further expansion (accepting small outside catering contracts, perhaps even sharing ownership in a small hotel). But that would require larger financial accommodation from external sources. On an average, there are 80 regular cus-

tomers of the eatery. Separate schedule of charges are established for vegetarian and non-vegetarian customers on the number of meals desired. In addition to her own labour, she employs eight workers - cook, ladies for making « chapatis » (the Indian style of unleavened bread), waiters, dish washers and an accountant. Her standard of living has improved.

The daughter-in-law, Mrs APM, 31, runs a beauty parlour. A University graduate, she has a diploma in personal grooming. When she married, the family was experiencing economic hardship ; they were all living on the mother-in-law's monthly pension of Rs. 375 ; Mrs APM's husband had spent some money on a visit to Saudi Arabia in search of employment. Although not confident in her own ability to start - and sustain - an independent business, she was encouraged by the ex-Chairman of the BN Bank, Mrs MD, and was supported to her mother-in-law and husband. With a total investment of Rs. 15000 - 5000 from Mrs PM and Rs. 10000 from the Bank - she now earns Rs. 2000 per month. She used the loan for converting part of the

house into a beauty parlour and in furnishing it; the loan has now been repaid. Reasons cited for starting the parlour were : aptitude, technical knowledge, economic necessity and « not to face social problems which normally a working girl (presumably outside the home ?) faces in our society. » She has one helper who is unpaid because she wants to learn the trade. Before starting the enterprise, a general market trend analysis - not a regular feasibility study - was undertaken in which the BN Bank helped. The Bank also advised on the improvement of the parlour layout. She is presently thinking along the lines of expanding the beauty parlour into a health clinic. This would require a bigger loan and a longer repayment period. Cosmetic products are difficult to obtain, especially, the imported ones due to high costs and import restrictions. She takes on young girls for training, has so far trained 5 students from whom she charged Rs. 2000 per person. Two months are devoted to general aspects and one month involves practical work. Her perception of the Bank is that «it is a peoples' bank and belongs to all the shareholders. ».



An illiterate depositor putting her thumb imprint at the Bhagini Nivedita Sahkari Cooperative Bank, Pune, India.

Efforts and programmes of NGOs in the least developed countries

A report prepared for UNCTAD and presented at the second United Nations Conference on the least developed countries

by Hendrik van der Heijden*

Introduction and setting

The positive contribution which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can make to the development of least developed countries (LDCs), as well as the valuable disaster relief assistance they can provide, was recognized by the Intergovernmental Group on the Least Developed Countries which met on the occasion of the Mid-Term Review of the SNPA in 1985. The Intergovernmental Group called upon:

- The Governments of LDCs and donors to encourage active participation of the local population, both women and men, through non-governmental entities;
- NGOs to comply with the national policies and legislation of the host countries and, while preserving their character, contribute to the development priorities of the LDCs, co-operating with appropriate authorities and organizations, in order to implement effective development programmes.

It also invited the NGOs of the donor countries to reinforce their role in consciousness-raising in their countries of origin, and in mobilizing increased private and public resources for the benefit of the LDCs. This recognition of the role of NGOs was reaffirmed in the Final Act of UNCTAD VII.

In recent years, Northern and Southern NGOs have become significant actors in development co-operation. In macro terms, financing by NGOs of developmental activities in developing countries has increased impressively, rising from some \$ 1 billion in 1970 to an estimated \$ 4.6 billion in 1986. About 70 per cent of the latter amount - \$ 3.3 billion - came from private contributions mobilized by NGOs from their many supporters in the North, while the remaining \$ 1.3 bil-

* The views expressed in this study are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the UNCTAD secretariat or of any official administration or authority. The designations employed and the presentation of the material do not imply the expression of any opinion whatever on the part of the UNCTAD secretariat.

lion was provided in the form of matching financial contributions by donor Governments which have increasingly recognized the important developmental role which NGOs are playing in the developing countries. In some donor countries NGOs have become known as the « third channel » for official development assistance (ODA). In terms of magnitude, NGO aid commitments are currently comparable to ODA commitments from the OPEC countries and are only slightly less than those from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries. For some 20 least developed countries, total NGO aid commitments are at least comparable in size to those from the United Nations agencies, IDA and the EEC respectively.

In development financing terms, NGOs' transfers are beginning to be of significance to the South: they currently finance some 8 per cent of the aggregate current account deficit of developing countries as a whole. These transfers to the least developed countries are estimated at about \$ US 1 billion annually, representing 13 per cent of the LDCs' aggregate current account deficit. Transfers from Northern NGOs are supplemented by the efforts of a rising number of NGOs from the South, including the self-help efforts of their members and beneficiaries. Some Southern NGOs also receive financial and in-kind contributions from developing country Governments. Recent work in Haiti indicates that NGOs operate half of the country's health facilities and probably an even larger share of the primary education system. For Burkina Faso, the size of NGO programmes may currently represent 20 per cent of development expenditures, indicating the growing NGO participation in the development efforts of some least developed countries. NGOs are increasingly co-operating with each other, as well as with official national and international development co-operation institutions.

Development education NGOs (i.e. those focusing on the shaping of public opinion) in the North are playing an important role in explaining the salient North-South development

and development co-operation issues to their audiences, which include policy-makers and parliamentarians. They have also moved beyond education efforts and are lobbying Governments of developed countries to assist in creating a more supportive external environment for equitable world growth. Over the last few years, and particularly since the Africa crisis and the external debt crisis in the developing world, development education and lobbying efforts have also assumed greater importance in the programmes of «operational NGOs». This is due to their first-hand knowledge of the effects of these crises on their partners and on the daily lives of the poor in the South.

Southern NGOs are demonstrating an enlarged capacity for designing and implementing development programmes. In addition, various Southern NGOs have initiated development education programmes in their countries, in some cases with Northern NGOs' support.

Over the last few years there has thus been an evolution in the institutional and programmatic roles of NGOs, as well as in the division of labour between Northern and Southern NGOs.

In view of its growing importance and the implications of its changing role, it is necessary to consider some of the main trends characterizing the evolution of NGOs' aid. This will help in identifying and discussing constraints which stand in the way of more collaborative NGO/government efforts aiming at the acceleration of socio-economic development in the least developed countries.

NGOs are a very diverse group of organizations. They include organizations as different as the International Committee of the Red Cross, which supplies emergency relief service; trade unions, which pursue the interests of their worker members and sometimes assist their overseas sister organizations; the International Executive Service Corporation, which makes recently retired business executives available to assist developing countries' entrepreneurs; and many small and some larger developmental organizations in the North, which mobilize private financial resources from their supporters and which assist private - usually poorer - groups in the developing countries in their efforts to improve their standards of living. It is the last named of these, and their counterparts in the South, which are the subject of this report. The analysis is limited to those developmental NGOs which - while they may receive financial contributions from donor country Governments - (a) are autonomous in the design of their programmes and policies, (b) belong to the category of voluntary and non-profit organizations, and (c) dedicate their funds and efforts principally to socio-economic development programmes primarily benefiting the poorer segments of developing countries' populations.

The least developed countries

The Substantial New Programme of Action (SNPA) for the 1980s for the LDCs

There are currently 41 LDCs accounting for a total population of about 390 million people (1987). Twenty-seven LDCs located in sub-Saharan Africa. While per capita incomes vary

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Much has been written about the role of Northern NGOs in development co-operation and about «the NGO approach» to development. (1) (2). The latter is often taken to include:

- Helping the poor with the identification of their needs and the implementation of programmes for meeting those needs;
- Collaboration with local NGOs' partners in a flexible and cost-effective way, and support for the self-reliant development of «indigenous NGOs»;
- Increasingly, programmes which complement those of local governments in developing countries in the carrying out of local and regional development programmes.

To help meet these objectives, NGOs are willing and able to make small grants. Most NGO-supported programmes appear to have focused on rural and community programmes, on human resources development and - more recently - on income- and employment-generating activities. While tending to concentrate on programmes for meeting the basic development needs of the poorer groups in developing countries, many NGOs will also focus on helping the very vulnerable population groups: the homeless, the victims of natural disasters, wars and civil disturbances, refugees, and those suffering from hunger and malnutrition.

It is not surprising that NGOs play a growing role in the LDCs: the difficulties which LDCs face in raising their income levels - as well as in improving health, nutrition and literacy - challenge NGOs to help alleviate the structural causes of poverty there. Thus, in various countries, NGOs have mounted significant programmes tending to complement economic and social development services by Governments of LDCs. At times, NGOs have directly assisted the poor in their efforts to initiate and accelerate their economic and social advance. This report aims at presenting an account of the field operations of NGOs in the least developed countries with a view to better understanding the strengths and weaknesses of their contribution to development co-operation.

The report is based on the results of consultations with Northern development NGOs initiated by UNCTAD in mid-1987 through a questionnaire sent to some 130 NGOs, of which 63 replied (see annex). The report will refer to these as «the 63 responding NGOs», which account for about one third of total NGOs' grant commitments to the LDCs (table 5). More recently, this information was supplemented by further consultations with selected NGOs in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. In addition, the report reflects information submitted, by NGOs from developing countries, as well as the experiences of a number of international «umbrella NGOs».

from some \$ 100 in Ethiopia and \$ 160 in Bangladesh to over \$ 850 in Botswana, average per capita incomes remain extremely low at about \$ 215 (1985), which is only 2 per cent of the average per capita income of developed market-economy countries. At this income level, the basic needs of the populations of the LDCs are far from being met: infant

mortality rates are as high as 138 per thousand, life expectancy at birth is only 46 years, and one half of the LDCs' children are still out of school. Adult literacy rates remain at around 30 per cent.

The LDCs face additional handicaps which were recognized by the international donor community when it unanimously adopted the Substantial New Programme of Action for the 1980s for the Least Developed Countries (the SNPA) in Paris in 1981. The main objectives of the SNPA are :

- To promote the structural changes necessary to overcome the least developed countries' extreme economic difficulties ;
- To provide fully adequate and internationally accepted minimum living standards for the poor in these countries ;
- To identify and support major investment opportunities and priorities in the LDCs.

The SNPA recognizes that «- concerted international action in support of national efforts is required to bring about structural transformation of the economies of the least developed countries... » . In this connection, it was also recognised that « only a substantial increase in official development assistance in real terms during the present decade will enable the LDCs to achieve the objectives of their country programmes within the framework of the SNPA ». To achieve this, donors agreed to supplement the low level of LDCs' savings by raising their aid flows to LDCs in the aggregate to 0.15 per cent of donors' GNP or to double their assistance levels.

While official donors' performance under the SNPA remains mixed, ODA flows to LDCs currently finance a large share of the LDCs' external capital requirements. The LDCs, which have accepted primary responsibility for their own overall development, have committed themselves in the SNPA to undertaking measures at the national level to accelerate their socio-economic development. While LDCs' performance in the policy reform area also reveals a mixed picture, current assessments appear to reflect major progress in terms of redirecting policies, particularly during the last few years.

The longer-term objective of the SNPA is to transform the economies of the LDCs to allow them to achieve self-sustained growth and development. With the aid dependence of

some LDCs (e.g. the Sahel countries) exceeding 20 per cent of their GNPs, this objective is far from being achieved for some countries.

Nor is the objective of broadly based and self-reliant development of the LDCs' to be reached at an early stage.

The SNPA and the NGOs

Development education NGOs have been analysing the reasons for the disappointing progress achieved by LDCs during this decade, particularly after the 1984/1985 famine and crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. This has occurred at least twice in the context of UNCTAD : on the Mid-Term Review of the SNPA in 1985, and as part of the preparatory process for UNCTAD VII (July/August 1987). An international NGO, Youth for Development and Co-operation (YDC), played a particularly stimulating role in this review process, which led *inter alia* to a «White Book» (3) on LEDC issues, which was published and widely distributed on the occasion of UNCTAD VII. More generally, various development education NGOs, including international ones such as ICDA (International Coalition for Development Action) and ICVA (International Council of Voluntary Agencies) and national ones such as World Development Movement in the United Kingdom and NCOS in Belgium, draw international attention to the special problems of the poorest countries.

« Operational development NGOs »- i.e. those which carry out or support development projects in developing countries - also participated in this review process, which was especially helpful. They enhanced the awareness among the various partners in development co-operation in the least developed countries of the fact that the developmental challenge does not have to be met by Governments alone. Governments of LDCs face multiple constraints, including those of a financial nature, and administrative capacity bottlenecks. In a number of areas, developing countries' governmental action can appropriately be supplemented by non-governmental programmes in a partnership for social and economic progress. This realization, which was long overdue, found expression in the Final Act of UNCTAD VII which recognizes «the positive contribution of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to the development of LDCs ».

NGOs in the least developed countries

Introduction : the macro setting

Over the last few years -and markedly during the 1980s - NGOs have stepped up their efforts to mobilize resources from their supporters in developed countries. At the same time, they have been successful in securing a rising share of ODA to support these resource mobilization efforts. Currently, resource flows from NGOs to the developing countries are estimated at about \$ US 4.6 billion (table 1). These flows are equivalent to about 10 per cent of DAC bilateral ODA.

The replies to UNCTAD's questionnaire (see para. 13 above) permit - jointly with the results of subsequent discussions with selected NGOs - the drawing of a first and tentative portrait of NGO action.

This « portrait » - which is summarily contrasted with DAC official bilateral development co-operation programmes - reveals the following main characteristics of NGOs' programmes :

- (i) these programmes tend to emphasize human resources development.

About 50 per cent of the programmes in 1985-1986 supported « social infrastructure » projects which include those aimed at helping to ameliorate the status and productive capacity of women. The results of a more detailed analysis of, for example, the activities of all major Netherlands NGOs similarly reveal a heavy concentration on human resources development : social infrastructure and women's development projects also absorb close to 50 per cent of their programmes. In contrast, the relative

- share of « social infrastructure » programmes in bilateral official DAC commitments amounts to about 22 per cent ;
- (ii) Both the 63 NGOs and the Netherlands NGOs report channelling about one quarter of their commitments towards « production and multisectoral programmes ». This is as large as the share of support for production projects in DAC bilateral ODA, but is contrary to the commonly held view that NGOs de-emphasize production and income-generating projects ;
- (iii) While DAC official bilateral programmes devote less than half of the share that NGOs devote to « social infrastructure » projects, NGOs' programmes tend to give considerably less emphasis to economic infrastructure projects : they devote on average some 5 per cent of their programmes to such projects, as compared with some 15 per cent for DAC bilateral official aid ;
- (iv) Following the recommendations of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on Africa's economic and social crisis, the establishment of the World Bank's Special Facility for Sub-Saharan Africa, and the

Sectoral distribution of aid commitments
(1985-1986) percentage of total commitments)

	«63 NGOs »	All Net her- land s	DAC bilat eral ODA
Social infrastructure	50.0	46.0	22.2
Education	14.3	0	10.9
Health, nutrition and poulation	18.2	8.0	5.3
Water supply	8.3	2.0	6.0
Other	9.2	21.	-
Production	23.6	24.	23.8
Agriculture)	15.0	21.	12.5
Multisectoral development)			2.5
Industry, mining and other	8.6	3.0	8.8
Economic infrastructure	4.6	-	16.5
Food aid, refugees and emergency relief	13.1	3.0	8.6
« Financial »	-	12.	24.9
Sectoral assistance	-	-	18.2
Debt relief	-	-	2.8
Institution building	-	12.)
Other	-	-)
Other	8.7	15.	4.0
		0	
Total	100.0	100.	100.
		0	0
Source : Table 2.			

Efforts and programmes of NGOs in the least developed countries

recommendations of the Development Assistance Committee of OECD, bilateral official donors are currently channelling a significant proportion of their commitments (about 20 per cent) to developing countries in the form of « programme assistance » and « debt relief ».

Currently available information indicates that a little over 20 per cent of total NGO's commitments is being channelled towards the least developed countries (table 3), with significant differences between donor countries - from 10 per cent in Japan to some 71 per cent in New Zealand.

Even though the share of the least developed countries in NGO grant commitments is about as high as the LDCs' share in DAC official bilateral aid commitments (24 per cent in 1986), it is significantly smaller than the « LDC orientation » of the programmes of UNDP and IDA, which reached about 35 per cent in that year. One possible explanation for the relatively small LDC share in NGO commitments may be that NGOs - unlike IDA and UNDP - do not make their aid allocation decisions on a « country » or « per capita income » basis. This helps to explain why NGOs tend to direct a significant share of their programmes towards such upper middle-income developing countries as Brazil and Mexico, which contain important poverty pockets. Historical ties between NGOs of former colonizing countries and indigenous NGOs in the developing world also help to shape partnership relationships. Finally, most NGOs maintain significant shares of their programmes in countries such as India, where poverty is pervasive and where there is need and scope for NGOs' programmes.

About 70 per cent of grants provided by NGOs to LDCs flows towards Ethiopia, the Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Bangladesh and Haiti, of which the aforementioned five major recipients receive only one half of the total flow going to LDCs.

The NGOs of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands provide the preponderant shares of NGO aid to the LDCs.

NGO developmental action

« NGO sector surveys » are beginning to become available. One undertaken for Haiti in 1986 indicates the significant contributions which NGOs are making in the field of human resources development (4). Over 200 private health organizations operate almost half of the country's health facilities, and nearly 60 per cent of primary education is provided by NGOs. In addition, NGO spending in 1985 on agriculture and community development amounted to 66 per cent of the public recurrent budget for agriculture. For education and health the corresponding percentages were 50 and 45 per cent respectively. This survey, which covered Haiti's 71 largest NGOs, indicated a tripling of NGO spending on education and health in the 1982-1985 period.

Bangladesh also offers an « outline » of NGO action : a relatively recent survey of 30 NGOs there revealed that many NGOs are shifting their emphasis towards income-generating and employment-creating activities. (5). They are involved in an impressive variety of income-generating activities in agriculture, handicrafts, rural industry and food processing, self-employment activities and infrastructure. Ten

Haiti - Expenditures of 71 NGOs (*)
(Million gourdes)

	1982	1983	1984	1985
Agriculture	6.6	8.6	7.9	8.3
Education	16.4	41	39	45.8
Health	11.9	10.	29	39.0
Subtotal	34.9	60	75	93.1
		.5	.8	
Community development	94.6	59	48	54.3
Cottage industry	1.6	1.1	2.	2.8
Total	131.1	121.	128.	150.2

(*) The World Bank, *Haiti-Public Expenditure Review* (Washington DC, 1987).

NGO-supported programmes in Bangladesh reach over 50,000 persons each. A study carried out for the World Bank concluded that NGO programmes in Bangladesh which aimed at generating off-farm rural employment were in their magnitude as significant as those carried out by the Government (6). The Canadian North-South Institute reports that « some NGO's programmes ...in Bangladesh ...are/ready having a large-scale impact on the rural poor, and a few appear to be of national significance ... While this initiative may be reaching the limit of its potential, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC)'s oral rehydration therapy programme hopes to reach every household by the end of this decade». There are, thus, indications that NGOs are becoming significant partners in development co-operation in the least developed countries.

In a study prepared in 1986 for Burkina Faso, the Comité français contre la faim (CPCF) concludes that NGO expenditures accounted for some 20 per cent of Burkina Faso's developmental expenditures. (8). Responses to UNCTAD's questionnaire indicate that NGOs are also involved in other activities, such as adult literacy programmes, pre-school and primary education, primary health care and nutrition, the provision of drinking water, maternal and child health care, and family planning.

In countries of sub-Saharan Africa it is not unusual to find some 30 to 50 NGOs, each displaying a different approach to development. Many originated as church-related organizations, and many are small, collaborating with one local partner only, but there are also secular NGOs, some larger ones representing local chapters of international NGOs such as of the International Planned Parenthood Federation. Others, such as the « 6 S » organization in the Sahel, are large « indigenous NGOs », reaching close to a million beneficiaries.

In many countries, Governments face important constraints which inhibit the provision of developmental services. These constraints can be :

- *Financial*: many developing - 27 in sub-Saharan Africa alone - are currently carrying out structural adjustment programmes. As a result, Governments are facing stringent financial constraints impeding the launching of new developmental initiatives : or

Efforts and programmes of NGOs in the least developed countries

- *Administrative* : institutional weaknesses in governmental structures at times also make it difficult to expand governmental programmes in poverty alleviation and human resources development.

The relative importance of these constraints in inhibiting the expansion of public programmes, thereby provoking supplemental NGOs action, varies from country to country. There are serious problems of mass poverty in South Asia, with the consequent need for rapid low-cost expansion of services catering to basic needs ; in selected countries of sub-Saharan Africa, institutional problems require NGO programmes to help deliver such services ; and income- and wealth-distribution issues in some countries of Latin America induce NGO programmes in land reform, neighbourhood development and community action.

To NGOs, the style of development and development co-operation is important. For many NGOs, participation and full information are seen as being of key importance. Some - NGOs view the development process as consisting of collaborative efforts towards self-reliant and broadly based development. Several NGOs which see themselves as the bearers of the «equitable development message», provide support in some countries for development education programmes which broadcast this message. They usually emphasize development which is also environmentally self-sustaining. Finally, more recently, a concern has been « institutionally self-sustaining development », i.e. a concern with strengthening the «indigenous NGO structures». The Netherlands NGOs are providing rapidly rising support for the strengthening of indigenous NGO structures. For this purpose also, Helvetas of Switzerland, has appointed « local co-ordinators » (in Haiti and in Mali) with the specific task of improving contacts with local NGOs and to ensure that Helvetas programmes respond to the need to support the institutional development of indigenous NGOs.

« Indigenous NGOs » and financing modalities

In many LDCs, there has been a substantial increase in the number of indigenous NGOs. These can be community organizations which finance, produce and distribute human resource development services - particularly education, health and nutrition —to the poorer population groups. These organizations include such grassroots organizations as neighbourhood groups, associations of small rural producers, women's groups, credit associations, parents' associations and schools, as well as developmental organizations which serve as intermediaries between external NGOs and local groups. These intermediaries are displaying substantial growth in the LDCs ; many possess an ability to identify grass-roots groups which are deserving of external support but need help with project preparation to obtain full access to external financial support and at times even domestic financial support. Sometimes - such is the case of « 6 S » in the Sahel and the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh - one can speak of genuine institutional evolution, offering scope for more effective and institutionally self-reliant NGO sector development. Northern NGOs report that they are adjusting their financing modalities in such a way as to support the development of their local partners more effectively. Various new financing modalities are being reported by Northern NGOs which are of significance not only the discussion

of collaboration between Northern and Southern NGOs but also for the discussion of how the problems of the LDCs can be better solved through the provision of official development assistance. It is no longer uncommon for Northern NGOs to move beyond « project financing » and to make « core financing » available in support of their local partners' general programmes. The Inter-American Foundation in the United States reports the usefulness of « pre-organization grants » which can be provided to finance NGOs' start-up expenses. Many NGOs are describing their support programmes as including provisions for recurrent expenditures. They may also provide financing for the completion of projects which had been started earlier but remained unfinished for lack of funding. NGOs' financing is usually not geographically tied for the procurement of equipment, the importance of which was underlined in CIDA's (Canadian International Development Agency) evaluation of Canada's NGOs (9). While NGO assistance is usually made available in the form of grants, there are also cases - reported by H1VOS in the Netherlands and by the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) in Geneva - where some loan financing is appropriate and thus made available. Assistance can sometimes be in small amounts. OXFAM (UK) reports its smallest grant to be one of £13 made available to Ethiopia in 1985, compared with its largest grant of £1.6 million, also for Ethiopia. *Brot für die Welt*, from the Federal Republic of Germany, has provided various grants of DM 10,000 each, but it also makes grants in amounts exceeding DM 1 million. These latter amounts indicate that NGOs sometimes support projects which may be as large as those supported by ODA agencies. The flexibility which Northern NGOs possess in tailoring their financing modalities to the special needs of their partners in the LDCs is a key aspect of their current operations.

The achievement of financial self-reliance by indigenous NGOs remains an important objective. Some indigenous NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa report external financing dependency ratios as high as 90 per cent. This heavy dependence on financing from Northern NGOs is creating its own problems, which were discussed in March 1987 at the World Development/ODI Conference in London. At that Conference, other aspects of North/South NGO collaboration were also raised, including the appropriateness of the Northern NGOs being preferred channels through which external financing flows to Southern NGOs.

There is an emerging trend for official agencies to channel their financing directly to the indigenous NGOs of the South. Some Northern NGOs have questioned this trend, arguing that this could lead to some developing countries' Governments taking steps to impose controls on these and, perhaps subsequently, on other financial flows to indigenous NGOs. The discussion of this subject is ongoing and will intensify as Southern NGO structures continue evolving towards further maturity. A series of meetings was organized by DAC/OECD in 1985 and in 1986 which gave attention to this matter and which highlighted the need to adjust the relationships between official aid agencies and NGOs to improve collaboration practices for the support of indigenous NGOs.

An evaluation of past NGO action

Many NGOs report the evaluations of their work. One key finding is that wherever there has been community participa-

tion in the design and implementation of NGO projects - including instances where there have been important sacrifices made by other project « beneficiaries » - there has been much better project sustainability. This is confirmed by CIDA's evaluation, (9) and by the 1985 evaluation undertaken by the Commission of the European Communities of its programme for the financing of micro- and NGO co-financed projects (10). This also applies to the replication by Governments of NGO projects : early government involvement in the projects' design stage appears crucial. The enlargement of NGO projects, and their replication by Governments are reported to depend crucially on collaborative relationships between NGOs and Governments, particularly at the local level, and on project costs.

Learning and dissemination of project results are reported to be areas where further progress is both possible and needed. For this purpose, networks of NGOs are being strengthened in Latin America, Africa and in Asia. Various sectoral groupings of NGOs have been formed to consider the results of NGO programmes ; this applies to environmental NGOs the those dealing with agriculture and rural development. At the same time, the IRED network is particularly concerned with financial self-reliance issues of Southern NGOs, as well as with issues of appropriate technology. A network of African NGOs, Forum of African Voluntary Development Associations (FAVDO), was established in Dakar in the course of 1987 with a view to learning more systematically from the lessons of experience. At the national level, NGOs are also increasingly coming together to consider issues of mutual interest, to co-ordinate NGO action in development, and for consultations with Governments. This is, *inter alia*, the case in Mali, Cape Verde, Bangladesh and Haiti. Northern NGOs increasingly report their financing of these crucially important activities, which help to enhance the effectiveness of local NGO's developmental activities in the LDCs.

On the whole, the record of NGO's action of the past 15 years or so, as reflected in NGO's resource mobilization and by their development programmes in the LDCs, indicates that NGOs have come into the mainstream of development and development co-operation. However, there exists scope for NGOs to increase the effectiveness of their approach to development. This is recognized by many NGOs, and has become the subject of frequent and intensive consultations among themselves within the context of their own umbrella organizations, such as *Coopération internationale pour le développement et la solidarité* (CIDSE), ICVA, and the World Council of Churches (last year's consultation at El Escorial in Spain provides an example). Within the framework of the United Nations system, the Non-Governmental Liaison Service (UNGLS) organized a series of consultation among NGOs to consider the implications for NGOs of the 1984/1985 crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, which was followed by another reflection on this matter in April 1988. The EEC/NGOs Liaison Committee created a number of working groups and the « Jean Perras Report » (11) provided an occasion for European NGOs to reflect on their contributions to African development. Among Southern NGOs, consultations are continuous, in part within the context of the IRED network. NGOs like CEBEMO of the Netherlands have undertaken impressive studies -jointly with overseas partners - with a view to improving NGO's contributions to self-help programmes for the poor in the third world (12).

An evaluation of current trends

The following encouraging evolution is taking place :

Beyond relief towards development:

InterAction, the umbrella organization of United States NGOs, reports the results of a survey undertaken among its members (13), indicating that most United States NGOs are moving towards supporting developmental programmes with their local partners. Both Médecins sans frontières and Médecins du monde in France report the same trend, from moving beyond emergency medical intervention towards helping with the establishment and upgrading of indigenous medical treatment capacity.

Towards strengthened project preparation

and implementation :

NGOs point to positive experiences with indigenous NGOs, leading to improved presentations of project proposals which can be of particular importance for some European NGOs, which process several hundred project financing proposals per year.

From individual project interventions towards joint action by different NGOs in the field,

thus enhancing NGOs effectiveness, *inter alia*, by achieving technical staff complementarities : Euro-Action of the United Kingdom offers a particular example of this trend.

From isolated project intervention to concern about the macro-impact of their operations.

Some NGOs were quick to point out the limitations of emergency food aid during the sub-Saharan crisis and met in Brussels in April 1985 to consider the need to contribute towards the official dialogue on the fundamental policy aspects of Africa's food crisis. At the same time, various European NGOs demonstrated the need for adjustments in the EEC's food aid programme, which could appropriately pay more attention to the need to maintain market incentives for African producers.

Towards partnership relationships with developing countries' and developed countries' Governments. NGOs increasingly report cases of projects in which they are working in close partnership with public sector agencies. This is particularly the case in sub-Saharan Africa. In the Gambia, the NGO community and the Government are collaboratively preparing agricultural and primary health care strategies and programmes. In Asia, Helvetas of Switzerland reports a close working relationship with government agencies in Bhutan and in Nepal. Some of these programmes are executed with Helvetas acting on behalf of the Government of Switzerland, disbursing Swiss public funds. Some NGOs have also accepted an offer made by the European Commission in 1987 to participate directly in the implementation of Lomé III programmes.

Towards notional and international coalitions for more effective «advocacy»:

such coalitions were formed on the occasion of the 1985 United Nations General Assembly special session on Africa's economic and social crisis, the Mid-Term Review of the SNPA in 1985, and UNCTAD VII in 1987. The operational NGOs which are members of CIDSE have come together to

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jointly review their position on the subject of the external debt crisis and its implications for poverty alleviation in the developing world. In addition, the recent establishment of FONDAD (14) in the Netherlands - inspired by NOVIB in the Hague and directing its attention to the debt crisis as well - is another manifestation of the trend of operational NGOs to involving themselves more specifically with the major development co-operation policy issues.

Weaknesses remain, with various reports indicating the key areas where improved programme effectiveness is required:

The need for more energetic private resource mobilization efforts.

In the United States, InterAction's study on the possibilities for more active private resource mobilization has indicated an important untapped potential for private fund raising. In Switzerland and in France, NGOs report difficulties with resource mobilization from the public. In other countries this problem is less acute. The United Kingdom is an example of what can be achieved with imaginative payroll deduction programmes.

The need for improved identification, selection, appraisal and evaluation of some NGO projects and programmes,

including the more active involvement of the beneficiaries themselves. In the design and implementation of projects.

The need for further timely interaction with «host Governments» ,

- both at the central and the local level, for policy and logistical support. In addition to «project beneficiaries», host Governments should also be involved early in the project cycle, especially if public sector project replication is aimed at.

The need to pay more attention to project and institutional sustainability,

by more determined attempts to strengthen indigenous NGO capacity and by ensuring earlier movement towards financial self-reliance.

NGOs could also take the lead in carrying out « NGO sector reviews » to help identify the main obstacles which stand in the way of development of the non-governmental sector and to help LDCs' Governments formulate policies and programmes based on the more intensive involvement of the non-governmental sector in poverty alleviation, human resources development and institution building, with the ultimate aim of accelerating broadly based development through a more collaborative and pragmatic private/public partnership.

NGOs' interest in developing a pragmatic partnership with Governments in LDCs is reflected by their participation in the aid co-ordinating mechanisms established by some of the LDCs. In several countries where these exercises have been held, notably in Cape Verde and the Gambia, special sessions have been organized as part of the UNDP round table process. The NGO sector could play a fuller role in this country review process (UNDP round tables and World Bank consultative groups).

Concluding remarks

Many NGOs' programmes reflect their view that official development assistance does not help much to solve poverty problems in the LDCs. Most NGOs, therefore, pursue a policy which emphasizes direct poverty alleviation programmes. They also focus on the major inequities in the world economic system which tend to make the task of poverty alleviation even more difficult. NGOs, therefore, express strong feelings of solidarity with the LDCs. Through their actions, many are making an important contribution to accelerated development and poverty alleviation by developing :

- *New forms of resource mobilization*, institutions, and mobilizing the savings of beneficiaries, combining this with energetic participation by the poor themselves in programme design and implementation ;
 - *New forms of programme delivery*, including new ways of reaching and involving « beneficiaries », the latter often based on beneficiaries' participation in project design and on collaboration with local governments ;
 - *New forms of delivering development aid*, including experimentation with more appropriate aid modalities such as « core financing », the provision of recurrent financing and **other forms of « flexible aid »** ;
 - *New forms of defining developmental priorities*, through an increasingly interactive process of inter-mediation between the poorest population groups. Governments and development co-operation institutions.
- Governments of both developing and developed countries and international official development co-operation institutions are increasingly recognizing the important contribution which NGOs are making towards broadly-based growth and poverty alleviation in the least developed countries. Reflecting this, they are, indeed, currently channelling significant financial aid through the non-governmental system. There remains scope for further adjustment of official policies towards the NGO sector in development co-operation, particularly to provide more flexible terms. The latter would

enhance the effectiveness of NGOs' action in development and help in stimulating the indigenous NGOs in the least developed countries.

Northern NGOs have expanded their capacities to meet demands from their local partners in the LDCs to the point where NGOs of some donor countries - France and Switzerland provide illustrations - have reached the limits of their financing capacities. Both French and Swiss NGOs are reporting that the mobilization of private contributions for developmental NGO programmes is increasingly difficult, *inter alia* as a result of competing NGO appeals to the public for contributions towards emergency relief programmes. These NGOs advocate strengthened development education programmes to help public understand the long-term nature of the development process, thus enhancing their willingness to contribute towards supporting structural solutions to development.

Many Northern NGOs are engaged in a dialogue with their Governments with respect to procedures for supporting NGO programmes aimed at strengthening the development of their local partners. While there is general recognition of the importance of this objective, there is not yet full recognition that this discussed in the near future within the context of DAC/OECD. In the various NGO liaison committees - particularly in the EEC/NGO Liaison Committee - the discussion on this important matter appears to be progressing.

Least developed countries' Governments can also play a more role in facilitating the work of NGOs, particularly in programmes which support poverty alleviation and equitable growth. Developing countries' Governments could also invite NGOs to contribute towards the design of such programmes, as the Government of the Gambia is currently doing. This may mean channelling public resources through the non-governmental system, making use of the comparative advantages which NGOs can have in reaching the many poor in a cost-effective manner. Official development financing organizations could appropriately support such governmental programmes for providing NGOs with matching fiscal contributions.

Development in Bangladesh, March 1988.

Notes

- 1/ OECD Development Centre, Liaison Bulletin, *The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Development Co-operation* (Paris, 1983) provides a fuller description of the characteristics of developmental NGOs.
- 2/ Van der Heijden, Hendrik : *Development Impact and Effectiveness of Non-Governmental Organizations* (September 1985 : the Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam).
- 3/ *Least Developed Countries : A Game of Appearances ?* Youth for Development and Co-operation, Amsterdam, 1987.
- 4/ The World Bank, *Haiti - Public Expenditure* (Washington DC, 1987).
- 5/ Mohammed Alauddin, *A Survey of Income-Generating/Employment-Creating Activities of Thirty NGOs in Bangladesh* (Institute of Social Welfare and Research, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, 1984).
- 6/ The World Bank, « Non-governmental organizations in rural development in Bangladesh », in: *Selected Issues in Rural*

7/ The North-South Institute, *Rural Poverty in Bangladesh* (Ottawa, April 1985).

8/ M.C. Guéneau, *Analyse économique d'un échantillon de petits projets de développement - Evaluation ex-post de 30 projets situés au Sénégal et en Haute Volta* (Centre d'études du développement, Université de Paris I, Paris, 1984).

9/ *Corporate Evaluation of CIDA's Non-Governmental Organizations Program*, (CIDA, Ottawa, October 1986).

10/ « An Evaluation of CBC Development Projects » (Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 1985).

12/ Koenraad Verhagen, *Self-Help Promotion - A Challenge to the NGO Community* (CEBEMO/Royal Tropical Institute, the Netherlands, Amsterdam/Oegstgeest, 1987).

13/ *Diversity in Development - US Voluntary Assistance to Africa* (InterAction, New York, 1985).

14/ Focus on Debt and Development.

	Private resources (1)	DA C gov t (2)	Total NG O gra nts (3- (1)	Share of donor countr y within DAC (per cent)
Australia	39	10	49	1.1
Australia	19		19	0.4
Belgium	23	14	37	0.8
Canada	17	14	32	7.0
Denmark	12	5	17	0.4
Finland	28	8	36	0.8
France	84	56	140	3.0
Germany, Fed. Rep. of	54	22	76	16.7
Ireland	20	4	24	0.5
Italy	11	48	59	1.3
Japan	82	19	101	2.2
Netherlands	14	97	111	5.2
New Zealand	7		7	0.2
Norway	57	28	85	1.8
Sweden	85	46	131	2.8
Switzerland	66	50	116	2.5
United Kingdom	19	31	50	4.8
United States	17	48	65	48.6
	53	4	57	
Total DAC	33	12	45	100.
		(1)		

Source: *Development Co-operation Report* (DAC/OECD, Paris, 1988) OECD/DAC secretariat.
1/4.7 per cent of DAC bilateral ODA.

	NGOs	DAC bilateral ODA to all developing
Social infrastructure	50.0	22.2
Education	14.3	10.9
Health, nutrition and population	18.2	5.3
Water supply	8.3	6.0
Community development and social services	9.2	
Production and multisectoral development	23.6	23.8
Agriculture	15.0	12.5
Multisectoral development		2.5
Industry and mining	7.0	5.6
Housing	1.6	
Trade, banking and tourism		2.1
Other		1.1
Economic infrastructure	4.6	16.5
Transport and communica- tion	3.6	8.1
Energy and other	1.0	8.4
Food aid, refugees and emergency relief	13.1	8.6
Food aid	4.7	6.4
Refugees	3.2	
Emergency relief	5.2	2.2
Other	7.0	
women projects	7.0	
Legal assistance		
Development education		
« Financial »	-	24.9
Sectoral assistance	-	18.2
Debt relief	-	2.8
Administrative expenses	-	3.9
Institution building	-	
Unspecified	1.7	4.0 a/
Total	100.0	100.0

Efforts and programmes of NGOs in the least developed countries

Table 3

Grant commitments to least developed countries from DAC donors, 1986

	Total NGO grants to all developing	NGO LDCs	LDC share of NGO grants	LDC bilateral ODA (1985-1986 average)
	(millions (1))	of dollars (2)	(3 - (2))	(em) M
Australia	49	10	20	16
Austria	19	5	22	8
Belgium	37	5	14	33
Canada	32	90	28	29
Denmark	17	10	59	47
Finland	36	10	28	42
France	14	40	29	21
Germany, Fed. Rep. of	76	19	25	29
Ireland	24	5	21	47
Italy	59	10	10	69
Japan	10	10	10	18
Netherlands	23	40	17	36

	NGO development	Estimate of NGO LDCs	LDC share of NGO	LDC ODA (1985-1986 average)
	ID	(2)	(per cent) (3/2)*1	(4)
New Zealand	7	5	71	17
Norway	85	20	12	41
Sweden	131	30	23	32
Switzerland	116	80	69	40
United Kingdom	222	50	23	30
United States	22	42	19	16
	37	0		
Total DAC	46	10	23	24
	05	40		

Source : Development Co-operation 1987 Report (OECD/DAC, Paris 1988). NGOs' replies to questionnaire ; estimates by consultants.

Table 4

External financing commitments to least developed countries NGOs and ODA, 1985 (Millions of US dollars)

	Total				of which		
	NGOs	ODA	DAC	IDA	United	EEC	OPEC
	a/	b/			Natio		
			Bilater		Org.		
1. Ethiopia	385	633	379	30	113	46	11
2. Sudan	106	1314	639	83	162	33	343
3. United Rep. of Tanzania	95	483	386	8	35	37	-
4. Bangladesh	69	1537	705	373	78	42	39
5. Haiti	58	156	111	10	9	1	-
6. Burkina Faso	45	250	128	62	28	18	-
7. Nepal	34	373	198	29	32	0	20
8. Uganda	33	152	50	44	92	2	10
9. Mali	30	499	253	68	31	27	16
10. Malawi	17	222	68	105	9	23	-
11. Cape Verde	16	62	43				
12. Gambia	15	33	23	-	9	1	0
13. Sierra Leone	15	111	91		8	3	2
14. Somalia	14	391	209	21	94	15	12
15. Togo	14	235	159	56	7	11	-
16. Bhutan	11	54	15				
17. Burundi	9	210	88	53	15	13	7
18. Rwanda	9	209	120	42	25	3	13
19. Benin	8	96	42	-	12	16	0
20. Botswana	8	113	69	-	28	8	-
Sub-total	991	7083	3776	984	724	299	473
Other 20 LDCs	49	1905	925	175	273	123	263
TOTAL	1040	8988	4701	1159	997	422	736

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries (OECD/DAC, Paris, 1987) ; estimates by consultants.

a/ Including commitments from the official sector.

b/ ODA commitments from DAC and OPEC countries and multilateral institutions mainly financed by them.

Efforts and programmes of NGOs in the least developed countries

Table 5
Estimated NGO by donor country, 1986

	To all developing countries		To LDCs			
	Total Value (millions of dollars)	Donor share (per cent)	All NGOs		63 NGOs	
			Value (millions of dollars)	Donor share (per cent)	Value (millions of dollars)	Donor share (per cent)
Australia	49	1.1	10	0.9	1	0.4
Austria	19	0.4	5	0.5	-	-
Belgium	37	0.8	5	0.5	15	0.4
Canada	320	7.0	90	8.7	3	0.9
Denmark	17	0.4	10	1.0	7	2.2
Finland	36	0.8	10	1.0	-	-
France	140	3.0	40	3.8	9	2.8
Germany, Fed. Rep. of	768	16.7	190	17.6	68	20.1
Ireland	24	0.5	5	0.5	7	2.0
Italy	59	1.3	10	1.0	3	0.9
Japan	101	2.2	10	1.0	1	0.1
Netherlands	237	5.2	40	3.8	6	1.8
New Zealand	7	0.2	5	0.5	-	-
Norway	85	1.8	20	2.0	8	2.6
Sweden	131	2.8	30	3.0	12	3.6
Switzerland	116	23.5	80	7.7	41	12.5
United Kingdom	222	4.8	50	4.8	45	13.8
United States	2237	48.6	420	40.04	113	34.8
Total DAC	4605	100.0	1040	100.0	324	100.0

Source: Development Co-operation Report (OECD/DAC, Paris, 1988). NGOs' replies to questionnaire; estimates by consultants.

ANNEX
Responding NGOs by donor country

AUSTRALIA

1. Australian Catholic Relief

BELGIUM

2. NGOs

3. OXFAM Belgique

3. World Solidarity

CANADA

5. SCIC (Saskatchewan Council

for International Co-operation)

6. CECI (Centre canadien d'études

et de coopération internationale

7. Canadien Crossroads Internationa

8. CARE Canada

28 TRANSNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, 1/1990

DENMARK

9. Danish Volunteer Service

10. Danchurchaid

11. Danish Missionary Council

FRANCE

12. CECF

13. CIMADE

14. Médecins sans frontières

15. Terre des hommes

15a. CCFD

15b. Médecins du monde

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

16. Brot für die Welt

17. Caritas GERMANY
 18. DAHW (Deutsche Aussätzigen - Hilfswerke e.V.)
 19. Deutsche Welthungerhilfe
 20. EZE (Evangelische Zentralstelle für
 Entwicklungshilfe e.V.)
 22. Kibel stiftung GmbH
 23. Misereor
 24. WFD (Weltfriedendienst e.V.)
 IRELAND
 25. Concern
 ITALY
 26. MSP (Movimento Sviluppo e Pace)
 JAPAN
 27. JOICFP (Japanese Organization for International
 Co-operation in Family Planning)
 NETHERLANDS
 29. NOVIB
 29a. CEBEMO
 29b. ICCO
 29c. HIVOS
 NEW ZEALAND
 30. Christian World Service
 31. Norman Kirk Memorial Trust
 NORWAY
 32. Redd Barna
 33. Free Church of Norway
 SWEDEN
 34. RÅdda Barnen

Efforts and programmes of NGOs in the least developed countries

35. Orebo Missionen
 36. Bibletrogn Vanner
 37. Holiness Vision Mission
 38. PMU Interlife
 SWITZERLAND
 39. Terre des hommes
 40. Aide aux lépreux (Emmaus-Suisse)
 41. Lutheran World Federation
 42. Swissaid
 43. Brot für Brüder
 44. Swisscontact
 45. Helvetas
 46. HEKS or EPER (Swiss Inter-Church Aid)
 UNITED KINGDOM
 47. 47. OXFAM (UK)
 48. ILEP (International Federation of Anti-Leprosy
 Associations)
 49. Planned Parenthood Federation
 50. Helpage International
 51. Tear Fund
 52. Christian Aid
 53. ActionAid
 54. Methodist Overseas Division
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 55. CRS (Catholic Relief Services)
 56. Christian Children's Fund
 57. Foster Parents Plan International
 58. Save the Children Federation
 59. World Vision International
 60. American Friends Service Committee
 61. United Church Board for World Ministries
 62. Church World Service
 63. Education Development Center, Inc.
 ASSOCIATIONS TRANSNATIONALES. 1/1990 29

Second United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries
Report of the meeting on the role of
non-governmental organizations
in the development of the Least Developed Countries

Kathmandu, 8-10 November 1989

Introduction

1. The Secretary-General of UNCTAD, in his capacity as the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, in co-operation with the German Foundation for International Development (DSE), convened the High-Level Experts' Meeting on the role of Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in the development of the Least Developed Countries in Kathmandu, Nepal, from 8-10 November 1989 as part of the preparation for the Second United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries.

Thirty-four high-level experts, who are invited in their personal capacity, and five observers, participated in the Meeting (for the list of participants see the annex).

2. The Meeting was opened by H.M. Queen Aishwarya Rajya Laxmi Devi Shah. H.E. Mr B.B. Pradhan, Minister for Finance and Industry of Nepal, who chaired the Meeting, suggested issues which might be addressed by participants, such as that of appropriate ways to regulate, co-ordinate and develop the NGO sector while preserving their essential characteristics ; of NGOs influencing development policies and outcomes while humanizing the development process ; the issue of priorities and that of synergic linkages between national and local NGOs, on the one hand, and national and international NGOs, on the other.

3. Mr. Y. Berthelot, Deputy Secretary-General of UNCTAD, addressing the issues to be discussed, singled out the need of NGOs to develop an adequate dialogue with public authorities and the search for ways and means to facilitate NGO co-operation with United Nations agencies, on the one hand, and to develop co-operation among the NGOs of LDCs and those of other developing countries, particularly neighbouring countries. Dr. M. Schnellier, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Nepal, underlined the role of NGOs as contributors to development education and as sources of funding. Statements were also made by Mr. B.P. Dhital, Vice-Chairman of the National Planning Commission of Nepal, Ms A. Henriques, Director of SOLIDAMI, Guinea Bissau, (see para. 10 below), and Mr. D. Chand, Member-Secretary of the Social Services National Co-ordination Council, Nepal.

4. The Meeting focused on ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of NGOs in achieving the development objectives of LDCs (Item 4 of the Agenda). In order to accomplish its work, two Working Groups were established to consider the nature of development NGOs, activities of develop-

ment NGOs, relations between NGOs, Government and the United Nations System, enhancing the effectiveness of the NGO contribution to LDC development, and NGOs and the Second Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries. The Working Groups were chaired respectively by Dr. A.S. Elawad, Islamic African Relief Agency (Sudan) and Mr. F. Judd, Oxfam (United Kingdom) who had been elected Vice-Chairmen of the Meeting. The agenda as adopted is shown in paragraph 25 below.

5. At its closing session the Meeting adopted the following conclusions and recommendations.

**Agreed conclusions
and recommendations**

Nature of Development NGOs

Diversity of NGOs

6. In the general discussion, participants recognized the wide diversity of NGOs in the LDCs and the North and the diversity of their activities.

Participants also recognized the diversity of political contexts in the LDCs which induces different forms of relationship between NGOs and governments. At the same time it is clear that, in general, the work and role of NGOs in promoting development in the LDCs is increasingly recognized and appreciated both by governments and intergovernmental bodies.

Main characteristics

7. There cannot and should not be too rigid a definition of development NGOs whether northern, southern or international. Nevertheless, they are characterized by an ethos and commitment to solidarity and justice : they are community-based organizations, concerned for global development and pay particular attention to the plight of the poor. They work in the realm of development, emergencies and rehabilitation as well as development education and advocacy. Their aim is to assist people to become less dependent and to empower them for self-reliance.

8. Development NGOs also contribute to development through their advocacy for the recognition of, and support for, the economy of the poor (the so-called informal sector).

9. While the legal status of NGOs varies between countries they share in common :

- (i) Their autonomy ;
- (ii) Their associative structure ;
- (iii) Their sensitivity to the needs and aspirations of poor communities.

10. As was stated at the opening ceremony :
« The distinguishing feature of the NGOs' contribution to the advancement of less privileged populations is not the quantity of financial aid which they can make available — although we acknowledge its importance - but the nature of this aid, and particularly the manner in which it is channelled and the approach used to promote the advancement of such populations. In our view the true effectiveness of NGOs results from the fact that they can interact directly with less privileged populations so as to assist them in taking responsibility for their own development... ».

11. The autonomy and identity of NGOs has to be respected. While NGOs must obviously take into account the general orientations of government development policy, their programmes and projects must be formulated in light of the demands and expectations of grassroots communities.

Formal arrangements

12. A development NGO is normally a non-profit making organization, voluntarily created in accordance with legal formalities, having a constitution with particular objectives reflecting a commitment to the community, open membership and effective and responsible financial management. Where governments also establish registration systems for NGOs, based on specific criteria and requirements, it is acknowledged that the agencies of the United Nations system will recognize such systems.

Activities of Development NGOs

13. NGOs have a long tradition of supporting community development in social sectors, particularly health, education and welfare. They are also increasing their support for the productive sector through income-generating activities and job creation. Some NGOs are assisting the formation of co-operatives and encouraging local savings in support of innovative credit schemes.

Field work and advocacy

14. Global issues of justice such as ecologically sustainable development, the debt crisis, structural adjustment, human resource development, food security and poverty alleviation confront NGOs from the LDCs and the North. Development NGOs, while primarily committed to field work, have the responsibility to understand and make known the causes of problems faced by then people of developing countries, especially the poor. Their field work and advocacy are closely interrelated and this interrelationship is rooted in their community engagement. The effectiveness of their advocacy reflects the quality of their practical work, and analysis and understanding of the economic and social circumstances of the country, and their identification with people at the grassroots level as well as their relationship with other NGOs working in the same sphere. The United Nations system and governments may wish to fund the practical work of NGOs while not necessarily endorsing the entire range of advocacy issues which NGOs uphold. There is a need to develop a two-way communication process between the United Nations system and NGOs in order to build effective

communication and international solidarity in support of full human development. At the same time the on-going North-South and South-South exchange and dialogue among NGOs on issues of common concern should be strengthened, particularly in international NGOs fora.

The contribution of LDC NGOs to development policy

15. Participants agreed that LDC NGOs had a vital role to play in contributing to the formulation of national and international development policies. In particular they should :

- Use their experience of grassroots communities to engage in dialogue with governments on national development priorities and programmes with a view to creating a positive climate for grassroots development initiatives ;
- Ensure that their experience of grassroots reality is used in support of the development education and advocacy work of Northern and LDC NGOs, particularly with regard to the negative impact upon the LDCs of the international economic system ;
- Northern NGOs should make full use of the experience of LDC NGOs in their advocacy and education activities and bring to the attention of the public in the North the real achievement of LDC NGOs, thereby enhancing support for their work.

Relations between development NGOs, governments and the United Nations system

General principles

16. There is a complex set of relations between development NGOs of South and North, governments of South and North and the United Nations system. These relations vary according to country, area and sector of work.

17. As a general principle, it was agreed that the best results in participatory, sustainable development processes can be achieved when these various institutions articulate and co-operate in close relationships but respecting each other's roles.

18. In particular, it was agreed that a co-operative and constructive working relationship between Southern governments and NGOs based on a respect for each other's roles, is very important to successful development and poverty reduction. It was affirmed that the Paris Conference could take steps to ensure that experiences in this co-operation are collected and analysed on a country-by-country basis, to be able to draw lessons from them. The findings should be discussed as soon as possible in appropriate fora, including United Nations/NGO meetings.

Relations between NGOs and governments

19. Participants in the Meeting agreed that the establishment of mutually agreed principles guiding relations between NGOs on the hand and Northern and Southern governments and intergovernmental organizations on the other is a desirable long-term objective. As a first step, we propose to the UNCTAD secretariat that it recommends to the Paris Conference on the Least Developed Countries that NGOs consider preparing principles to guide their own approach to relations with Northern and Southern governments and intergovernmental agencies and that these latter institutions each consider drafting statements of principles to guide their own approach to relations with NGOs.

20. Where possible NGOs operating in a particular country should seek to co-operate with the government in order to enhance co-ordination and facilitate effective implementation of projects and programmes.

20. In the meantime, specific action at the national level should be taken to strengthen dialogue and consultation between government and NGOs. We recommend that appropriate arrangements also be made so that NGOs are able to make inputs to national planning and that these should include focal points for NGOs in relevant government agencies at national and/or local levels.

Official funding of LDC NGOs

22. In recognition of the significant contribution of LDC NGOs to the development of their countries, there is a growing tendency among official bilateral and multilateral donors to fund directly LDC NGOs. Participants recognized the potential benefits of this but also underlined some potential dangers, not least that such funding could alter the nature, autonomy and style of LDC NGOs. To ensure that such funding makes a positive contribution, the following proposals were made :

- Northern and LDC NGOs should discuss this issue openly with a view to developing a consensus around the positive conditionalities needed to minimize the dangers and maximize the potential of this type of funding ;
- Once these positive conditionalities have been elaborated, NGOs should enter into a dialogue with official donor agencies to make known their views.

Enhancing the effectiveness of the

NGO contribution to LDC development

23. The discussion of this theme produced recommendations addressed to Northern and LDC NGOs respectively :

To Northern NGOs

- Northern NGOs should be prepared to fund multi-year and flexible programmes, going beyond individual projects ;
- Northern NGOs should respond to the concerns of LDC NGOs and provide better quality information on their nature, objectives and ways of functioning ; in particular they should make clear their sources of funding and the constraints they face with regard to their constituencies and public opinion at large in the field of development education and fund-raising.
- Northern NGOs should strengthen their co-ordination in support of their LDC counterparts around specific regions, activities and approaches to development;
- Northern NGOs should be prepared to support the institutional strengthening of LDC NGOs as well as the development projects and programmes implemented by LDC NGOs.

To LDC NGOs

- LDC NGOs should define clearly their objectives and strategies, both at the policy level in the national contexts, and at the local level in their development activities ;
- LDC NGOs should be vigilant in ensuring that Northern NGOs make known their nature, objectives, functioning and sources of funds ;

- LDC NGOs should not limit themselves to the project approach but should encourage the development of participatory processes in the community that build self-reliance, and should provide services and support that respond as far as possible to the goals and needs articulated by the community ;
- LDC NGOs should strengthen national-level and South-South co-ordination mechanisms and fora in order to exchange experiences and create alliances on a geographical or sectoral basis in order to multiply the impact of their work, and strengthen their capacity to engage in dialogue with governments ;
- LDC NGOs should try to achieve a minimal financial self-reliance and look into the possibility of new forms of finance,
- LDC NGOs should develop a capacity for development education and awareness raising among decision-makers and opinion formers and among the less privileged ;
- LDC NGOs in an intermediate situation between donors and grassroot groups should not impose development projects and programmes upon these groups but, through discussion and dialogue, support their own initiatives.

NGOs and the Second Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries

24. Participants felt strongly that NGOs, from the LDCs and the donor countries, should participate actively in the preparatory process leading up to the Conference and in the Conference itself. In this regard, participants recommended that:

- NGOs should prepare a substantial contribution to the Conference in the form of a report and/or statement which will assess the successes and failures of LDC development strategies and identify the external and internal causes, including the role played by the donor community. In preparing this contribution, NGOs should use their experience of grassroots reality to expose the impact of debt and structural adjustment policies on the well-being of the most affected groups in the LDC population ;
- Serious consideration should be given by the United Nations system to supporting the active participation of NGOs in the preparatory process leading to the Conference and at the Conference itself. It is necessary that NGOs prepare themselves to contribute to the regional preparatory meetings of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific in February 1990, the Economic Commission for Africa in March 1990 and the preparatory meeting of the Inter-governmental Group on the LDCs in Geneva, March 1990. A further opportunity will be provided by the NGO strategy workshop being planned by NGLS/Geneva for March 1990 ;
- Northern NGOs should engage in policy dialogue with their respective donor governments in preparation for the Conference. They should also mobilize public support for its successful outcome ;
- LDC NGOs should discuss with their own governments the main objectives to be pursued at the Conference.

Organizational matters

1. Designation of Chairman

25. H.E. Mr. B.B. Pradhan, Minister for Finance and Industry of Nepal, acted as Chairman of the meeting. The Meeting held five working sessions.

Adoption of the agenda (item 2)

26. The agenda was adopted at the opening meeting, as follows :

1. Opening of the Meeting
2. Adoption of the agenda and organization of the work of the Meeting
3. Review and assessment of the contribution of NGOs to the development of LDCs ; current policies, major constraints and opportunities
4. Enhancing the effectiveness of NGOs in achieving development objectives of LDCs
 - (a) Identification of areas where NGOs' participation can be effective

- (b) Modalities of NGO participation in development
 - (c) Mobilization of resources for NGOs' activities
 - (d) Support by international NGOs to NGOs in the LDCs
- (i) Co-operation between LDCs' NGOs and international NGOs
- (ii) Promotion of LDCs' NGOs
 - (iii) Substantive support
 - (iv) Financial support

5. Co-operation between NGOs and the United Nations system

6. Other business

7. Agreed conclusions and recommendations.

3. Recommendations and report of the Meeting

(item 7)

27. At its closing meeting, on 10 November 1989, the Meeting adopted its agreed conclusions and recommendations together with its report.

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2. Mr. Jerrold BERKE, Resident Representative of UNDP, Kathmandu, NEPAL
3. Mr. R. BHATIA, Director of the International Monetary Fund Office in the United Nations and Special Representative in the United Nations of the IMF, Washington, D.C., UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
4. Mr. Winfried BOLL, Senior Adviser, Foundation Development and Peace, 68053 D - Bonn, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
5. Mrs. Anne Marie BEULINK, President, NGO/EC Liaison Committee, c/o NOVIB, The Hague, NETHERLANDS
6. Mr. Michael CARTER, Chef, International Economic Relations Division, 1818 H Street, NW World Bank, Washington, D.C., UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
7. Mr. Jervase CHAKUMODZI, Executive Secretary, Council for Social Welfare Services, P.O. Box 480, Blantyre, MALAWI
8. M. Jean CHAUDOUET, président du C.N.J.D., Beau-champ, FRANCE
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New social movements and the energy question in Western Europe

A cultural approach

by Herbert Gottweis*

Introduction

In the 1970s and 1980s the political landscape of Western Europe underwent significant changes with the emergence of a multitude of new issues, campaigns and protest groups which are, particularly in Continental Europe, discussed under the heading of «new social movements». Much has been written over the last years about these new movements and we now know a great deal about their structures, actions, philosophies and the scope of their concerns. Although this «participatory revolution» deserves attention as such, it appears to be equally important to focus on a dimension which has been neglected or only treated in a very general way in the past: what impact have these new movements taken on society and politics in Western Europe? Were they only a symbolic challenge or a temporary irksome obstacle for the political authorities without major political consequences? Or is it more appropriate to see in them new agents of cultural, social and political change which are capable of having substantial influence on society and politics? Certainly the relatively small amount of time which has

passed since the first emergence of the new movements makes it impossible to give a final answer to this question. However, first cautious assessments seem to be possible today. Different macro-theoretical efforts have been made to elucidate the social and political relevance of the new social movements. Here, based on a case-study, a more modest empirical attempt is made to discuss the relevance of the new movements by analysing how and with what impact they have tried to influence national, governmental energy policy in Western Europe and which future developments can be expected.

In the first part of the article I will sketch briefly the last forty years of West European energy policy against its political and socio-economic background and try to show how the two oil-crises led to a crisis of the Western energy paradigm pressing for a reorientation. I will then deal with the new social movements which intervened in this reorientation discourse and tried to influence the direction of a new West-European approach towards energy policy. Finally, the recent «Post Chernobyl» situation of this intervention effort and possible future developments are discussed.

Two cultures of West European energy policy

Expansionist energy policy

After the second World the energy industries of continental Western Europe were devastated, resulting in the scarcity of energy until the early 1950s. Reconstruction was inspired by the US and became financially possible through organizations such as the European Coal Organization (ECO).

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the Economic Commission for Europe (a United Nations regional organization), the OEEC (the Organization for European Economic Cooperation) and the European Coal and Steel Community (Harris/Davies, 1980). This immediate postwar scarcity was followed by a period of abundance during which prices fell and supply was plentiful. Low cost, Middle-Eastern crude-oil made it possible throughout the 1960s for the relative costs of oil to decrease in relation to other fuels.

Coal went out of fashion and nuclear power seemed to promise a cheap and abundant electricity future.

The move from coal to oil and natural gas certainly weakened government controls over energy supply and demand, since coal was generally nationalized, while the oil industry was to a much greater extent in private hands and organized internationally.

However, even what was left of government control could hardly justify being labeled as energy policy. « *What has passed for energy policy is a collection of decisions and non decisions that have had their genesis in efforts of public officials and private actors to cope with other policy concerns that inevitably have energy implications. Decisions have been taken in other spheres on the basis of criteria internal to them, and energy consequences have been toted up afterwards*» (Lindberg 1977, 365). Since energy is the capacity to do work, and neither price nor scarcity were an issue at this time, energy was put to work. In other words, supercheap energy became an important ingredient in the making of the Fordist regime of capital accumulation in the West.

The concept of Fordism basically refers to two interlinked phenomena : firstly, it is a system of intensive capital accumulation combining a rise in labor productivity with an increase in the per capita volume of fixed capital through methods of Scientific Work Organization (Taylorism) ; secondly, Fordism refers to the continual adjustment of mass consumption to the historically unprecedented rise in productivity generated by intensive capital accumulation. Wage-regulations linked the nominal wage to cost-of-living and productivity thereby making sure that final demand would keep pace with supply (Lipietz 1982, 34-35; Jessop 1986).

After the second World War Western Europe and the US had to rebuild their economies after a twenty-year period of depressed consumer demand. Between 1945 and 1973 favorable economic conditions in the US stimulated high growth rates throughout the world economy. The growth of the US economy helped the European and Japanese economies to reconstruct their war-devastated economies on American mass-assembly principles and to achieve the *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle) of the late 1950s. Pent-up demand for homes, household appliances, and other consumer goods stimulated increased production. Technological innovations in the electric equipment, machinery, scientific instrument, transportation, chemical and space vehicle industries caused rapid growth. Moderate wage increases and high labor productivity led to low labor costs, which also contributed to growth. Last but not least, the price of oil, a key resource for expanding growth, remained low. All these conditions increased total demand and the result was rapid growth (Andrain 1985, 45).

The political equivalent of these developments in the economic sphere was the coming of the « end of ideology ». Political parties settled their conflicting views in favor of a mixed economy and the extension of the welfare state distribution of the increasing flow of benefits more equally (Lauer 1983, 332).

It is against this background that expansive productionism developed as the dominant paradigm or culture of the energy sector. According to this paradigm (here presented in an ideal-typical way) the expansion of supply was the primary goal of the energy sector in order to meet the continuously increasing demand. It was expected and hoped for that demand would increase, because a (hopefully) ever growing economy was supposed to be an ever increasing consumer of energy. In this respect, the growth of the energy supply was seen as a function of the growth of the predominant and central economic sector. If a gap between constrained supply and necessary demand is not met, then a severe economic crisis will develop causing ruin and endangering society. Actors in the energy sector who share the culture of expansive productionism either do not see long-term physi-

cal or environmental consequences of their activities, or they just feel that if these problems actually develop, they can be dealt with in the future by technology and experts. They believe that needs are ever increasing and that it is possible to satisfy these needs through an ever increasing generation of resources. We label this cultural category with A (Caputo 1984).

The first oil crisis and symbolic crisis management

The events of 1973 with skyrocketing oil prices made it clear that a continuation of the way gone hitherto would lead to a situation in which the energy sector cannibalized the economy.

All of a sudden a tension emerged between the more global goal of economic growth and the energy-sector specific goal of supply-expansion. This called for a conceptual reframing of the once established attitudes towards energy.

Energy shortages and price increases created the perception among the decision-makers in the oil-dependent countries of a crisis necessitating a crisis response. We can say that a crisis response always suggests to a certain extent that decision-makers have not been alert enough in anticipating the crisis, and thus tends to be disproportionately larger than the response developed in a non-crisis situation. Also, consideration of what is necessary supersedes what is feasible. This specific decision-making context, however, raises the question of how seriously the reaction to the first oil crisis were meant and if they really would survive in a more relaxed environment (Aharl 1987).

The first reactive policies by the oil-consuming countries then actually reflect more of a sense of urgency and the need to do something, than they had a real impact on the energy situation. More promising seemed to be the collective Western response through the creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA). The American government feared that the rapidly rising oil prices could ruin Western economies and wanted to use the energy crisis to reassert American leadership in the West through American led energy cooperation. Against initial reservations from other Western governments oil-sharing plans were finally worked out with the US allies and at the Washington energy conference in 1974 the IEA was conceived.

The main IEA goals for energy policy and management can be singled out as :

- reducing absolute demand for oil and limiting growth rates of energy demand
- increasing energy prices to encourage conservation
- eliminating demand for fuels (i.e. oil) in short supply by substituting alternative, preferably indigenous fuels
- shifting electricity generation to nuclear and coal
- encouraging international research effort for raising energy efficiency and developing renewable energy
- sustaining energy investments, including frontier oil (IEA 1982; MacKillop 1984, 386).

How seriously were these goals, developed in a situation of crisis, pursued in the more « normal » period of 1974-78 ? Overall, we can say that adjustment to the changed energy situation had not been very satisfactory in most West European countries. What had been achieved in terms of adjustment was born by the demand side, whereas the supply side of energy failed to react to the significant price increases of, 1973-74. Certainly, indigenous energy production in OECD Europe increased by 27% between 1973 and 1978,

but it was due to production increases of oil and gas in the energy-rich countries of the UK, Norway and the Netherlands. Oil, natural gas and nuclear power expanded less than had been projected by the OECD before 1973. Industry performed best in terms of the reduction of specific energy demand per unit of output, whereas, in general, consumption of energy increased in transport and the residential/commercial sectors (with the exception of Sweden and Denmark showing a decline in the residential/commercial sector). These sectoral differences in energy saving correlate highly with the price policies enacted: whereas real energy cost for industry increased in all countries considerably, this was not the case in the transport sector and to a lesser extent in the households (with the exception of Sweden and Denmark where energy prices increased in the residential/commercial sectors). The failure to push the development of renewable energy sources and energy conservation programs is nicely mirrored by the IEA research and development expenditures: in 1978 30.8% of the expenditures were for nuclear energy, 29.2% for the Breeder and Fusion programs, as compared to 6.2% for energy conservation or 14.8% together for renewables and energy conservation (Maul 1981).

What can we conclude from this? It seems as if a great deal of the IEA goals for energy policy and management adopted under crisis conditions simply did not survive the « scrutiny » of normal conditions. Whereas some elements of the IEA adjustment plan pointed towards a deeper reorientation of Western energy policy, these aspects clearly lost momentum later in favour of the more conventional supply-restructuring/expansion elements of the plan. Although success had been made with respect to decreasing energy-demand, progress was small and in addition, partially recession-induced (1975). Therefore we can hardly interpret the reactions to the 1973 oil crisis as reflecting a conceptual reframing of the once established attitudes towards energy.

The second oil crisis or the making of reformist energy culture

Were the reactions to the second oil shock, in the wake of the Iranian Revolution caused by descriptions of supplies different? At first glance the crisis response pattern does appear to be different. Even though energy and oil demand continued to rise in the interval between the two oil shocks (but at rates considerably below those before the first oil crisis), after the second oil-crisis the demand movement was dramatically reversed by large drops in energy use and massive drops in petroleum use. Nevertheless, closer scrutiny reveals more response-conservatism than one would expect from the extent of change. Progress in West European domestic energy production was essentially due to the growth in North Sea oil production and in nuclear energy. The contribution of renewable energy resources plus related research and development investments remained low (IEA 1985). This means that decreased dependence on energy-imports had been accomplished by expansion of (domestic) traditional energies. But what explains the general negative growth movement on the demand side? Is this an evidence of a new approach towards energy?

We have argued that the energy culture of expansive productionism treated energy supply as function of the predomi-

nant and central economic sector. This attitude was possible since energy was abundant and supercheap. Had this attitude changed because it had become economically questionable after the price-explosions of the oil-crisis? The negative growth development on the demand side after the second oil crisis seems to point in this direction. However, an answer with respect to attitude change requires as a first step a discussion of how energy demand can possibly be decreased in a modern, highly industrialized country. The first and obvious option is that energy demand slows down with a slowing of economic growth. A second option is to break up the historical one-to-one relationship between growth in energy demand and economic growth. Both developments took place in Western Europe in the seventies and early eighties.

(1) By the early 1970s European economies had largely recovered from wartime damages and consumers had partially satisfied their appetites for automobiles, homes and household appliances. The consumer durable markets, which had been the primary engines of expansion lost importance. Some new industries like laser and micro-processing created a few new jobs, but they could not substitute for the automation-induced losses in the iron, steel, shipbuilding, garment and fabricating metal industries. Sluggish demand for manufactured goods meant that factories operated at less than full capacity, meaning declining labor productivity. At the same time wage and welfare indexation pushed up popular earnings despite inflation, and as a result manufacturing unit labor costs escalated. The outcome of the large gap between rises in hourly compensation and output per hour was a decline in economic growth. In short, the whole Fordist growth machine of capital accumulation was in trouble (Davis 1984; Andrain 1985, 46). The situation was then exacerbated by the steep oil price rises which hindered rapid growth. Furthermore, the oil multinationals were awash with super-profits, crowding out other manufacturing sectors, and so finance and rentier interest were strengthened at the expense of the productive economy as a whole (Davis 1984, 15).

(2) Since 1979, the overall energy intensity has fallen substantially in the IEA countries. These reductions in energy and oil intensity had a considerable impact on the level of energy and oil consumption in these countries. Energy and oil demand developments however show considerable differences in the different major-use sectors:

- Industry accounted for 35.6% of the final energy consumption and 24% of the final oil consumption in 1983, compared to 41.5% and 29.8% respectively in 1973.
- The transport sector accounted for 55.4% of final oil consumption in 1983, compared to 44.6% in 1973.
- The ratios for the residential/commercial sector are 34.6% of final energy consumption in 1983, compared to 32.7% in 1973.

Although final energy use grew steadily, oil use declined sharply (IEA 1985, 28).

Certainly, an important factor contributing to these reductions was the recession, bringing a decline in economic growth. However, high oil and gas prices have also stimulated changes in the product mixes of many industrial sectors and a gradual shift of energy-intensive industries from countries where energy prices are high to countries with low energy prices (i.e. aluminium and petrochemical industries). Besides these structural changes, technological change made major improvements in home appliances, furnaces, air

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conditioners, industrial machinery, homes, factories and commercial buildings possible. Structural and technological change as well as investments for energy-saving equipment

and fuel substitution were supported by governmental policies, such as financial incentives, efficiency standards for buildings, automobiles, etc. Energy reductions were also caused by immediate reactions

of the consumers, for example turning down thermostats, reduction of heat losses in the industrial process, etc. (IEA 1985, 32).

All in all, we can say that the declining energy consumption in Western Europe after the two oil crises reflects a reaction to a changed West European economic situation, plus an answer to problematic developments in international economic relations. The recession-induced energy demand reductions certainly cannot be attributed to any energy-policy decisions as such, and might only be of temporary character.

In 1983, for the first time since 1979, total primary requirements grew largely as a result of the economic recovery in the US and Japan which led to an increase of oil imports in Western Europe. Especially in Western Europe (in

contrast to the US and Japan) industrial production trends were followed closely by oil demand, which could suggest that industrial structural change in Western Europe has been

less pronounced than in the US and Japan. In other words, more economic growth still seems to cause higher energy demand (IEA 1985).

However, the type of energy used to meet this demand has changed. High oil prices and supply discontinuations have stimulated a restructuring of the energy supply. Between 1973 and 1983 the European share of imported oil in total requirements declined from 58% to 34%. This shift away from oil was achieved by a move towards natural gas, nuclear fuel and coal.

Nevertheless, we cannot contest that after the two oil-crises, the real and potential correlation between economic growth and energy growth is less positive than it used to be.

The reasons for this are primarily structural and technological. Here again, developments like the emigration of energy-intensive industries to Third World countries or the new market opportunities of energy-saving gadgets can hardly be attributed to energy-policy decisions. Nevertheless, particu-

larly the technological change was stimulated in addition by governmental programs. But already before oil prices tumbled in 1985, after a period of fresh conservation enthusiasm

following the two oil crises, tendencies toward a decline in the conservation efforts of several West European governments were discernible (Muller 1984).

Although it certainly would be wrong to overrate the changes in West European energy policy after the two oil crises, there is, on the other hand, no reason to play them down. In the wake of the second oil crisis governments came to play an increasingly important role in the making of energy policy and as a result a new energy culture, a new energy paradigm developed (culture B), which can be seen as a reformist version of energy culture A (expansive production-sim). Actors who belong to this culture B (presented here in an ideal-typical way) also believe in the necessity of economic growth and they anticipate the energy needs to rise. However, they also are attracted by the idea of higher energy efficiency and consider the breaking of the one-to-one relationship between economic growth and energy growth to be an important goal of energy policy. They see the short and long-term consequences of their activities and they believe that resources are somewhat limited. Nevertheless, within this given and perceived context there are ways to maximize

resources collectively. For culture B actors there is no contradiction between promoting technology of microprocessor

control systems for energy saving in buildings and advancing fast breeder reactor programs. We may say that this new « technical fix » culture reflects to a certain extent the newly emerging regime of capital accumulation of Post Fordism stressing new technologies as the backbone for a new form

of capital accumulation. As mentioned before, in the seventies labor productivity began to decline causing insufficient surplus-valued results from a growing mass of invested capital. A way out of this situation of capital accumulation could certainly be seen in broadening the Fordist dynamic through

revolutionary productivity (and wage advances) in the service and information sectors. Growth as usual certainly was not an option anymore, what was called for were « new ways

and forms of growth » - and this required a modified approach towards the energy question (Caputo 1984; Hirsch 1985).

A new culture of West European energy policy ?

The making of a new energy culture

It is against this background of the transition of Fordism to Post Fordism that we have to understand the emergence of new social movements articulating opposition against governmental energy policy. Economic decline creating a pessimistic public mood, the faltering of the political growth consensus as a result of a split in society between winners and losers of the Post Fordist transition and a more visible

and transparent role of the governments in managing this transition (Berger, 1979) set the stage for the conflict over energy and, implicitly, for a conflict over the direction and the character of this transition. This conflict took the form of an

attack on all three areas of the energy system (production, distribution, consumption), but especially with respect to large-scale power-generation. The focus of this attack has been the real or potential damages threatening humans and

nature from activities in the three energy sectors. The widely diversified character of the energy system has opened up a

broad range for concern in this respect. The most visible activities of these new social movements can be divided broadly

in two categories : first, increased, partially new forms of mass use of civil rights and second, activities located outside the framework of legality.

(1) Demonstrations, protest marches and rallies, especially near planned energy-production plants, gained prominence in the 1970s. Partially as a result of these activities consultations, hearings and commissions of inquiry were initiated by

many governments to take the public into concern. An example of this is the windscale inquiry, a public commission

with the task to recommend whether the British Nuclear Fuels Limited should be given permission to construct a Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant. In Sweden, Denmark,

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Austria and Germany the governments organized nationwide public debates between supporters and adversaries on nuclear power in order to promote « free and rational discussion ». Also, in some countries (Austria, Switzerland, Sweden) referendums to stop governmental energy projects (nuclear, hydropower) were initiated. Other forums for articulation of disagreement with governmental energy policy were judicial and quasi-judicial institutions, where energy decisions were increasingly challenged (Lauber 1982). (2) Activities belonging to the second category conflicting with the framework of legality include violations of demonstration rights and anti-nuclear terrorism. Sabotage and vandalism directed against nuclear installations occurred in Spain, France, West Germany, Sweden and Switzerland (Pilat 1980). Whether the activities from the second category can be legitimately linked with the new social movements as such or not is certainly debatable. However, it should be recognized that the activities of category one outstrip the activities of category two by far in terms of scope and participation.

How can we interpret these activities which have so much contributed to the impression that after the two « quiet » decades following World War M a « participatory revolution » (Kasse 1984) began in Western Europe? Certainly, at this point it is necessary to point towards the social-structural composition of the new social movements. Activists and sympathizers seem to be recruited primarily from three social groups: (1) the «new» middle classes (high educational status, relative economic security, employment in personal-service occupations) ; (2) « decommodified » groups (middle class housewives ; high school and university students ; retired people ; unemployed or marginally employed youths) ; (3) « old » middle classes (independent and self employed such as farmers, shop owners and artisan-producers), (Offe 1985, 832f ;). We could regard actors coming from the three groups described as either giving new emphasis on values such as autonomy and self-identity and having the cognitive skills making them especially sensitive for the legitimacy of the new dimension and new directions of government involvement in enacting energy policy after the two oil crises ; or as typical « losers » of the transition of Fordism to Post Fordism rendering them especially susceptible for political protest (Offe 1985). However, the social-structural possibility for a new issue-group cleavage neither explains the actual existence of such an issue-group cleavage nor the occurrence of political conflict. Cleavages may lead to conflict, but not necessarily. The condition for the reflection of social divergences in political life is politicization (Lane/Ersson 1987, 34f.), and this implies processes of communication.

Traditionally, communication is understood as a process of transmission. An originator sends a message to an addressee who receives a piece of information. However, this definition overlooks one of the main characteristics of communication, which is selection. Communication takes something out of the possible horizon of reference and ignores other things : communication further necessitates a selection of a specific form for transporting the communication ; and finally communication implies expectations concerning the reception selection of the conveyed information (Luhmann 1985). This tripartite definition of communication as a process of selection enables us to be more specific about the less visible, internal activities of new social movements in the field of energy policy. Emphasis is on the self-produced or autopoietic character of the movements which

adds a new dimension to the understanding of NSMS by transcending functionalist and resource mobilization perspectives (Japp 1984). In the beginning of the conflict over energy there was e.g. not the anti-nuclear movement, but a social-structural heterogeneous movement potential, neither a well-defined problem definition nor an obvious conflict dimension. As already mentioned, NSMs in the energy sector focus on specific risks stemming from energy-production/distribution/consumption. These risks certainly would also exist without the existence of new social movements, however, they have isolated risk as an important dimension of energy policy making. In this manner they have largely contributed to a new way of thinking about energy policy in the Western World and hence initiated a radical change in energy culture.

« Cultural change can be defined as the process by which some members of a society revise their cultural knowledge and use it to generate and interpret new forms of social behavior. At the heart of all cultural change are new patterns of thinking, new ideas, and new cognitive maps for behavior. In order for cultural change to occur, someone must revise his or her cultural knowledge and create new ways of understanding experience. It is often the case that people revise their cultural knowledge because of some major traumatic events. Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, wars, famines, disease epidemics... all stimulate cultural change. However, in absence of such events, small revisions in culture are made in a continuous process » (Spradley/Mc Curdy 1980, 382). Cultural change can be understood in terms of four related processes : innovation, social acceptance, performance and integration. Innovation shall be defined here as recombination of concepts from two or more mental configurations into a new pattern that is qualitatively different from existing terms » (Spradley/Mc Curdy 1980, 382). Mental configurations are clusters of concepts that are organized into a unified pattern of experience. They are crucial for the perception and interpretation of experience, however, their organization is often outside of human awareness. Innovation can be divided further in three steps : analysis, referring to the process of isolating the constituent parts of a configuration ; identification, which means that distinct configurations must be treated as if they were partially similar; and finally substitution, where concepts of the prototype configuration are replaced with concepts of the stimulus configuration. The three configurations which are of special interest for understanding new social movements as energy culture innovators are : risk-avoidance, hazards of life and energy generation. We can split these configurations into the following parts.

risk-avoidance	hazards of life	energy-generation
- abolish the risk	• death	• large scale (nuclear, coal, oil hydro)
• reduce the probability of loss	• illness	
• reduce the size of loss	- natural disasters	- small scale (solar, biomass, wind)
• insure yourself • ignore the risk	manamade disasters	

An important initial achievement of NSMs in the field of energy policy is the identifying of specific forms of energy-generation, namely large scale energy-generation, with all sorts of hazards of life, such as death, illness, natural disasters and man-made disasters. This was expressed by using different forms of expression, ranging from rational arguments to wearing skeleton costumes at demonstrations or buttons connecting nuclear power with death in everyday life. Certainly, not only large-scale plants were targets, but also cars burning gas and mining sites, although there is a heavy emphasis focusing on plants.

This specific conceptual recombination runs contrary to firmly established patterns of thinking about energy, which link, for example, nuclear power with cleanness or at least with economic necessity. I think we can reasonably assume that before the 1970s no larger attempts were made to establish a connection between the hazards of life and energy generation. Nevertheless, even before the 1970s it was obvious for energy-policy makers that there are risks involved with specific energy options. However, if there were risk-avoidance strategies pursued in the field of energy policy at all, then they were of a very specific type. We can say that these strategies were similar to those applied in traffic-policy in order to avoid car accidents. The surest way to avoid car accidents is to abolish cars. This was certainly never a feasible option. Instead, measures were taken to reduce the probability of loss, for example by prohibiting drunk driving or requiring driver's license. In addition, efforts were made to reduce potential size of losses, such as requiring cars to be equipped with better bumpers or requiring drivers to wear safety belts. And finally, insurance schemes became obligatory, altering the consequences of an accident. Likewise, in the case of energy policy, risks involved with energy-generation were neither completely ignored nor abolished, but strategies such as safety measures, evacuation plans, selection of the site, etc. were adopted in order to avoid or reduce risk. According to Aharoni, these risk-avoidance strategies reflect culturally a « New Social Order » : « *In all countries of the developed world, government is used to reduce or shift the risk borne by individuals. A new social order has evolved that started with a reliance by citizens on government for the solution to certain economic, social and cultural problems and has grown to include pressure on government to mitigate almost every risk an individual might be asked to bear* » (Aharoni 1981, 1). Obviously, this « New Social Order » necessitates a certain trust or belief that government is prepared and able actually to shift or reduce risk. With respect to energy policy, we can say that the actors in NSMs simply mistrusted the capability and willingness of the governments to control risks involved in energy-generation.

Culturally well established government strategies for reducing the probability of loss, reducing the size of loss or insuring against consequences of loss were equated by actors in NSMs with ignoring the risk ; or we could interpret that proponents of NSMs have equated large scale energy-generation with hazards of life and ignoring the risk. Whoever operates a nuclear power plant necessarily ignores the risks involved and this will lead to disaster. There is only one way to face up to the risk adequately: to abolish it.

This new way to think about some core-elements of governmental energy policy (presented here in an ideal-type fashion) was and is certainly not common cultural knowledge, but specific for the social world of the NSMs in the field of energy policy. Modern man does not live anymore in a

single social space, but in a patchwork of small social worlds, moving, so to say, from one social world to the other (Luckmann 1970). Each social world develops a universe of discourse. Experiences are categorized in particular ways, and a special set of symbols is used to refer to them. Each social world is a culture area, the boundaries are neither set by territory nor formal group membership, but by the limits of effective communication (Shibutani 1962). We can say that « membership » in energy-related NSMs, or, as Melucci prefers to say, in the loosely structured movement networks ((Melucci 1985, 788), is constituted through participation in those cultural confirmation selection/recombination processes, which slowly led to the creation of a new energy culture. Risk-aversity articulated in opposition against specific forms of energy-orientation, but every issue can also be seen as a concrete example of abstract principles pointing towards a particular vision of society and nature (Tesh 1984, 38). Members of the social world of NSMs see the world and its available resources as limited (spaceship earth). They think that the best strategy for surviving is to decrease needs and to say within these limited resources. This would also decrease the need for energy. Solar energy, biomass, wind and wave energy and consequent energy conservation would be soft alternatives to the hitherto gone hard path. Together with fewer hazards for humans and nature comes a more decentralized type of society with no need for large-scale technology and its associated demand for elitist expertise, central state authority and inherently anti-democratic institutions (Caputo 1984, Pepper 1984). We label this survivalist cultural category (here developed in an ideal-typical way).

In the beginning, as usual with cultural innovation, a few highly creative people having the capability to break down configurations more easily than others played a crucial role in developing culture C. In this context, books such as «Limits of Growth», «Blueprint for Survival», «Small is Beautiful » and Lovin's « Soft Energy Paths » played an avant-garde role in disseminating new ways to think about energy and environment (Pepper 1984, 22). Later, more and more actors, recruited primarily from the three groups identified above, became involved in this communication process leading to the negotiation of a problem diagnosis (identifying what is wrong and who is responsible for this state of affairs), to the identification of problem solutions and the creation of a rational for collective action (Ladd/Hood/Van Lieren 1983, 253) finally stimulating the establishment of protest movements.

Impacts of the new social movements

In evaluating the impact of innovation of the new survivalist energy culture, we have to take into account some more aspects of the process of cultural innovation. In order to become effective, (1) a cultural innovation must be accepted as valid and have revision impacts on people's cultural knowledge. Furthermore, (2) the new cultural knowledge must influence behavior in some way, the innovation must be used to interpret behavior and generate behavior (Spradell/McCurdy 1986).

(1) The protest behavior of the NSMs as described above can be understood as it's specific form of communicating the new energy culture to the reference groups of public opinion and political authorities. Through these transportation processes, the C culture had the chance to spill over to other

social worlds and to find its articulation there in a changed way to perceive the energy problem. The spill over this « new cultural knowledge » can be best documented by the development of West European public opinion about nuclear power and renewable energy sources. If we regard people's opinions as coded messages about their life experiences and underlying systems of beliefs and values as providing the keys to the code (Bennet 1980), we can then interpret dramatic shifts in public opinion as a reflection of cultural change. Traumatic events, which we identified above as typical stimuli for the revision of cultural knowledge, certainly were another important factor of influence here. Immediately following the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, support in the US for nuclear power decreased dramatically and this resistance spread into Europe (Pligt et al. 1984). Even more dramatic were the results of polls after Chernobyl. In France, a « before Chernobyl » majority of about two thirds in favour of nuclear power was cut to about half ; in Germany only 17 % are now in favour of nuclear power. Polls from elsewhere in Europe show roughly a third of the people in favour of nuclear power, and slightly larger numbers against. Between a third and a half have no strong feelings either way (*Financial Times*, Jan. 29, 1987). At the same time the number of Europeans in favour of renewable energy sources (more than 50%) is substantial and has remained about the same since the early 1980s (Commission of the European Communities 1987).

However, I think it would be exaggerated to attribute the switch from a before mid-70s European majority for nuclear power to a current majority against and the strong support for energy alternatives such as solar power or tidal power only to traumatic events. It seems to be quite plausible that NSMs which had begun to communicate their new way to look at energy already years before the mentioned accidents had laid a belief-system/values ground for the changes to take place. The shifts of the public opinion in the direction of energy culture C, although closely correlating with nuclear accidents, seem to be more than a temporary phenomenon. They are not only restricted to the rejection of nuclear power, and include also the more programmatic elements of culture C, pointing towards a more fundamental normative reorientation.

With respect to the political authorities there are few signs that energy culture C is recognized as valid or has had a revision-impact. The slowing down of nuclear programs in almost all West European countries does not reflect cultural change but increased costs of nuclear power, technical problems and/or errant machiavellism. Even in a country like Austria, which banned nuclear power before its first plant went into operation, top energy policy makers readily admit that they are certainly personally in favor of nuclear power, but that this option is politically simply not feasible right now. The situation is more ambiguous concerning energy conservation and renewables. Also in this case some authors assume political opportunism to be the moving force behind the tendency towards more energy conservation measures and the development of renewables (Lucas 1985 ; Kitschelt 1986). However, as mentioned above, the 1970s are cha-

racterized by the creation of a new, reformist energy culture 8 which is fully compatible with a stronger emphasis on energy conservation and the development of alternative energy sources. This new situation crystallizes in the case of France, which generates currently 70 % of its electricity from 49 nuclear power stations and runs at the same time some of the most ambitious programs in renewables and conservation in Western Europe (Lucas 1985, 57f.). Even if we attribute this development to the intention to pacify ecological unrest, it must be seen that the emergence of energy culture B is more than the result of tactical considerations, but also the expression of the transition of Fordism to Post Fordism stimulating a modified approach towards energy. Consequently, we interpret the impact of the NSMs on governmental energy policy with respect to conservation and renewables as facilitating the creation of energy culture B. Nevertheless, it should be noticed that energy cultures B and C differ profoundly in their conceptualization of the energy policy instruments conservation and renewables : whereas efforts to develop renewable energy sources more efficiently and to save, energy are the core elements of energy culture C, they only have peripheral and supplementary status in energy culture B.

(2) Even if the slowdown of the nuclear programs in most West European countries can only partially be attributed to the influence of NSMs and does not reflect a new risk aversity among energy policy makers, it certainly constitutes the most visible impact NSMs have taken on governmental energy « behavior ». Nevertheless, there are currently 150 nuclear plants in operation in Western Europe (Belgium : 8 ; Federal German Republic : 21 ; Finland : 4 ; France : 49 ; United Kingdom : 38 ; Italy : 3 ; Netherlands : 2 ; Sweden : 12 ; Switzerland : 5 ; Spain : 8). This means that in most West European countries the NSMs were not able to prevent the transition from oil to nuclear power which is shown by the steep increase in the percentage of nuclear power for electricity generation during the seventies and in the first half of the eighties. There is no nuclear power in Austria, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway and Portugal. Only in Austria and Denmark can the absence of nuclear power generation be related to anti-nuclear activism. In addition, most West European governments pursue ambitious programs in future nuclear technologies. In 1984, with the agreement of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK (and the Netherlands in principle) to a phased research, development and design program in fast reactors began a new phase of European nuclear collaboration. In nuclear fusion, the JET (Joint European Torus) project, the flagship of the Euratom Fusion Programme, unites 14 European nations -the 12 EC countries plus Sweden and Switzerland (*Financial Times*, July 9, 1987). Also, renewables and energy conservation have not gained a core position in West European energy policies (with the exception of Sweden and, to a lesser degree, Denmark). Furthermore, there were no institutional reforms towards a more decentralized energy system with a higher level of local and public participation (with the exception of the Scandinavian countries, where decentralized structures of energy supply exist traditionally).

From protest to policy ?

If my analysis of the impacts of the new social movements on governmental energy policy and public opinion is correct, then the conclusion is that NSMs were successful in preparing a shift in public attitudes towards nuclear power from affirmation and indifference to increased rejection and, implicitly, in creating a situation more favorable to social and environment-friendly energy choices. However, despite this expansion of the issue of radically new energy policy inspired by energy culture C, there are few signs that the issue has made its entrance into the West-European decision-making systems and that a serious, formal consideration of the issue by decision-makers has taken place. West European energy policy still appears to be dominated by a coalition of members from the energy cultures A and B who seem to be rather unimpressed by the visions of culture C actors and still set on growth of the energy sector, even if they differ considerably in their estimates concerning the score of this growth. How can we explain this rather limited influence of the new social movements on West-European energy policy? In general, this situation simply confirms the old wisdom that in politics the movement between public and formal agenda is far from automatic and that any issue can remain stalled between the two periods for long periods of time (Cobb/Ross/Ross 1976, 130). More specifically, it seems that on the one hand this stalemate in agenda building is closely related to the existing national opportunity structures which obviously constrained the chances of the NSMs to take decisive influence on governmental energy policy (Brand 1985, 326f. ; Kitschelt 1986). On the other hand, it must be taken into account that in the last 15 years new social movements in the energy sector had strongly focused in their activities on protesting against the construction of large-scale power plants, especially against nuclear plants. In contrast, there was much less emphasis in communicating alternative energy futures and its social and economic implications. What had been done was in general rather unspecific and vague and by less visible than the protest activities. Given limited resources and an existing chance to prevent the construction or beginning of operation of large-scale power plants, this strategy is understandable. Nevertheless, this strategy limited the chances of the NSMs to expand their issue to other groups and to link it with preexisting ones, steps which might have been necessary in order to move the agenda of the NSMs more efficiently into the decision-making arena. In other words, the new social movements in the different West-European countries turned out not to be strong enough alone to force their issue onto the national agenda, but at the same time pursued a political strategy which was not designed to attract any coalition-partners with decision-making power.

If this was the past, what is the present situation of NSMs in the context of West European energy policy and what might be their future ? The present situation differs from the situation of the early 1970s insofar as that today there are roughly 150 West European nuclear reactors in operation and that a further nuclear expansion comparable to the past must not be expected. Although shorter term energy consumption is expected to rise due to the recent fall in energy prices, energy forecasts expect only moderate consumption increases in the middle run (*Financial Times*, Feb. 3, 1987),

which implies decreasing construction activities, not only in the field of nuclear power generation. As a result, there seem to be far fewer chances for new social movements to mobilize against projected plants or plants under construction. The transition from coal and oil nuclear power and more energy saving, as recommended by the IEA in reaction to the two oil crises, appears to have reached its point of political and economic feasibility. But today's political context is also a Post Chernobyl context. This also means that, since the traumatic event of the nuclear accident in 1986, a clear majority of the Europeans are against nuclear power and for developing renewable energy sources as the most appropriate solution to the problem of how energy needs are to be met. This falling off in support for nuclear power since Chernobyl is found in all sections of the population, regardless of their age, educational level or political views. At the same time surveys show a clear increase in support for protest movements. Nearly sixty percent of the Europeans approve movements opposing the construction or use of nuclear power stations (Commission of the European Communities 1987). One would expect that this dramatically changed political environment is about to change the way the NSMs to fight their cause. Is there any evidence for such development? Basically, in the second half of the 1980s, there are two new tendencies discernible in the strategies of the NSMs in Western Europe : firstly, increased internationalization of the political activities and, secondly, a trend towards programmatic specification and a stronger emphasis on the elaboration of problem solutions.

Internationalization

The nuclear disaster of Chernobyl has drastically shown the limits of any national strategy against nuclear power. Since fall 1986, a series of international conferences organized by anti-nuclear activists have tried to respond to this situation with the coordination of political activities on an international level. The Anti-Atom International conference on reactor «un» safety in Vienna in September 1986 (organized simultaneously with the international Atomic Energy Organization (IAE) conference on reactor safety) was followed by the « For a Future without Atomic Power World Alternative Conference « on " Energy in Cannes in October, 1986 (organized simultaneously with the World Energy Conference organized by energy producers and state administrations). In April, 1987 the European initiative for Direct Democracy met in Stuttgart and in May, 1987 the «Anti-Nuke International Meeting » took place in Brussels. The objectives of these conferences were to establish a European network composed of representatives from local and national anti-nuclear movements, Green parties, labour unions, concerned scientists and lawyers working for the abolition of nuclear power in Europe through the initiation of referendums, the development of abolition scenarios and the coordination of political protest and demonstrations. Besides attempts of a conceptual and strategic reorganization there are also strong signs for a new period of national NSMs «foreign policy»: in Sweden, e.g. the initiative « Stoppa Barseback nu » (close the nuclear power plant in

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Barseback, Sweden now) mobilizes against other nuclear power plants close to Sweden, such as Ignalina (in the Soviet Union), in Austria an initiative agitating against a nuclear reprocessing plant in nearby Wackersdorf (Germany) got a new boost. The main impact of this internationalization seems to be support and information for the many sometimes scattered local and national movements, as well as a strong stimulus for movements in countries where nuclear protest had slackened, be it because « the battle » seemed to be lost (as in France), or because « the battle » was won, (as in Austria). In other words, processes of internationalization might have the important implication that they reduce the influence of national opportunity structures and hence add to the mobilization potential of the NSMs. The West-German government's decision of 1989 to renounce the construction of the nuclear reprocessing plant in Wackersdorf as a reaction to the surging internal and external pressures is a good example for the effectiveness of this international political mobilization.

Programmée specification and elaboration of solutions

It seems that in the mid-eighties besides continuing political protest activities, NSMs engage more in developing elaborated and specified scenarios for alternative energy futures. This trend is probably related to the fact in most West European countries (in the first half of the 1980s) Green parties emerged out of networks and alliances of citizen initiatives (Muller-Rommel), 1985, 491). These Green

parties not only needed more or less coherent platforms to demonstrate that they are more than protest parties and actually can offer alternative solutions. Also, in those countries where candidates of the Greens were elected in local or national elections, this usually meant access to new resources enabling these parties to win programmatic stature. This development was accelerated by the Chernobyl event, when all of a sudden the majority of the West Europeans turned against nuclear power and, may be for the first time since the

severe setbacks of the mid-seventies for the NSMs in many West European countries, abolishing nuclear power was perceived again to be a realistic possibility. What came to be at stake then was not a single nuclear power plant, but nuclear power as such. In the seventies the energy conflict was explicitly over single nuclear power plants and implicitly

over nuclear power as such, after Chernobyl it is quite the reverse. Whereas fighting against a particular plant in a particular region does not necessarily require or stimulate the generation of alternative solutions, the situation is different when the conflict assumes a more generalized character. Then the question immediately arises : if not nuclear power, what else, and if there is an alternative, how to get from here to there ? It might be that this situation has somehow forced the anti-nuclear activists to be more specific about how to make out of energy culture C a feasible political program.

Without going into details here, the « transition from nuclear power » programs, as developed recently by groups

such as Greenpeace in the UK, the German Greens or French anti-nuclear activists, propose the following strategy : (1) As a short term measure nuclear power should be abolished immediately or within a couple of years. At the same time the life of existing coal, oil and gas fired stations should be extended and some new coal or gas stations should be

planned : also, the governments must introduce new combined heat and power schemes as well as energy conservation measures in industry, offices and home. This must be supplemented by institutional reform towards a more decentralized, « recommunalized » type of energy supply system strongly oriented toward the needs of energy consumers, rather than toward the marketing interests of energy producers. The different « Ausstieg » (exit) scenarios show in great detail and by means of statistical computation that this strategy is economically and technically feasible. (2) In the long run a combination of energy conservation measures as well as a build-up of renewable sources of energy should reduce primary energy demand drastically. Research, development and demonstration budgets must be restructured accordingly.

What are the main economic and political implications of these « exit » scenarios ? They open up new possibilities for « coalition »-building because they have profound implications for other issues than energy policy. The first step of the exit scenario, a shift from nuclear to coal and gas, would be especially beneficial for the declining coal industries and the job situation there. With respect to conservation and renewables, a broad range of positive side-effects with implications for employment, creating business, economic performance, social policy and energy security can be expected. In the UK a study on the employment potential of an energy conservation program directed principally at reducing space heating showed estimates the annual employment generated by the program to be up to 155,000 jobs. The jobs created would be largely unskilled and semi-skilled, with a high proportion of the jobs occurring in areas of high unemployment. A recent study for the Commission of the European Communities has estimated that the net employment increase of conservation programs with about 520,000 person years by the year 2000. One reason for the positive net effects of conservation programs is that they are more cost-effective than increasing energy supplies ; another reason is

that conservation employment tends to be national or locally

based, whereas often a considerable portion of the energy supplied is imported (IEA 1987,88f.). A decrease in energy imports also would contribute to energy security. The growing number of poor people who are unable to heat their homes adequately would also benefit from programs insulating homes. In general a « recommunalized » energy system based strongly on renewables and conservation is expected to cause substantial financial relief for households, industries and the communes (Hennicke/Johnson/Kohler/Seifried 1985).

Currently, this potential for « coalition »-building is far from exhausted by anti-nuclear movements or Green parties.

However, there are first signs of such attempts as demonstrated by a gradual rapprochement between Greens and labor unions in Germany and Switzerland. But we should not expect any strong and formal alliances or coalitions between NSMs or Green parties and more established political groups in the near future. The loosely structured movement networks and Green parties are unlikely partners for this kind of coalition. More probable are informal issue-coalitions

based on a shared perception of problems and a shared interpretation of a solution for these problems. These issue-

coalitions might be only of temporary character, nevertheless, they could be crucial for a gradual entrance of energy culture C related issues into West-European decision-making systems.

Outlook

Even if we assume, which is at this point in time difficult to assess, that we face after Chernobyl a new pattern of anti-nuclear mobilization attempting a radical reorientation in energy policy in Western Europe which is very different from the one of the mid-seventies because of the new patterns of international organization, programmatic specification, potential attractiveness for new « coalition-partners » and mass support, we should not anticipate automatic success. Given the strong determination of most West European governments not to phase out nuclear power or to make any other substantial changes in national and international energy policy, constraining political opportunity structures and the need to make a far reaching highly controversial decision, the above mentioned search by the anti-nuclear activists for national or even local referendums appears to be a promising strategy for the near future. The same conflicting pressures which might make West European governments unable to generate more than a non-decision as a response to the anti-nuclear mobilization might stimulate them to recede to a referendum. This was already the case in Sweden, Austria and Switzerland (Sweden decided to phase out nuclear power by 2000, Austria said no to nuclear power, Switzerland yes). In Italy a referendum was initiated by the Greens and several citizen initiatives. On November 8/9, 1987 a broad majority of the Italian voters said « No » to nuclear power elections leading to a moratorium for further nuclear power plants in Italy. In Switzerland recently, more than 100.000 signatures have been submitted by an initiative demanding a ban on all future nuclear expansion and calling for the phase-out of existing nuclear plants as soon as possible. The campaign to make Switzerland nuclear-free has been

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- given a boost by a government study which confirms that nuclear phase-out is possible by the year 2025 without energy rationing or damage to the national economy. That is the conclusion of one of three scenarios described in a study drawn up by a group of experts charged by the Swiss government to look into post-Chernobyl energy futures (WISE 1988). All West European nations, with the notable exception of Germany, provide the possibility for referendums, although it is only frequently used in Switzerland (Butler/Ranney 1978). However, such a referendum could only initiate a profound energy policy change if it would not only decide for or against nuclear power (as it was the case in Austria and Switzerland), but also oblige the government to pursue a new energy path with an emphasis on renewables and conservation (as is the case in Sweden). In this respect a comparison between the energy policies of Sweden and Austria since the referendum is revealing: whereas Sweden has shown strong attempts to redirect its national energy policy towards a strong emphasis on renewables and conservation, Austria has primarily substituted nuclear power with a stronger reliance on large scale hydro-power and coal. (Gottweis 1986).
- Thus, despite the limited impact of the NSMs on West European energy policy in the past, it is exactly this « defeat » of the NSMs in the energy conflict that has led to the creation of new strategies, which by avoiding the shortcomings of the old strategies might turn out to be more successful than the ones applied in the past. These new strategies, together with the altered public attitudes towards energy questions after Chernobyl, might lead to the establishment of more powerful « coalitions » - on a national as well as on an international level - pressing for a radical change in energy policy based on ideas as expressed by an energy culture oriented on the survival of mankind.
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Turning Nightmares into Dreams : The Green Movement in Eastern Europe

by Michael Redcliff*

The demand for a more sustainable, more ecologically-sound way of life is now surfacing in Eastern Europe in a form significant not only for the democratization process in the East, but also for environmental movements in the West. It is becoming apparent that although environmental protest is often global in nature, and arises from a similar unease with the courses of the current development process, such protest can also serve as a focus for very specific opposition movements, concerned as much with ethnic identity and alternatives to centrally planned economies, as with the breakdown of ecological systems. The emergence of green movements in Eastern Europe also highlights the difficulties which the environment poses for Marxist theory, and the state's response under what Bahro has termed *actually existing socialism* (1).

Marxism and the Environment

The environment poses a number of problems for Marxist theory. Any materialist philosophy, certainly one as concerned with historical transformations as Marxism, must attach weight to the environment and natural resources. The writings of Marx and Engels make considerable reference to the centrality of the natural environment, as numerous writers have demonstrated (2). But Marxism envisages labour, capital and technology, rather than natural resources, as the dynamic ingredients in transformative social change. Although Engels, in two essays published in 1875 and 1876, drew attention to the possibility of man neglecting the laws of nature, and having to live with the consequences, he still insisted that our understanding of nature — through science — enabled us to act to minimize any 'imbalances' or crises (3).

Imbued as they were with the Promethean spirit of the late nineteenth century, neither Marx nor Engels saw ecological factors as a break on human possibilities. Indeed, notably in his critique of Malthus, Marx argued that there were no «natural limits» on human potential, merely the economic and political limits imposed by the way capitalism. This article is reproduced from *The Ecologist*, Vol. 19, N° 5, September/October 1989, with permission.

exploited resources. Marx made it clear in *Grundrisse* that «natural necessity in its direct form» was disappearing, since capitalism had replaced the needs created by nature with *historically created needs* (4).

The central problem for Green politics — that ecological imbalance and scarcity followed the creation of these «historical needs» — was hardly touched on by Marx and Engels, for whom scarcity was not a binding constraint. Human alienation from nature, which Marx saw linked to human alienation from labour, and the products of labour, was viewed exclusively as a feature of capitalist society (5). Human beings needed to reconcile themselves to the physical conditions of their existence, but this could only come about when those conditions of existence were transformed under communism.

Two other areas of Marxist theory also pose problems for the development of sound ecological policies: the way that value is conceptualized in Marxism, and the role accorded to science and technology in transforming human relations with nature. According to the Marxist theory of value, what distinguishes «value» is the amount of labour time embodied in commodities. The term «commodity fetishism» — later up by Green thinkers like Bahro as a central part of their critique of consumer society (6) — was, for Marx, symptomatic of capitalism's distortion of real value. To ascribe a greater value to one of two commodities, each of which embodied an equal amount of labour, was a nonsense, according to Marx, but clearly happened all the time in capitalist society. Under communism, objects, whether precious gems or basic foods, would be worth no more than the labour embodied in them: their use value would no longer be more nor less than exchange value.

The problem which such a theory presents for Green thinking is not difficult to identify: since value is not based on the inherent property of natural substances, but the labour that enters into their transformation, what «value» do we attach to the environment, or what Marxists have termed «external nature»? Marx's assumption, improbable as it may seem from the standpoint of the late 1980s, was that under the advanced forms of production which communism promised, there would be *both* an adequate supply of material goods *and* sufficient clean air, unpolluted water, fertile soils and plentiful forests to support any population. What

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we today call « carrying capacity » would not be an issue.

Marx and Engels expected socialism to bring « social mastery » over nature, through the rational use of advanced technology. As Marx expressed it in the first volume of *Capital*, nature was « man's original tool house », the origin and source of capital (7). This extraordinary faith in technology was later echoed by Trotsky, who wrote : « ...the proper goal of communism is the domination of nature by technology, and the domination of technology by planning, so that the raw materials of nature will yield up to mankind all that it needs and more besides. » (8).

Similar convictions were put even more forcefully by Lenin in 1920, who claimed that « Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country » (9).

Marxist theory — and the convictions to which it gave rise - have thus encountered serious problems in adjusting to the scale and the nature of environmental issues. As Schmidt put in *The Concept of Nature in Marx*, his classic text on the subject, « ...there is no systematic Marxist theory of nature of such kind as to be conscious of its own speculative implications. » (10). Or, as Bahro has expressed it, in what was to become a more revisionist stance, « ...we can no longer share the spirit », with which Marx celebrated the progressive role of capitalist industrialization (11).

What has developed in most industrial societies (both capitalist and state socialist) is a profound unease at the way in which confident assumptions about industrial society have been systematically undermined by day-to-day experience -

the creation of waste, the failure to solve pressures on limited resources, and the increasingly restricted role for individuals to take responsibility for their own immediate environment and that of others in other societies.

These kinds of concerns strike at the heart of Marxist analysis, requiring either a total re-think of basic concepts or, alternatively, the jettisoning of Marxist theory itself as an analytical tool (12). We are also left with practical problems to resolve. If, contrary to what Marx believed, human society is no longer capable of solving the problems it sets itself, how

do societies forged within a Marxist framework resolve the contradictions of their own development ? This is the question facing East European countries today.

Industrialization and the Environment in Eastern Europe

To understand the growth and direction of East European Green movements today, we need to direct our attention to the way in which the state has managed the environment, as well as social discontent, in the Soviet Union and its economic and political allies. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, « socialist industrialization » was traditionally depicted as a unique attempt to establish heavy industry, usually in the shortest time possible. As Zeigler remarks, the dedication to five-year planning was linked to huge penalties and disincentives if planning targets were not met (13). The result was the « storming » of heavy construction works, and minimal attention to the environmental effects of major projects. Not surprisingly, those countries with the largest concentration of heavy industry have, subsequently, faced the greatest environmental problems. Today, in parts of Czechoslovakia and Poland, even infant mortality rates have begun to rise again, as a result of widespread air and water pollution (14).

In the course of the drive to rapid industrialization, which echoed the Soviet experience under Stalin, the political élites

« The latest Slovene opinion polls show that about 70 per

cent of the population (some two million people) would support a Green Movement in Slovenia, if one existed ». In East European countries sought to legitimize their own position through acquiring industrial technology from the West. Often this technology was already semi-obsolete when it was introduced. On the whole, the notion of the « quality of life », an issue which has animated environmentalists in the West since the 1960s, was seen in the Eastern Bloc countries as faintly « exotic ».

Bureaucracy

The extremely bureaucratic and top heavy administrative structure of Eastern Bloc countries has also contributed to environmental degradation. The excessive fragmentation of different departments of government, each with a different environmental concern, is not a peculiarity of communist governments, but in some ways it is even more pronounced in Eastern Europe than in the West. Environmental issues tend to fall between departments, and lose visibility as a result. In addition, within a socialist economy, primary materials for projects are provided effectively free of charge ; there is no market mechanism to reflect even the cost of extraction, inadequate as this may be.

To compound the problem there has been a serious lack of « feedback » as environmental problems have emerged.

This lack of awareness and willingness to act is, in turn, related to the official view of state planning as « rational » - according to objective, socialist principles : thus government intervention to protect the environment is only considered justified if it is supported by value-free (socialist) science. Decisions about the environment should be taken on « technical » as well as « political » grounds. Especially in the Soviet Union, the leading distinction within the «official» camp is between those who favour policies of unrestrained growth, in other words, a continued quest for socialist industrialization, and the scientists and policymakers who urge a larger role for technical factors. Most people in both camps reflect a boundless confidence in technological « fixes », both to achieve growth objectives and to undo the consequences of unsustainable economic growth.

The essential element in the management of the environment, as of much else, is the Administrative Command System (ACS), which is not only responsible for environmental planning, but also sets the tone of most social responses to

it (15). Until relatively recently, most movements of social protest over the environment were, in fact, supplementing the official actions of the ACS. As we shall argue, this is decreasingly the case today : environmental movements, most notably in Hungary, Yugoslavia and Poland, see themselves as an alternative, rather than a complement, to the ACS.

Information Management

Until the area of *glasnost*, secrecy was an important characteristic of Soviet environmental planning. Information was collected quite systematically about air and water pollution, for example, but it was published in a much less systematic form, partly to obscure the facts and to hinder comparison (16). More recently, reliable data has appeared on a variety of subjects central to environmental planning : child

mortality figures have been revised, and information on levels of air pollution and environmentally-linked illness have appeared.

Just three years ago, Zeigler presented a picture of « *information management* » in the Soviet Union which had scarcely changed since Stalin. Under the state corporatist model he outlined, the role of the media in the Soviet Union was to « *mobilize bias* », not a middle-class opinion (or 'middle America') as in the West, but of privileged bureaucratic interests. Environmental issues were only discussed after they had been explicitly or implicitly approved of : at this stage they were submitted to the media and the media was left to communicate the state's objectives. Recognizing that, even in his first year of office, Gorbachev had begun the long task of reform, Zeigler commented : « *We can only speculate about the environmental consequences should the Soviet Union initiate a major reform programme* » (17).

The events following the Chernobyl accident may only have dented Soviet technological hubris, but there is little doubt that they did prompt some serious re-assessments of environmental risk. Today, about 40 people from the Soviet Union's independent environmental movements participate as Deputies of the Supreme Soviet, and expanding international contacts have helped forge links between Soviet citizens involved in environmental campaigns, and Green activists abroad.

Ecology Movements : The New Opposition

To appreciate the range and current direction of environmental movements in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we need to examine the specific combination of factors which has led to their evolution, and the challenge that they represent to the established order—the ACS - in these countries. Individual countries have experienced a specific range of environmental problems, and the political debate surrounding these issues are linked, in a variety of ways, to non-environmental aspects of the current political situation. It is worth reviewing some of these experiences :

The Soviet Union

According to research undertaken by Yanitsky, based both on interviews with over 100 key environmental activists, and on an analysis of candidates' election programmes for the position of Peoples' Deputy, environmental movements in the Soviet Union are on the threshold of some fundamental changes (18).

For the first time in the history of the country, independent movements are emerging, not as part of the ACS, but in opposition to it. These movements are composed of well-educated, sometimes well-connected people, whose aim is to ensure that environmental issues are fully discussed before policies are framed. According to Yanitsky, « *in the course of perestroika a qualitatively new situation began to develop* », in which groups of citizens have drawn attention to environmental problems from outside the state structure, with the aim of co-opting scientific opinion on to the side of dissent (19). These movements see themselves as « *environmental defenders from the encroachments of the ACS* ».

Unlike previous groups of nature conservationists, some of which had limited official support, these movements « *realize that their bitter enemy is neither pesticides nor technology, but the system which makes use of them* » (20). Attention has increasingly shifted from criticism of the actions of the ACS - in areas such as the deployment of new nuclear

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power plants, industrial enterprises, canal construction and other public works — to criticism of the system of planning itself, and the way that production is financed and organized.

Most environmental activists are imbued with similar values to those in the West, placing emphasis not simply on ways and means of effecting change but on alternative systems of values. In some parts of the Soviet Union, notably the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, these alternative environmental values are closely linked, in specific ways, with the programmes of the nationalist Popular Fronts.

According to Yanitsky's calculations, the membership of environmental groups in the Soviet Union is similar to that in many Western countries : about eight per cent of the urban population over 14 years of age are at least passive members of environmental groups, and about one per cent are active members. Efforts to enlist the support of scientists and technical experts are especially marked among residents' groups.

The activities of environmental groups constitute part of the move towards the gradual creation of an autonomous civil society in the Soviet Union, outside the parameters of the state bureaucracy. However, as in the West, the growth

of ecology-conscious opinion still faces major handicaps, notably in convincing industrial workers that restructuring the economy need not lead to the loss of their livelihood.

Hungary

Hungary provides the clearest example of popular mobilization around environmental issues. In the 1970s, the environmental movement in Hungary was confined to parts of the monolithic one-party system. There was little discussion of the limits to growth, or the applicability of environmental problems in capitalist industrial societies to socialist ones.

Much of the impetus for the growth of the environmental movement was provided by the attention being given to global concerns in other countries, which increasingly led people to ask about environmental problems in Hungary. Ecological threats appeared to go hand-in-hand with other important economic problems and to require major financial investment. This gave rise to demands for closer supervision of state-funded projects and scrutiny of their environmental implications. It was realized that ensuring environmental standards implied a transfer of resources from other sectors of activity, and a longer time horizon in which to make decisions.

In Hungary in particular, early opposition to the government's environmental policies helped to create the conditions in which the demands for greater democracy were framed. During the 1970s, lobbying by environmental groups was instrumental both in changing legislation on the environment and in charting the evolution of those state institutions responsible for environmental management. Persanyi calls the official organizations of the state the « *traditional players* », and it is these groups which, through their neglect of participatory demands, helped stimulate a wider ecological consciousness (21). Hungarian citizens, he notes, have « *become dissatisfied with the opportunities offered by the traditional organizations directed from above in accordance with Stalin's driving-belt principle* » - that is, the idea that state organizations are « *driving belts* » between the party and the people.

The real breakthrough for the opposition movements came during 1988, when groups opposing the building of a

series of dams on the Danube came together to voice their opposition not merely to the new dams themselves but to the thinking behind them. It became clear, as Persanyi explains, « *That environmental protection was as policy-free as the wooden horse of Troy was soldier free* » (22). Moreover, the arguments over the Danube dams drew on other concerns which were not strictly ecological : the demand for a new model of political management united different opposition forces, socialists, social democrats, liberals, Christian democrats and nationalists, as well as radical ecologists.

Nonetheless, as these groups became transformed into political parties - now possible under the new democratic reforms in Hungary - there is a very real threat that environmental demands will be given less emphasis than economic reforms designed to open up the economy to market forces.

Indeed, such are the differences in attitudes and values amongst Hungary's environmentalists, that, in Persanyi's view, « *if a Green party were created in Hungary in the near future the majority of environmentalists would stay out* » (23).

At the same time, there is undoubtedly a much broader

basis to environmental consciousness than is likely to be reflected in electoral support for Green groups alone. Local environmental campaigns — from the protests at Heviz over the effects of bauxite mining, to demonstrations against the planned dumping of radioactive waste from the Paks nuclear power plant near Ofalu, and the protest over urban air pollution, especially in Budapest - have all highlighted the wider

political implications of environmental protection, and the state's role in the destruction. Indeed, because opposition groups used ecological issues as part of a broader campaign

for democracy and citizenship, environmental consciousness is widely diffused in Hungary. The successful setting up

of formal, democratic political parties is thus very unlikely to lead to a reduction in environmental consciousness, although the current move to greater democracy might not immediately benefit the ecological opposition.

Poland

The 1980s have also seen the rise to prominence of an opposition movement in Poland, in the form of Solidarity. Outlets for collective action that were previously closed have opened up new areas for political dissent, and groups have formed around a plethora of causes - from ecological and consumer groups to movements for the promotion of entrepreneurship. Most of these movements have not been examined in depth, but a series of studies have been undertaken of local community activity in Poland, and have recently been summarized by Jalowiecki (24). What follows is an abridged version of this analysis.

As a result of the government's refusal to give assurances to local people that their communities would be protected from the worst ravages of «redevelopment» schemes, numerous « citizens' movements » have sprung up though out Poland. In the town of Augustow, for example,

a movement emerged in 1982 when a group of 27 small holders challenged the expropriation procedure under which the city council acquired land for housing development. Local farmers, invoking land use legislation, sought to reverse the official decision. Initially, environmental protection was a secondary issue but it gradually gained prominence as people from nearby towns were drawn into the

wider debate about development planning priorities. The local movement succeeded in forcing a decision to revise the city plan in 1987.

The movement in Rabka had similar roots, emerging after about 30 farmers protested against the planned expropriation of their holdings in a beautiful, mountainous region ear-

marked for residential development. As in Augustow, the adversaries were the city planning office. The protesters argued that development would interfere with the ecology of the area, destroying the landscape and changing the micro-climate. In due course, allies were found in the Polish Ecological Club, the Association of Polish Planners and the central political authorities. Although the local environmental group was denied official recognition, the Society of Friends of Rabka had, by 1987, halted the original development plan.

Similar local movements sprang up in Gloskow, where local market-gardeners opposed a plan to introduce high-density development :again, environmental protection initially emerged as a secondary issue, but later grew in importance, becoming linked to the whole question of citizens' rights (25). Although slightly different in form, Polish urban movements have also seized on environmental protection, which has been invoked by local people seeking to reverse urban planning decisions.

Other movements have had less parochial influence.

The best example is probably the movement opposed to the storage of radioactive waste from a prospective atomic power station at Miedzyszcz Wielkopolski. The issue in this area, once the documents outlining plans had been leaked, was the risk posed by the waste dump to a large urban population, and additionally, the threatened destruction of a natural habitat for one of Europe's most important colonies of bats.

All these protest movements emerged from what was seen as the infringement of the rights of individuals or groups to be consulted in the planning process. In the course of the protest campaigns, however, it was the issue of environmental protection which came to exert the most important influence : what was at stake was the violation of a broader

system of values, in which long-term sustainable objectives were sacrificed in favour of short-term economic benefits. Far from simply upholding sectional interests, these movements came to represent the protection of the common good.

Yugoslavia

The success of environmental movements in Yugoslavia has been influenced by several of the factors already discussed, especially the democratization process, which has favoured greater recognition for the « nationalities » over the centralized state. In many respects, though, Yugoslavia's proximity to the West - geographically and politically - has

given greater emphasis to the international dimensions of domestic ecological issues. Most of the adherents to the Green movement, in Slovenia at least, are young and critical of what they see as the rigidity of state socialism. The state has sought to enlist them in support of official environmental programmes, but this has proved a daunting, if not impossible, task. As Kos argues :

« *Before the producers of ideology realized that their efforts were directed to an empty space, the young developed their own political life. The so-called marginal, alternative subculture of the young has become openly political* » (26).

Subsequent protest has often been in consort with Green movements in other countries : together with Italian ecologists, Yugoslav Greens opposed the projected coal-fired electric power station in Mije, on the Italian side of the Yugoslav/Italian border. With Austrian environmentalists, Yugoslav activists opposed the disposal of radioactive waste in

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Yugoslavia. Some actions have been even wider, such as Yugoslav participation in the European Youth Forest Action campaign.

Awareness of the perilous state of Yugoslavia's environment has spurred official government institutions into several initiatives, including a major conference in 1987 on « Ecology, Energy and Saving ». However, the declaration which emerged from the conference had hardly any practical political effect (27).

Much more important in political terms was the establishment of a Green Union in Slovenia in early 1988. In its published programme, the Union explicitly states that official institutions are unable to deal adequately with environmental problems, while their actions are exclusively concerned with alleviating environmental damage *after the event*, rather than with the promotion of alternative, ecologically-conscious development policies. By early 1989, there were about 25 societies actively involved in environmental protection in Slovenia. These locally-based organizations are able to enlist a great deal of 'casual' support. A recent street demonstration in Slovenia, for example, saw the participation of an estimated 100,000 people to demand changes in the way the Slovene environment and natural resources are managed.

Opinion polls on environmental issues in Yugoslavia show an awareness of Green concerns that is increasing almost daily. According to Kos, the latest Slovene opinion polls show about 70 per cent of the population (some two million people) would support a « Green Movement » in Slovenia, if one existed (28). Not all of those polled were aware of the existence of environmental movements in Yugoslavia.

The ecological agenda is seen as necessarily international, and subversive of the model of « Socialist industrialization » still favoured by the party orthodoxy. As young people become more disaffected with official politics, they gravitate towards local, ecological action, rarely showing interest in national-level Yugoslav institutions, preferring instead to forge links with similarly-minded people in other countries.

The New Opposition

The emergence of Green movements in Eastern Europe has significance for a number of reasons : these movements expose problems in orthodox Marxist analysis ; they remind us that ecological politics cannot simply be understood in terms of Western capitalism ; and they serve to illuminate the way in which the ecological crisis is bound up with questions of human rights, freedom of information and participatory democracy.

The historical circumstances that separate the two economic systems in Europe have given rise to opposition movements with separate agendas, but shared objectives. In Western Europe, the Green movement has emerged to challenge the « official opposition », represented by social democratic, Christian democrat or communist parties. In Eastern Europe, Green politics - allied to demands for human rights and recognition of ethnic aspirations - has developed as part

of the growth of civil society. In a serious sense, the new Green movements of Eastern Europe are the political opposition, although often their activity is focused at the local level.

What has forged these Green movements is the guiding principle that people have a right to decide how their own

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resources and environment are managed, and the role of government is to respond to their wishes. Belated international recognition of the limits to resource exploitation has merely lent more urgency to essentially domestic preoccupations.

Signs of a Rethink

One indication of the success of the Green movement in the Eastern Bloc is that official Marxist ideology is now being criticised from within the state bureaucracy. For example, researchers at the Academy of Sciences in the German Democratic Republic - in this respect, as in so many others, one of the least reconstructed states - no longer see environmental problems solely as a contradiction of capitalism. There is now a belated, but explicit, recognition that « *at a later moment natural barriers (add) a new dimension which cannot be overcome any longer by the logic of the (large scale) technological mode of production* » (29). What is required, in the view of these East German researchers, is that « priority (be) given to preventive environmental policy » (30). This paper and others like it, concede that the more technological innovations incorporate environmental considerations, the more necessary it becomes for environmental policy to be subject to greater democratic control. More sustainable environmental management has to be translated into democratic action.

The same issue is raised in even clearer terms in the context of Poland. As Jalowiecki comments : « *The crisis now being experienced by other socialist countries springs from a planning illusion. It was assumed that nationalization of the economy would clear the way to central control of the flow of capital goods and human behaviour for the good of society as a whole. It turned out, however, that interests within society are conflicting, that extreme centralization of decision-making not only does not reduce, but may actually encourage, deviant behaviour, that there is no algorithm for guiding complicated economic and social processes, and that bureaucratic control is none too effective* » (31).

A New Agenda

It is a paradox of economic development in Eastern Europe that a « second path » to industrialization, by extending the role and influence of the state, has only served to exacerbate environmental problems, removing their solution from the hands of those worst affected, and putting it into the hands of those for whom immediate economic growth must have priority. But this model leads to its own undoing : the « concrete Utopias » which people believe in are increasingly not those of « actually existing socialism » but the movements of ecological opposition.

There are clearly social contradictions as well. Environmental activists in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, rather like their counterparts in the West, are overwhelmingly well-educated, young, and usually middle-class. The compass of their protest is much wider, of course, but this appeal cannot be read from their class position. As Kos expresses it, « *in this respect the new social movements under socialism are indeed something quite new, because individuals act as citizens and not primarily as working people* » (32). It is not the dictatorship of the proletariat that environmentalists are pursuing, but the democracy of civil society, the emancipation of the citizenry.


At the same time, the demands of the new environmental

movements carry a momentum that appears to place them outside history, as it were, as part of a wider, global imperative. Links to the scientific community are valued not because of the « scientific » claims of the dominant ideology, but because it is felt that, in a better world, science might come to the aid of the people, and the environment. Ethnicity is emphasized, because it is important in its own right, in societies whose political boundaries do not describe the boundaries of ethnic groups, but also because an attachment to the land and natural resources is deemed part of the individual's ethnic identity. Ethnic identity and environmental consciousness function as two sides of the same coin.

Green movements have arisen in response to strong, existential needs, for the Utopian as well as the pragmatic.

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Bridging Institutions

The U.S. Institute for Development Research (710 Commonwealth Ave, Boston MA 02215) (IDR) has become increasingly interested in the organizational forms it calls «bridging institutions». Bridging institutions work with diverse constituencies to promote cooperation and mutual influence to solve problems or to attain common visions. IDR is particularly interested in bridging institutions that promote sustainable development, though they can serve many purposes and take many forms.

IDR's interest in bridging institutions stems in part from our work with grassroots nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The Irian Jaya Community Development Foundation (YPMD) of Indonesia, for example, works to organize poor and unsophisticated village groups to become more self-reliant. They must also build credibility with international donors who support their work, and preserve good relations with government agencies that work in the area. Like many grassroots NGOs, YPMD must bridge economic, political and cultural chasms separating these constituencies to be effective in the long term.

Intermediary or support agencies that provide services to grassroots NGOs also function as bridging institu-

tions. The Society for Participatory Research (PRIA), for example, provides consultation and training to enhance the capacities of grassroots agencies in India and other Asian countries. PRIA's work requires dealing effectively with NGO clients and sources of technical support as well as with international donors and national government officials in order to strengthen the capabilities of the NGO sector.

The Asian NGO Coalition (ANGOC) exemplifies another type of bridging institution - national and regional associations of development agencies. ANGOC works to span the differences between members drawn from many countries and deals on

their behalf with international agencies concerned with regional NGO activities.

IDR also cooperates with bridging institutions that are issue-based coalitions and networks, like the Congress for a People's Agrarian Reform (CPAR) in the Philippines or the Voluntary Action Network/India (VANI). These coalitions include diverse constituents who need each other meet common objectives for influencing national or international policies. They seek to bridge the gap between grassroots agencies and national and international development policy-makers.

While our interest in bridging problems has been sparked by our association with these agencies, it has

been strongly reinforced by our recent experiences. A year ago IDR decided to complement a « Southern strategy » of assisting partner NGOs in developing countries with a « Northern strategy » of influencing regional and international policies that affect their work. We have consequently undertaken research and writing for the World Bank, US-AID, and OECD and made presentations to donors and policy makers.

IDR has become, in a sense, another type of bridging institution. It has not been easy to please all our constituencies. Many NGO colleagues, for example, criticized drafts of our analysis for the World Bank as too academic and « neutral ». Readers

at the Bank, in contrast, thought we were prone to issuing « clarion calls » for action. Finding ways to speak effectively to both constituencies is a challenge, but we believe that linking North and South in the creation, transmission, and reformulation of development ideas and policies is an important role for IDR.

In short, IDR's interest in the problems and possibilities of bridging institutions is relevant at many levels. We believe that bridging institutions will play a key role in catalyzing sustainable improvements in the capacity of poor people to participate in and benefit from social, economic, and political development. We also think that IDR's own capacity to contribute

to sustainable development turns in large measure on its capacity to act as an effective bridging institution itself.

ONG/Banque mondiale

Les répertoires des projets financés par la Banque mondiale avec possibilité d'une participation des ONG a été remis à jour en septembre 1989. Il répertorie tous les projets financés par la Banque Mondiale et pour lesquels une collaboration avec des ONG peut être envisagée.

World Bank, International Economic Relations Division, Strategic Planning and Review Department, 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington D.C. 20433, U.S.A.

New... Creations...

Representatives of the associations for English studies in the European Community met in London on July 15 under the chairmanship of Martin Dodsworth to discuss the formation of a European Society for the Study of English. Piero Boitani (Rome) was elected as chairman of an Organizing Committee.

According to its draft constitution the society will consist of a federation of national associations for teachers of English in higher education in the European Community. Membership of the society will follow automatically from membership of any national association. Teachers from countries such as Greece and Holland where no national association exists may be able to join on an individual basis. The society is also interested in exploring forms of association with European countries which are not members of the European Community.

The proposed aims of the society include arranging biennial or triennial European conferences ; fostering research in specialist areas ; providing an information network for English studies in the European Community ; assisting colleagues with course development, documentation and resourcing ; developing European understanding of English languages, literatures and cultures, including those other than British ; and developing relationships with colleagues studying English in other European coun-

New... Creations... New... Creations...

tries and other parts of the world, especially in developing nations.

The inaugural conference of ESSE is booked for the University of East Anglia, Norwich, from 4 to 8 September 1991. The Organizing Committee of ESSE is, through national associations, inviting suggestions for workshop themes and convenors from colleagues in the European Community. The committee will meet in January and the conference will then be formally advertised with a call for papers.

Correspondence about the society can be addressed to : *Professor Piero Boitani, Chairman of the Organizing Committee of ESSE, Department of English, Università Roma, Villa Mirafiori, Via Carlo Fea 2, Roma 00161, Italy;*

and to : *Dr Robert Clark, Secretary of the Organizing Committee of ESSE, School of English and American Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TT, England.*

European Citizen Action Service (EGAS) a été créé dans le but d'informer, de conseiller et de renforcer la position des ONG auprès des institutions de la Communauté européenne, et servira de point focal aux ONG dans leurs relations avec la CE.

Euro Citizen Action Service (ECAS), 22B rue de Toulouse, 1040 Bruxelles, Belgique.

Un réseau des universités des capitales européennes vient d'être créé à Bruxelles. Vingt-et-une universités étaient présentes à cette première réunion: l'Université Friedrich-Willems de Bonn, l'Université libre et l'Université technique de Berlin, l'Université libre de Bruxelles, la Vrije universiteit Brussel, l'Université de Copenhague, l'Université Complutense et Autonoma de Madrid, les universités Paris I, III et IV, celles de Strasbourg, l'Université d'Athènes, l'University College de Dublin, les universités La Sapienza et Tor Vergata de Rome, le Centre universitaire du Luxembourg, l'Université d'Amsterdam, l'Université nouvelle de Lisbonne, les universités de Londres et d'Edimbourg. La raison d'être de ce réseau a été expliquée par M. Verhaegen, recteur de l'ULB, qui est à l'origine de cette initiative, et qui a souligné que, *au-delà des contacts individuels entre personnels académiques, un engagement institutionnel des universités était nécessaire pour structurer les initiatives, pour stimuler les secteurs où la collaboration européenne n'émerge pas spontanément et pour accroître leur participation aux programmes européens ».*

Le choix des universités des capitales, qui n'est pas exclusif, le réseau se voulant souple, s'explique par leurs caractères communs : le large échantillon des disciplines, le fait qu'elles sont confrontées aux problèmes

urbains des grandes métropoles (manque d'espace, transports, logement), etc. Un groupe de coordination élaborera des lignes générales d'action et des groupes de recherche étudieront des problèmes spécifiques. L'un deux, consacré aux politiques urbaines (environnement et écologie urbains, aménagement du territoire, transports, santé publique) est coordonné par l'Université d'Amsterdam; un autre, qui traitera des problèmes liés à la mobilité et à l'accueil des étudiants (logement, transports, formation linguistique...), est coordonné par l'Université de Copenhague. Un troisième, baptisé Jean Monnet et coordonné par l'Université La Sapienza, travaillera à la diffusion des études européennes et s'occupera des problèmes liés aux équivalences des titres. Un dernier point abordé a été celui de l'information et de la communication à l'intérieur du réseau et avec les autres institutions universitaires problème que tous les responsables jugent essentiel pour mieux favoriser les échanges des étudiants.

(Franco Rizzi, *Le Monde*, 9.2.90)

Un ambitieux projet de « Réseau de musées européens », qui permettra aux visiteurs de bénéficier des plus récentes techniques de télécommunication pour en apprendre davantage sur les œuvres présentées et tout ce qui peut s'y rapporter, vient d'être lancé sous l'égide de l'Unesco.

Mis sur pied par le Conseil international des musées (ICOM) avec le concours de neuf musées européens et de plusieurs sociétés industrielles et instituts de recherches, le projet, baptisé European Museum Network (EMN) s'étalera sur quatre ans et sera pleinement opérationnel pour l'exposition universelle de Seville en 1992.

Il permettra, par exemple, à un visiteur, se trouvant devant le fameux « Repas de Noce » du peintre flamand Pieter Bruegel de se renseigner sur l'évolution des rites du mariage en Flandre mais aussi dans d'autres pays du monde (exemple le mariage impérial chinois). Il pourra aussi entendre des morceaux de musique enregistrés sur les instruments anciens représentés sur le tableau et les voir fabriquer, tout apprendre sur les robes de mariées ou le mode de fabrication des bijoux

ine linguistique des paroles des chansons de circonstance alors en usage.

Il lui suffira pour cela de pianoter sur un terminal placé près du tableau et qui lui indiquera, soit par une voix artificielle, soit par un texte inscrit sur l'écran, les choix qui s'offrent à lui. Toutes les données choisies et obtenues pourront ensuite être imprimées et emportées par le visiteur.

Le coût du projet, environ 11 millions d'écus (environ 12 millions de dollars) sera pris en charge pour moitié par le programme RACE (Recherche sur les technologies de communication avancées en Europe), lancé en 1987 par la Commission des Communautés européennes (CEE) pour développer la compétitivité de l'industrie européenne des télécommunications, sa technologie et ses services.

Les neuf musées de différentes disciplines (art, architecture, ethnologie, technique) choisis pour la première étape de ce projet-pilote sont le Deutsche Architekturmuseum de Francfort, le Deutsche Schiffahrtsmuseum de Brème (musée national maritime de RFA), le Musée des antiquités nationales de Saint-Germain-en-Laye, la Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian de Lisbonne, la Kunsthalle de Hambourg, le Musée archéologique national de Madrid, le Musée d'Art moderne Reina Sofia de Madrid, le Musée national du Danemark de Copenhague et enfin l'Übersee-Museum de Brème (relatant notamment l'histoire du commerce entre cette ville hanséatique et ses partenaires commerciaux d'outre-mer, en particulier dans les anciennes colonies allemandes).

Le projet pourra ensuite être élargi à d'autres « musées associés ».

Trois instituts de recherches - le Centre des sciences de musique et de loisirs (ZMF) et l'Institut Fraunhofer de recherche des systèmes et de l'innovation (ISI), tous deux situés à Karlsruhe, et le Bildarchiv Foto de Marburg - participent au projet.

Cinq entreprises industrielles basées à Stuttgart, Nuremberg, Berlin-Ouest, Madrid et Lisbonne travaillent actuellement à la réalisation du support technique de l'opération : mise au point d'un système intégral d'information sur l'art, configuration

du matériel informatique, télévision par câble, systèmes de télécommunication et de télématique, etc.

(*La Wallonie*, 28.8.89)

Une Assemblée constitutive de l'Association méditerranéenne des journalistes et écrivains du tourisme (AMJET) s'est tenue le 18 octobre 1989. C'est à l'unanimité que les quelque 120 participants en provenance de 16 pays ont choisi la Tunisie comme siège de la nouvelle association et ont élu M. Tijani Haddad (Tunisie) au poste de président. L'Italie, l'Espagne, le Maroc, l'Égypte et la France ont été élus au poste de vice-présidents.

(*Nouvelles de l'OMT*, nov.-déc. 1989)

L'Assemblée de l'Organisation internationale de télécommunications maritimes par satellites (INMARSAT) a décidé de modifier la Convention portant création d'INMARSAT pour permettre à INMARSAT d'offrir des services mobiles terrestres de télécommunications par satellites à l'échelle mondiale.

INMARSAT est l'organisation internationale au sein de laquelle 55 pays membres coopèrent à l'exploitation d'un système de satellites pour les communications mobiles. L'Organisation, qui a son siège à Londres, a été créée par une convention adoptée en 1976 sous les auspices de l'OMI. Elle jouera un rôle de plus en plus important dans les télécommunications maritimes à la suite de la mise en place du Système mondial de détresse et de sécurité en mer (SMDSM) dans les années 90. INMARSAT offre actuellement des services de téléphone, de télex, de télécopie et de transmission de données à plus de 8.000 navires en mer, ainsi que des services analogues aux aéroports.

INMARSAT s'emploie activement à mettre au point une gamme de moyens de transmission de données destinées aux services mobiles terrestres, tels que : radiomessagerie dans les deux sens, gestion des parcs de véhicules, indication automatique de la position, alerte en cas d'urgence, ainsi que de services terrestres de télésurveillance et de télécommande. Ces services utiliseront des stations terrestres peu onéreuses et com-

paces, suffisamment petites pour être installées sur n'importe quel véhicule ou pour pouvoir même être portées à la main.

(Nouvelles de l'OMI n° 2, 1989)

Au sein de la Ligue internationale des associations pour les personnes handicapées mentales vient d'être créée une Association européenne de l'ILSMH. En sont membres effectifs, avec droit de vote, les associations nationales membres de la Ligue internationale et établies dans les pays de la Communauté européenne, ainsi que les organisations européennes membres associés de la Ligue internationale. Le conseil d'administration comprend dix personnes de huit nationalités différentes : néerlandaise, irlandaise, britannique, danoise, allemande, française et espagnole.

Le siège est établi Avenue Louise 248, 1^{er} étage, 1050 Bruxelles.

Les Annexes au *Moniteur belge* du 11 janvier 1990 publient les statuts du European Bureau for Conservation and Development (EBCD), association internationale bénéficiant de la loi belge du 25 octobre 1919. Elle a pour objet « l'étude, la définition et/ou la mise en œuvre de tous moyens techniques, contractuels, réglementaires ou autres susceptibles de contribuer à la promotion, à la conservation et à la gestion des milieux naturels européens et plus généralement de concourir à la diffusion et aux objectifs de la stratégie mondiale de la conservation, notamment l'utilisation durable des espèces et des écosystèmes. L'association réalise son objet dans la plus large collaboration avec les institutions de la CEE et toutes organisations nationales ou internationales, publiques ou privées ayant des préoccupations similaires. »

Les membres effectifs sont des personnes physiques. Le conseil d'administration compte actuellement 5 personnes de 5 nationalités : allemande, belge, canadienne, française et néerlandaise. Le président est B. des Clers de Beaumets, directeur de la Fondation internationale pour la sauvegarde du gibier ; K.A. Brynaert, vice-président de la Canadian Wildlife Federation et Yves Lecocq, secrétaire général de la Fédération des associa-

tions de chasseurs de la CEE, sont respectivement vice-président et secrétaire général de l'EBCD.

Le siège est fixé Rue de la Science 9, B-1040 Bruxelles.

Le 6 juin s'est tenue la réunion constitutive de Europe 2000, Association internationale, apolitique, elle a pour objet l'étude systématique et la promotion des conditions susceptibles de favoriser le maintien de l'état de droit fondé sur le respect des droits de l'homme dans la société européenne du deuxième millénaire. Dans ce but Europe 2000 se livrera à différentes activités : information, publications et éditions, organisation de colloques et séminaires, consultations à des organismes publics et privés, actions en justice.

Le premier conseil d'administration désigné comprend 8 personnes de 5 nationalités différentes : Belgique, Espagne, Pays-Bas, Portugal, Suède. Le président est W.Ch.J.M. Van Lanschot (Pays-Bas) et le secrétaire général trésorier T. Sleswijk Visser (Pays-Bas).

Le siège est établi Bd de L'Empereur 24, B-1000 Bruxelles.

Réunis en congrès à Singapour du 23 au 27 mai 1989, des représentants du personnel enseignant, originaires de 12 pays asiatiques, ont décidé la création d'une Fédération professionnelle asiatique pour l'enseignement. Cette décision répond au vœu exprimé par le 11^e congrès de la Fraternité des syndicalistes d'Asie (BATU) qui s'était tenu en décembre 1988. La mise sur pied de cette fédération se fera en collaboration avec la BATU et la Confédération syndicale mondiale des enseignants (CSME).

(Labor, n°3, 1989).

L'Annexe au *Moniteur belge* du 9 novembre 1989 publie les statuts de la Confédération d'associations d'écoles indépendantes de la Communauté européenne (CADEICE) qui a le statut d'association internationale selon la loi belge du 25 octobre 1919. L'association a pour objet de : regrouper des associations d'écoles indépendantes des pays membres de la Communauté européenne, en vue de contribuer à la réalisation du droit à l'enseignement dans le respect du pluralisme et du droit des parents à choisir l'enseignement de leurs enfants, tels que ces droits et intérêts

résultent et sont protégés par les systèmes juridiques et les traditions éducatives des pays européens, ainsi que les instruments internationaux ayant application en la matière ; promouvoir les intérêts de l'enseignement indépendant, quels que soient les principes religieux, philosophiques ou sociaux qui en forment le fondement, pour autant qu'ils soient conformes à la déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme. Peuvent devenir membres les associations d'écoles indépendantes qui souscrivent à ces principes et qui, indépendamment de leur mode de financement, ne font pas partie du secteur de l'enseignement public dans leurs pays respectifs. La présidente est Mme Claude Duval (France), le vice-président Alvaro Fernandez (Espagne), la secrétaire Mme Kartali-Moraiti (Grèce) et la trésorière Mme Bosquet-Bigwood (Belgique).

Le secrétariat est établi à 15424 Psihico, Athènes. Le siège social est fixé Avenue Montana 15, B-1180 Bruxelles.

Le 29 mars 1989 a été créée à Bruxelles l'association dénommée Aviation Research and Development Institute (ARDI). Elle a pour objet de : étudier les problèmes économiques, humains, politiques et techniques propres à l'aviation civile en vue de rechercher et proposer des solutions adéquates, d'analyser les besoins et techniques propres à l'aviation civile dans les pays en voie de développement et de formuler les recommandations appropriées. Le président est Jean Laurent Martial (belge), président honoraire du Bureau international des containers, le secrétaire général Adrianus Groenewege (hollandais), président de l'International Aviation Development Corporation.

Le siège est établi à B-1140 Evere, rue P. van Obberghen 50. (Annexe au *Moniteur belge* du 21 décembre 1989)

Le 16 septembre 1989 s'est tenue à Bruxelles l'assemblée constitutive du Centre international de documentation Marguerite Yourcenar (CIDMY). Il groupe exclusivement des personnalités belges telles que Georges Sion et Baudouin de Grunne. Le Centre a pour objet de faire connaître en Belgique, et à l'étranger, à un

large public, l'œuvre de Marguerite Yourcenar, de la répertoirer, de collecter et diffuser les informations les plus variées sur son œuvre et sa biographie ainsi que sur les œuvres qu'elle a pu inspirer ou influencer ou desquelles elle s'est elle-même inspirée.
Adresse : rue de la Samaritaine 46 bte 2, 1000 Bruxelles.

L'Annexe au *Moniteur belge* du 28 décembre 1989 publie les statuts de l'European Lung Cancer Working Party, association internationale régie par la loi belge du 25 octobre 1919. Les membres effectifs, fondateurs, sont au nombre de 10 de 4 nationalités différentes: Belgique, France, Italie,

Luxembourg. L'association a pour objet d'encourager et de développer la coopération européenne dans le domaine de la recherche sur le cancer pulmonaire. Le président est Jean Klastersky (Belgique) et le secrétaire trésorier Jean Paul Sculier (Belgique),
Le siège est établi : rue Heger Bordet 1, 1000 Bruxelles.

On the suggestion of the International Network for a UN Second Assembly (INFUSA) at the annual World Citizens Assembly in New York City in October 1989, a group of organizations agreed to sponsor the first of a series of international Conferences on a more Democratic United Nations (CAMDUN).

The conference will be open to delegates from all interested organizations and institutions, and to individuals with an internationalist and/or a globalist commitment.

The first conference will be held in New York City on 13-15 October 1990. The second is scheduled for a European capital in 1991, and it is hoped that the third can be held in India and the fourth in Australia. The target is that 1994-5 should see the beginning of a democratically strengthened UN system to meet the challenges of its second half-century.

DAMDUN-1 will provide an open forum for discussion of all relevant proposals on the strengthening of the UN system by democratic input from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the public, and parliamentarians.

Endorsements for the Conference have been received (as on 1 December 1989) from : UNESCO Peace Education Laureate Dr Robert Muller. Dr. Hanna Newcombe (Director, Peace Research Institute, Dundas), and Professors Frank Bamaby, Benjamin Ferencz, André Frank, John Fried, Robert Manley and Saul Mendlowitz.

Book Review

The Laws of Life: Another Development and the New Biotechnologies,
by Gary Fowler, Eva Lachkovics, Pat Mooney and Hope Shand.
Development Dialogue, the journal of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden,
1988: 1-2.

Biotechnology is being touted by many of its proponents as the most significant scientific breakthrough since the discovery of fire. The power of this technology is indeed great. And its importance to the future of agriculture and health care is indisputable. But will this powerful new technology be used to solve society's problems or will it merely increase them or create new ones?

This question provides the focus for a pathbreaking new study released by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and the Rural Advancement Fund International, « *The Laws of Life: Another Development and the New Biotechnologies* », provides the first comprehensive examination of the possible negative social and economic impacts of biotechnology.

The authors look primarily at the consequences for the Third World. There, they predict that overproduction and transfer of production of some crops from the fields of the Third World to corporate laboratories will produce massive economic disruption

and unemployment. They note that « *Any new technology introduced into a society which is not fundamentally just will exacerbate the disparities between rich and poor* ». Case studies of several crops indicate that this process is already well underway.

Much of the genetic material upon which biotechnology is based is found in the Third World. This diversity, already of great importance to the agricultural and pharmaceuticals industries, will increase in value as the new technologies begin to use and manipulate it more efficiently. Political and economic struggles over control of «genetic resources» and biotechnology are certain to intensify, according to the authors.

The use of biotechnology to create a new biological warfare arms race is also explored. Will crop diseases inflicted anonymously be used to bring nations to their knees in the future? This technology which is unlocking the secrets of life, may, the authors

speculate, find its most tragic use in the destruction of life.

Stressing that there is genuine potential for constructive uses of biotechnology, «*The Laws of Life*» outlines more than 30 recommendations aimed at national governments, the United Nations system, the private sector and the «third system» of citizen groups and religious organizations.

The authors are working for the Rural Advancement Fund International (RAFI) and can be reached under the following addresses:

Gary Fowler and Hope Shand, The Rural Advancement Fund International, P.O. Box 1029, Pittsboro, NC 27312, USA, phone (919) 542-5292.

Pat Mooney, The Rural Advancement Fund International, R.R. 1 (Beresford), Brandon, Manitoba R7A 5Y1, Canada, phone (204) 483-3955.

* *Development Dialogue* may be ordered from the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in Uppsala (address on letterhead). Price (North America and Europe) : institutional USD 30 excl. postage, individual USD 15 excl. postage.

Bibliographie

UAI Current Publications

Yearbook of International Organizations / ed. by UAI-München, New York, London, Paris: Saur, 1989-26th ed. 1989/1990. - 30cm. - ISSN 0084-3814: FB 27.900; DM 1298.00.

Vol. 1 Organization Descriptions and Index. 1473 p. + Appendices (15). - ISBN 3-598-22201-7: DM 498.00; FB 10.700.

Organization descriptions (24.209 entries)

The non-profit organizations included may be intergovernmental, non-governmental, or mixed in character. They cover every field of human activity. Descriptions, varying in length from several lines to several pages, are grouped into the following sections:

- Federations of international organizations
- Universal membership organizations
- Inter-continental organizations
- Regional membership organizations
- Semi-autonomous bodies
- Organizations of special form
- Internationally-oriented national bodies
- Inactive and dissolved bodies

Religious orders and fraternities

Contents of descriptions

The descriptions, based almost entirely on data by the organizations themselves, include:

- Organization names in all relevant languages
- Principal and secondary addresses
- Main activities and programmes
- Personal and finances
- Technical and regional commissions
- History, goals, structure
- Inter-organizational links
- Languages used
- Membership by country

Multilingual index (110.000)

The computer-generated index provides the most detailed available means of identifying international bodies. Access is possible via:

- Organization names in English, French, and other working languages
- Former names in various languages
- Name initials or abbreviations in various languages
- Organization subject categories in English, French, German, Russian and Spanish
- Personal names of principal executive officers.

Vol. 2 International Organization Participation : Country Directory of Secretariats and Membership (Geographic Volume). 7th ed. 1989/90. - s.p. - ISBN 3-598-22202-5: DM 498.00; FB 10.700.

Secretariat countries (Section S). This part lists by country the international organizations which maintain headquarters or other offices in that country. Address are given in each case.

Membership countries (Section M). This part lists, for each country, the international organizations which have members in that country. For each organization listed, the international headquarters address is given, in whatever country that is located.

Vol. 3 Global Action Network : Classified Directory by Subject and Region (Subject Volume). - 7th ed. 1989/90. - s.p. ISBN 3-598-22203-3: DM 498.00; FB 10.700. Classified by subject (Sections W, X). This part over 8,000 international organizations to their according to their principal preoccupations. Subjects however are grouped into both general and detailed categories, as well as on the basis of interdisciplinary subject combinations. The classification scheme highlights functional relationships between distinct preoccupations.

Classified by region (Section Y). This part lists international organizations according to the region with which they are particularly concerned.

International Congress Calendar/ed. by UAI. - Brussels: UAI, 1990.-30th ed. 1990, 30 cm. - ISSN 0538-6349 : DM 42800 ; FB 8.990; Vol.1 : 382 p. : DM 140.00 ; FB 2.940; Vol.2: 472 p. : DM 130.000; FB 2.400; Vol.3: 462 p. : DM 130.00 ; FB 2.400 ; Vol.4 : DM 130 ; FB 2.400.

The International Congress Calendar is intended as a convenient reference work for anyone seeking information on international events. From the 23rd edition (1983) the Calendar appears quarterly. Each of the four volumes is self-contained including indexes. Amendments and additions occurring between volumes are specially indicated so that every issue contains the most up-to-date information on international events. Again, this year events listed in the Calendar have increased considerably. All the information on these events is derived from primary sources, i.e. the organizations themselves through regular questionnaire mailings. The proven structure of the Calendar remains unchanged, ensuring convenient access to all events by means of : a geographical section, a chronological section and a subject/organizations index.

Encyclopaedia of World Problems and Human Potential/ed. by UAI. - München, New York, London, Paris: Saur, 1990. - 3rd ed. - ISBN 3-598-10842-7. World Problems and Human Potential now in its third edition, is a comprehensive source of information on world problems that have been recognized, on how they are perceived to be interrelated, and on the human resources available to challenge them. Detailed sections draw attention to a variety of alternative insights into the ways in which human development and the world problématique mutually inhibit, enable, and provoke each other.

International Association Statutes Series / ed. by UAI - München, New York, London, Paris: Saur, 1988. - 30 cm - ISSN 0933-2588. Vol. 1. 1 ed. - 600 p, 30 cm. - ISBN 3-598-21671-8 (Saur München): DM 460.00.

The first volume includes the official texts of nearly 600 statutes of international nongovernmental organizations described in Sections A, B, C of the Yearbook of International Organizations, namely bodies with membership in countries in at least two continents. Future volumes will include statutes of organizations from other sections, namely regional bodies and those of a less conventional structure. They may also include statutes of lesser known intergovernmental bodies or those of a hybrid governmental/nongovernmental nature. In contrast to the Yearbook series, each volume of the Statute series will only include information not published in previous volumes of the series.

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YEARBOOK OF

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

26th edition 1989 / 90

Changes of address

----- ADDRESS.....
 Chairman: Norman Acton, 25 East 21st Street, New York NY

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 966 CMTWCL B. Fax (32 2) 230 87 22.

Deputy SG and Secretariat: Richard C Hunter, 1021 Prince
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) SG: John C McKenzie, 1-7 Great Georges Street, London SU1P
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 222 75 00.

SG: Ian Martin, 1 Easton Street, London UC1X 80J, UK. T. (44
 1) 833 1771. C. Amnesty London WC1. Tx 28502. Fax (44 1) 833
 5100.

SG: David Martin, Poste Restante, Larkhill Post Office,
 Larkhill, Salisbury SP4 8PY, UK. T. (44 980) 33371 Ext 5446.
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Exec Dir: Ms Mary R DeMelim, 290 Westminster St, Providence
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Sec: Dr Manuel Hilgarth, Universitaets-Frauenklinik,
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 237969 IAA UR. Fax (1 212) 983 0455.

Sec: Larry E Price, PO Box AAA, Newington CT 06111, USA. T.
 (1 203) 666 1541. fx 650215-5052 MCI. Fax (1 203) 665 7531.
 ASSOCIATIONS TRANSNATIONALES, 1/1990 59

REF NAME.....	ADDRESS.....
6B1223 International Association for the Physical Sciences of the Ocean (IAPSO)	SG: Dr Robert E Stevenson. PO Box 1161, Del Mar CA 92014-1161, USA. T. (1 619) 481 0850.
6B1240 International Association for the study of the Liver (IASL)	Sec-Treas: Dr Johannes Bircher, Univ of Witten/Herdecke, Beckweg 4 D-5804 Herdecke, Germany FR. T. (49 2330) 62 35 82.
6B1246 International Association of Agricultural Economists (IAAE)	Sec-Treas: R J Hildreth, 1211 W 22nd Street, Suite 216, Oak Brook IL 60521, USA. T. (1 708) 571 9393.
BB1276 International Association of Educators for World Peace (IAEWP)	Exec Vice-Pres: Prof Charles Merclieca, PO Box 3282, Mastin Lake Station, Huntsville AL 35810-0282, USA. T. (1 205) 534 5501- Tx 9102405482. Fax (1 205) 851 9157.
BB1326 International Association of Physical Education and Sport for Girls and Women (IAPESGW)	Sec-Treas: Janet Grier, 25 Kelly St, Doncaster VIC 3108, Australia. SG: Prof Dr F Surlyk, Geological Survey of Greenland, Rooster Voldgade 10, DK-1350 Kobenhavn K, Denmark.
6B1342 International Association of Sedimentologists (IAS)	SG-Treas: Prof Robert G Wetzel, Dept of Biology, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa AL 35487- 0344, USA. T. (1 205) 348 1793. Fax (1 205) 348 6544.
BB1362 International Association of Theoretical and Applied Limnology (IAL)	Pres: William H McLin, Epilepsy Foundation of America, 4351 Garden City Drive, Suite 406, Landover MD 20785. USA. T (1 301) 459 3700.
BB1413 International Bureau for Epilepsy (IBE)	Mediterranean Community: c/o CAP Napoli, Piazzale Pisacane I-80133 Napoli, Italy. T. (39 81) 266566. Tx 721271 CAPNA.
BB1444 International Cargo Handling Coordination Association (ICHCA)	SG: Ibrahim F I Shihata, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433, USA. T. (1 202) 477 1234. C. ICSID.
BB1720 International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC)	Exec Dir: Dr Lawrence Shaw, 1901 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Suite 201, Washington DC 20006, USA. T. (1 202) 463 6660 - (1 202) 463 6661 - (1 202) 463 6662. C. ICAC Washington DC. Tx 701517. Fax (1 202) 463 6950.
BB1775 International Criminal Police Organization - Interpol (ICPO-Interpol)	Hailing Adress: BP 6041, F-69411 Lyon CEDEX 06, France. Pres: Barber B Conable, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433, USA. T. (1 202) 477 12 34. C. Indevas.
BB1791 International Development Association (IDA)	SG: Curtis J Hogan, 435 So Newport Way, Denver CO 80224, USA. T. (1 303) 388 9237. C. IFPCW. Tx 450711 ILRS DENVER.
BB1975 International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers (IFPCW)	Secretariat: Av des Arts 1, Bte 5, B- 1040 Bruxelles, Belgium. T. (32 2) 219 45 37. Tx 63393.
BB2103 International Hockey Federation (IHF)	SG: Prof John Edmonds, The St George Hospital, Dept of Rheumatology, Kogarah, Sydney 2217, Australia.
BB2195 International League Against Rheumatism (ILAR)	Exec Dir: George D Hoffman, 345 Woodcliff Drive, Fairport NY 14450, USA. T. (1 716) 383 8330. Tx 67 14921 IHC UW. Fax (1 716) 383 8442.
BB2261 International Information Management Congress (IHC)	Chairman: A James H Singer, 777 UN Plaza, New York NY 10017-3521, USA. T. (1 212) 949 8480. C. IPACADEHY.
BB2339 International Peace Academy (IPA)	SG: Elise Boulding, Campus Box 327, University of Colorado, Boulder CO 80309-0580, USA. T. (1 303) 492 2550. Tx GILA 910 940 3441 LASP UNIV COLO. Fax (1 303) 492 5105.
BB2341 International Peace Research Association (IPRA)	Pres: Gen Sven Thofelt, Sköldvägen 32, S-182 61 Djursholm, Sweden. T. (46 8) 755 39 88.
BB2346 International Modern Pentathlon and Biathlon Union	SG: Marie-Louise Heiri, Zollikerstr 128, CH-8008 Zurich, Switzerland. T. (41 1) 55 38 39.
BB2355 International Philatelic Federation	Acting Exec Dir: Robert G Jones, 800 Barksdale Road, PO Box 8139, Newark DE 19714, USA. T. (1 302) 731 1600 Ext 20.
BB2401 International Reading Association (IRA)	Exec Vice Pres and Mailing Address: PO Box 309, Sharbot Lake KOH 2PO, Canada. T. (1 613) 279 31 72 - (1 613) 279 31 73. Fax (1 613) 279 31 30.
BB2404 World Leisure and Recreation Association (WLRA)	Pres: W Gerald Wilson, 525 School Street NW, Washington DC 20024, USA. T. (1 202) 554 2106. C. 'INTROADFED' - Washington. Tx 440336 INRF-UI, Washington. Fax (1 202) 479 0828.
BB2418 International Road Federation (IRF)	SG: Dr John A Jr Boswick, 2005 Franklin St. Suite 660, Denver CO 80205, USA. T. (1 303) 839 1694.
BB2474 International Society for Burn Injuries (ISBI)	SG: Jean-Paul Risch, PO Box 1715, L-1017 Luxembourg, Luxembourg. T. (352) 49 53 70.
BB2503 International Society for Research on Civilization Diseases and Environment	SG: Prof Marie-José Himbault- Huard, 164 rue de la Pompe,
BB2547 Société internationale d'histoire de la médecine	
BB2559 International Society of Nephrology (ISN)	
BB2573 International Society of Dermatology: Tropical, Geographic, and Ecologie	

F-75116 Paris, France.
Trees: Robert W Schrier. Univ of
Colorado, School of
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179, 4200 East Ninth Ave,
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303) 270 7765,
SG: Dr Maria Melida Duran
de Rueda, Aptdo Aéreo
90123,
Bogota 8, Colombia.
Pres: Sigfrid A Muller, 200 First
St SW, Rochester MN 55905,
USA. T. (1 507) 284 3736.
60 TRANSNATIONAL
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REF NAME.....	ADDRESS.....
.....	Dir Gen: Dean Burch, INTELSAT, 3400 Internat Drive NW Washington DC 20008-3098, USA, T. (1 202) 944 680. Tx
BB2627 International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT)	89-2707/64290 SG: M Fickelson, RILEM, Ecole Normale Supérieure Pavillon du CROUS, 61 ave du Président Wilson, F-94235 Cachan CEDEX,
B62784 International Union of Testing and Research Laboratories for Materials and Structures	France, T. (33 1) 47 40 08 59. Fax: (33 1) 47 40 01 13 SG: W Daniel Lamey, 400 University Drive PO Box 140577
BB2853 Junior Chamber International (JCI)	Coral Gables FL 33114, USA. T. (1 305) 446 7608. C. JAYCEES. Tx 441084. Fax: (1 305) 442 0041.
BB3404 Universal Federation of Travel Agents' Associations (UFTAA)	Secretariat: 17 rue Grimaldi, 98000 Monaco, Monaco, T. (33 93) 50 00 28. Fax (33 93) 15 96 77
BB3504 World Crafts Council (WCC)	SG: John Vedel-Rieper, PO Box 2045, DK-1012 Koebenhavn K Denmark. T. (45) 42 86 18 87 - (45) 31 46 10 60 C
BB3529 World Federation of Neurology	WORLD CRAFT Copenhagen. Tx OK FOTEX 16600 attention WORLD CRAFT Copenhagen. Fax (45) 42 86 03 47
BB3577 World Psychiatric Association (WPA)	WORLD CRAFT Copenhagen.
BB3613 World's Poultry Science Association (WPSA)	Sec Treas Gen: Dr F Clifford Rose, Academic Unit of Neuroscience, Charing Cross Hospital, London W6 8RF, UK. T. (44 1) 741 7833. Fax (44 1) 741 7808.
BB3651 Screen Printing Association International (SPAI)	SG: Prof Dr F H Schulsinger, Dept of Psychiatry, Kommunehospitalet, 1399 Kobenhavn K, Denmark. T. (45 1) 93
BB3913 International Phenomenological Society	85 00 Ext 3390. Sec: Rosé-Marie Wegner, Peter- Schütze-Weg 11, D-3102 Herrnansburg, Germany FR.
BB4016 Airport Operators Council International (AOCI)	Pres: John H Crawford, 10015 Main Street, Fairfax VA 22031-3489, USA. T. (1 703) 385 1335. C. Interspa, Washington DC. Tx 904059 WSH. Fax (1 703) 273 0456.
BB4117 International Society of Citriculture (CISC)	Pres: Prof Ernest Sosa, Box 1947. Brown University, Providence RI 02912, USA. T. (1 401) 863 2718.
BB4125 International Water Resources Association (IWRA)	Int Headquarters: 1220 19th Street NU, Suite 200, Washington DC 20036, USA. T. (1 202) 293 8500. Fax (1 202) 331 13621
BB4446 International Softball Federation (ISF)	Sec-Treas: Charles W Jr Coggins, Botany and Plant Sciences, University of California, Riverside CA 92521, USA. T. (1 714) 787 4412. Fax (1 714) 787 4437.
BB4531 International Association for Hydrogen Energy (IAHE)	SG: Glenn E Stout, 205 North Mathews, University of Illinois, Urbana IL 61801, USA. T. (1 217) 333 6275. Tx 5101011969 UI TELCOM URUD. Fax (1 217) 333 8046.
BB4589 International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP)	Pres: Don E Porter, 2801 NE 50th Street, Oklahoma City OK 73111, USA. T. (1 405) 424 5266. C. INTSF. Tx 796143 ASAI SF
BB4601 International Association of School Librarianship (IASL)	OKC. Fax (1 405) 424 3855. Pres: T Nejat Veziroglu, PO Box 24 82 66, Coral Gables FL 33124, USA. T. (1 305) 284 4666.
BB4622 World Council for Curriculum and Instruction (WCCI)	Exec Office: Louisa E Jones, 909 NE 43 Street, Rm 306, Seattle WA 98105-6020, USA. T. (1 206) 547 6409. Tx 265214 PAIN UR. Fax (1 206) 547 1703.
BB4626 World Amateur Golf Council (WAGC)	Exec Sec: Dr Jean E Lowrie, PO Box 1486, Kalamazoo MI 49005, USA. T. (1 616) 343 5728. Exec Sec: Maxine Dunfee, School of Education, Indiana University, Bloomington IN 47405, USA. T. (1 812) 855 4702.
BB5216 International Council of Psychologists (ICP)	Joint Sec: P J Boatwright, Golf House, PO Box 708, Far Hills NJ 07931-0708, USA. T. (1 201) 234 2300. C. Usgolf. Fax (1 201) 234 9687.
BB5221 International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)	SG: Dr Patricia W Cautley, 4805 Regent St, Madison WI 53705, USA. T. (1 608) 238 5373. Exec Dir: Robert N Sempler, 540 Madison Avenue, 21 St Floor, New York NY 10022, USA. T. (1 212) 486 2446. Tx 640428. Fax (1 212) 751 1614.
BB5367 International Society of Tropical Foresters (ISTF)	Pres: Warren T Doolittle, 5400 Grosvenor Lane, Bethesda MD 20814, USA. T. (1 301) 897 8720.
BB6S55 International Association of Dento-Maxillo-Facial Radiology (IADHFR)	Contact: Prof Robert P Langlais, Dental Diagnostic Sc, UTHSC Dental School, 7703 Curt Floyd Drive, San Antonio TX 78284, USA. Permanent Sec: Dr Carol L Abell, PO Box 579, Santa Claus IN 47579-0579, USA. Pres: Thomas E Brown, Center for Electronic Records, NI
B89313 Federation of International Poetry Associations (FIPA)	
DC0051 International Association for Social Science Information Service and Technology (IASSIST)	
CC0064 Strategic Management Society (SMS)	
CC0075 World Federation of Acupuncture Societies (WFAS)	
CC0106 International Society of Phonetic Sciences (ISPhS)	

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ASSOCIATIONS TRANSNATIONALES, 1/1990 61

REF NAME.....	ADDRESS.....
DC0112 World Federation of Building Service Contractors (WFBSC)	Exec Vice-Pres: Carol A Dean, 10201 Lee Highway, Suite 225 Fairfax VA 22030, USA. Last known address: Orly, France.
CC0266 International Air Safety Association (IASA)	Pres: Prof P M Suter, Surgical Intensive Care Hospital, Cantonal University, CH-1211 Genève 4, Switzerland.
CC0334 World Federation of Societies of Intensive and Critical Care Medicine	Sec: Diana Halliday, c/o Ministry of Defence, St Christopher House, Room 9/145, Southwark Street, London SE1 OTD, UK. T. (44 1S 921 13 55.
EC0358 Commonwealth Advisory Aeronautical Research Council (CAARC)	Last known address: Sundsvall, Sweden. Sec: Dr D Blake, Dept of Geology, NHB 245, Univ of Illinois
CC0377 World Flying Disc Federation (WDF)	1301 W Green St, Urbana IL 61801, USA.
CC0379 International Bryozoology Association (IBA)	SG: J E Gibson, The Dow Chemical Company, 1803 Building, Midland MI 48640, USA.
CC0385 International Union of Toxicology (IUTOX)	!!! NO ADDRESS !!! SG: Bernard Mattelaer, Romeinselaan 6, B-8500 Kortrijk, Belgium.
CC0398 International Destination Management Association (IDMA)	Exec Dir: Dr Kjell Roos, PO Box 1644, S-751 46 Uppsala, Sweden. T. (46 18) 17 51 58. Fax (46 18) 17 50 31.
CC1124 International Academy of the History of Pharmacy	Last known address: Paris, France. Sec: Jane Forman, Dept of Economics, Room 700, Hew York University, 269 Mercer Street, New York NY 10003, USA. T. (1 212) 924 4386. Fax (1 212) 366 5067.
CC1173 International Association for Accident and Traffic Medicine (IAATM)	Head Office: c/o SVO, Sweelinck Plein 14, 2517 GK The Hague, Netherlands. T. <31 70) 46 96 79 Ext 463. Fax (31 70) 46 96
CC1199 International Association for Medical Research and Cultural Exchange	SG: Leone de la Grandville, rue Beryer 9-11, F-75008 Paris, France. T. (33 1) 42 56 17 53. Chief Exec Officer: Etienne P Laurent, 61 Quai d'Orsay, F-75007 Paris, France. T. (33 1) 47 05 4S 43. C. cidesuca.
CC1206 International Association for Research in Income and Wealth (IARIW)	TX 206 387 F. Fax (33 1) 45 51 59 83.
CC1217 International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA)	SG: Jacques Desgraz, CP 1471, CH-1001 Lausanne, Switzerland. T. (41 21) 36 18 71. Fax (41 21) 36 48 66.
CC1255 International Association of Art Critics	Contact: Dr Fermin Villarroya, Departamento de Geodinamica, Fac de Ciencias Geologicas, Univ Complutense, 18040 Madrid, Spain. T. (34 1) 449 73 91. Tx 41793 UCGEO. Fax (34 1) 243 91 62.
CC1261 International Center for Companies of the Food Trade and Industry	Pres: Adolf Sprudz, University of Chicago, Law School Library, 1121 East 60th Street, Chicago IL 60637, USA.
CC1269 International Association of Crafts and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (IACME)	Exec Dir: Margareta Haag, Ostermalmgatan 19, S-114 26 Stockholm, Sweden.
CC1297 International Association of Hydrogeologists (IAH)	Pres: Dr Bengt Holmquist, National Swedish Museums of Military History, Box 14095, S-104 41 Stockholm, Sweden.
BC1300 International Association of Law Libraries (IALL)	SG: Jaroslav Aichler, Geological Survey, PO Box 65, 790 01 Jesenik, Czechoslovakia.
CC1310 International Association of Medical Laboratory Technologists (IAMLT)	Last known address: Glasgow, UK. Dir: Harald Krauss, Rue Albert-Elizabeth 40, B-1200 Bruxelles, Belgium. T. (32 2) 735 60 48. Fax (32 2) 735 69 74.
CC1317 International Association of Museums of Arms and Military History (IAMAM)	Exec Dir: William T Maloney, 13 Elm Street, PO Box 1564, Manchester MA 01944, USA. T. (1 508) 526 8330. Tx 940 103. Fax (1 508) 526 4018.
CC1378 International Association on the Genesis of Ore Deposits (IAGOD)	SG: Jan Daelemans, Station de recherche de Génie Rural, Van Gansberghelaan 115, B-9220 Merelbeke, Belgium. T. (32 91) 52 18 21. Fax (32 91) 52 15 83.
CC1403 International Bowling Board (IBB)	SG: Prof Mels van der Ploeg, Dept Cytochemistry and Cytometry, Sylvius Lab, Leiden University, 72 Wassenaarseweg, 2333 AL Leiden, Netherlands. T. (31 71) 27 61 91.
CC1431 International Association of Insurance and Reinsurance Intermediaries	Sec: Hans Laurell, Swedish Road Safety Office, S-78186 Borlänge, Sweden.
CC1443 International Society for Cardiovascular Surgery	Admin Sec: Eileen King, Room 812, 475 Riverside Drive, New York NY 10115, USA. T. (1 212) 870 3049. C. CHWOMENUN NY, USA.
CC154S International Commission of Agricultural Engineering	SG: Jochen Grönke, Grosser Hirschgraben 17-21, D-6000 Frankfurt-Main, Germany FR. T. (49 69) 1306318, Fax (49 69) 1306309.
CC1581 International Federation of Societies for Histochemistry and Cytochemistry (IFSHC)	SG: Steven J Brown, 421 Aviation Way, Frederick MD 21701. USA. T. (1 301) 695 2220. C. IAOPA, Tx 89 3445. Fax (1 301) 695 2375.
CC1628 International Committee on Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety (ICADTS)	62 TRANSNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, 1/1990
CC1641 International Committee for World Day of Prayer	
CC1643 International Booksellers Federation (IBF)	
CC1733 International Council of Aircraft Owner and Pilot Associations (IAOPA)	

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